The exploration of a safety attitude model for departmental safety representatives towards the implementation of a safety management system in an institute of tertiary education in Hong Kong by Li, Chi-moon
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL
THE EXPLORATION OF A SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL FOR
DEPARTMENTAL SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES TOWARDS THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN
AN INSTITUTE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION IN HONG KONG
being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the University of Hull
by
Chi-moon LI
Bachelor of Commerce in Marketing and Management - BCom (Curtin); 
Master of Applied Science in Safety Management - MAppSc (UWS)
(June, 2009)
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
The following work has been completed by the author as course work research project 
report in the PhD Education at The University of HULL under the supervision of Mr. 
Nigel Wright, Senior Lecturer of the University of Hull.
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my 
knowledge and belief, it contains no material that was previously published or written 
by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the 
award of any other degree or diploma of a University or other institute of higher 
learning, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.
Chi-moon LI
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work is the results of many efforts, directly and indirectly related to the project. 
First and foremost I need to express my deep gratitude and admiration for Departmental 
Safety Representatives (DSRs) in the University who participated in this study. They 
provided valuable comments, suggestions and participated with enthusiasm during the 
data collection.
I would also like to express my deepest gratitude towards the sincere support and 
assistant rendered by:-
Mr. Nigel Wright, Senior Lecturer of the University of Hull, U.K. Mr. Wright is the
IV 
supervisor of my PhD research project. He played a very important role in
supporting the work that led up to the qualitative part of the study. Many thanks for 
his valuable guidance, patient, encouragement and unfailing support throughout the 
whole process of this research study over the past five years.
Dr. Charles C.K. KAM, former Deputy Chief Occupational Safety Officer of Labor 
Department of HKSAR. Special thanks for his patient explanations of the initial 
conception of this study and development of all phrases of this research study.
Dr. Joseph K.C. KWAN, Director of Safety and Environmental Protection Office 
(renamed as Health, Safety and Environment Office in 2008), The Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong. Special thanks for his unfailing 
support, guidance and encouragement for my study.
My Rosaline and Jonathan; every one of you has supported me throughout the whole 
period of my PhD study in the past five years. I love you all!
IV
AA
VI 
ABSTRACT
C.M.LI: THE EXPLORATION OF A SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL FOR 
DEPARTMENTAL SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES TOWARDS THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN AN 
INSTITUTE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION IN HONG KONG.
In this dissertation, an institute of tertiary education in Hong Kong "The 
University" represents a leading international research university dedicated to the 
pursuit of new knowledge in cutting-edge fields and the education of tomorrow's leaders. 
In the University, the success of an effective safety management system (SMS) depends 
on many factors, one of which could be safety attitudes of Departmental Safety 
Representatives "DSRs" who have a major role in implementing SMS at the 
departmental level. They are employees with additional safety duties to make sure the 
University's safety policy, in-house rules, procedures, Code of Practice and legal 
requirements are adhered to. Clearly, DSRs are different from each other. Attitude, 
behaviour, personal beliefs, culture, competence, personality and various co-factors of 
individual ultimately make a difference toward the implementation of SMS. A 
well-designed workplace with a well established SMS does not guarantee an injury-free 
workplace. The problem, however, is that some DSRs involved may have different
safety attitudes in implementing the SMS at work. Then, what would happen? An
VI
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attempt has been made in this project to study the DSRs' safety attitudes by exploring
the relationships of DSRs' introspection and various cognitive factors which may most 
likely influence the effectiveness of SMS implementation in the University.
A comprehensive review of literature has provided a substantial ground work 
for the design of research instrument and the theoretical framework to develop the 
hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". A self-reported six points Likert type 
safety attitudes survey questionnaire was developed to measure responses of the 
targeted group 'DSRs' safety attitudes towards the implementation of SMS that probes 
into the possible relationships between various cognitive factors. Constructs measured 
by the survey included perceptions of safety management, perceived management 
commitment to safety, perceptions of safety communication, perceptions of safety 
training, personal beliefs in accident causation, perceptions of group safety norms, 
perceived safety responsibility and perceived efficacy in managing safety.
With respect to analyzing data, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) version 11.0 for Windows was employed to test validity and reliability of the 
survey questionnaire. Both were over recommended levels and so the survey 
instrument was deemed fit for use.
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Structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed to analyze relationships
among constructs of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". Path analyses 
using AMOS 5.0 suggested some theoretically justifiable modifications to the model. 
The hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" was tested by examining the goodness 
of fit of the model. Assessment of model fit was based on multiple criteria including 
model-fit indexes of Chi-square (p) value, Goodness-of-fit index (GFI), Adjusted 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
and PCLOSE. The results of five (5) selected model fit indexes fulfilled the criteria of 
model acceptance; as such the "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" fits the data and fails to 
be rejected. The excellent fit of the data from the questionnaire to the hypothesized 
"DSRs Safety Attitude Model" provided further evidence of the validity and reliability 
to the questionnaire. The significance of the research hypotheses between the model 
constructs was also tested and concurred with the hypothesized model structure. It is 
concluded that the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" falls within the criteria 
of a "Fit but Parsimonious" model in explaining DSRs' safety attitude towards the 
implementation of SMS at departmental level.
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Chapter 1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
1. INTRODUCTION:
In this dissertation, the "University" represents "an institute of tertiary 
education in Hong Kong". The University officially admitted its first cohort of 
students in October 1991 and now has become one of the leading universities in Hong 
Kong. A leading university requires the infrastructure and facilities that contribute to 
the execution of its mission. It comprises of four schools: the School of Science, 
School of Engineering, School of Business & Management, and School of Humanities 
& Social Science. The University has 574 research laboratories on the campus, it is 
just like a 'microcosm' in that the risks involved are no less complicated than those 
experienced in the industrial or non-industrial sector in the local community. In order 
to strive for safety excellence, more resources such as management and employee effort, 
funding for safety improvement projects, personal protective equipment, training and 
support, as well as safety promotional activities are really needed. However, 
challenges arise in line with the demand for safety supports in academic and research 
activities, cost-cutting, downsizing in manpower and the need to fulfil new legislative 
requirements have been increasing. These challenges provide the safety impetus to the
management of the University. This first chapter of the dissertation presents the
1
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problem statement, roles and challenges of Departmental Safety Representatives
"DSRs" in implementing the safety management system (SMS) at the University. 
Research aims, objectives and project direction of this study also discussed.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT:
In the University, DSRs are full time employees with part-time management 
responsibility in ensuring relevant policies, safety rules, operating procedures and legal 
requirements are adhered to. Clearly, DSRs personal characteristics are different from 
each other. Their attitudes and various co-factors ultimately make a difference toward 
the implementation of SMS. The effectiveness of SMS implementation could be 
affected by the personal characteristics of individuals such as personal experience, skills, 
knowledge, education and training, which influence personal beliefs when performing 
tasks.
A well-designed workplace with a well established SMS does not guarantee an 
injury-free workplace, if DSRs involved are not as proactive as they should be. As 
such, the overall safety performance in the University and the effectiveness of SMS 
implementation at departmental level are directly affected by DSRs safety attitudes. In 
order to understand more deeply DSRs safety attitudes towards the implementation of 
SMS, their roles and challenges will be discussed in Section 3.
Chapter 1 3 
3. ROLES AND CHALLENGES FOR DSRS;
The problem of running a safe job is complicated by the fact that the hazards 
present may derive from characteristics of the individuals involved, the physical 
workplace environment, the nature of the work and the interaction between these factors. 
In the University, activities such as research and experiments inside laboratories, 
industrial process inside workplaces and construction works around the campus 
comprise a wide range of risk exposures. The safety requirements can be totally 
different from one research project to another. Where strict procedural guidelines 
attempt to control unsafe behaviour, a human factors' perspective acknowledges 
individual differences that influence behaviour.
Today, safety management is a complex activity requiring the expertise of 
safety specialists. At the University's level, the mission of the Safety & 
Environmental Protection Office (SEPO) is to promote and help sustain health, safety 
and environmental protection in teaching, research, and other activities at the University 
by providing professional expertise, efficient support services and effective compliance 
assistance. To fulfil its mission effectively, a team of eighteen (18) SEPO's 
professional staff always provide necessary expert support through planning, organizing, 
controlling and monitoring the effectiveness of implementation of SMS at University
level. They are not working alone in ensuring a safe working environment for all
3
Chapter 1 4 
stakeholders (i.e. including staff members, students and contractors) in the University.
To ensure proper execution of teaching and research projects and to ensure a safe 
workforce at the departmental level, it is a formal requirement that "DSRs" should be 
appointed in each department to assist the Head of Department "HOD" in implementing 
the departmental SMS.
DSRs including Departmental Safety Officers, Deputy Departmental Safety 
Officers and staff members with a duty of safety supervision (e.g. Fire Safety 
Ambassadors and front-line supervisors) are nominated from various departments and 
offices. In the academic year of 2005/2006, a total of 314 staff members were 
appointed as DSRs. They were recruited from the local community and from countries 
with varying cultural backgrounds, educational levels, working experiences and 
expertise. There exist differences in language, personal beliefs, norms, perceptions 
and attitudes towards occupational safety. As such, DSRs would be likely to produce 
differences in implementing SMS at departmental level. In recent years, DSRs are 
facing a more demanding situation in performing safety duty.
Major challenges for DSRs will be discussed in section 3.1; 3.2; 3.3 and 3.4.
Chapter 1 5 
3.1 CULTURAL DIFFERENCES:
The mission of the University is to advance learning, knowledge and 
contributing to the economic development of Hong Kong through teaching and research, 
particularly in the field of science, technology, engineering, management and business 
studies. In 2006, the student population stood at about 9,000, with 64% enrolled in 
undergraduate programs, 23% in taught masters programs and 13% in research 
postgraduate programs. About 1,500 students (16.7% of student population) were 
non-local students. The proposed change from a three-year to a four-year degree 
structure has brought new challenges to campus development. With the 
implementation of the four-year undergraduate degree program in 2012, it has been 
estimated that about 9,680 students will be educated in each academic year, hi the 
University, about 2,000 staff members, including 400 faculty members from 24 
countries have been employed to deliver educational services to students. More than 
half of the faculty members (52%) are recruited from outside Hong Kong and about 
one-third are from North America.
In recent years, connections with leading institutions in the world through 
academic partnerships make the composition of staff members and students increasingly 
diverse. New comers including staff members and students are continuously arriving
on campus to perform various tasks in each academic year. They are vulnerable to
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accidents, until they become aware of hazards and learn how to cope with them.
Thus, human factors, organizational culture and their interaction with research and 
technical aspects are concerns in safety management. Therefore, maintaining a 
positive safety culture with proper safety attitudes and behaviour on campus is not only 
important in ensuring a healthy and safe environment on campus, it is also important for 
our students and visiting scholars to experience how safety issues are integrated into 
every aspect of campus life. The main challenge for the DSRs will be to lead a 
cultural change at the departmental level.
3.2 COMPLEXITY OF FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT:
In the University, there are more than 570 science and engineering research 
laboratories including Chemical Engineering, Chemistry, Biology, Biochemistry, 
Physics, Mechanical Engineering, Civil & Structural Engineering, Electrical & 
Electronic Engineering, Research Centre, Material Characterization & Preparation 
Facility, Microelectronics Fabrication Facility, Geotechnical Centrifuge Facility and 
Wind/Wave Tunnel Facility managed by various departments. A full range of campus 
services including a sports centre, student halls, staff quarters, restaurants, bookstore, 
supermarket, visitor lodgings and banks are also offered. In fact, activities such as 
research and experiments inside laboratories, industrial process inside workplaces and
building construction works comprise a wide range of risk exposures. Occupational
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safety hazards may involve the use of potentially dangerous hardware and the handling
of hazardous materials, such as chemical and radioactive substances, biological 
materials, toxic and harmful gases, high-power laser set-ups, high voltage electrical 
equipment, mechanical/ pneumatic/hydraulic power operated tools, machinery, robotic 
instruments and dangerous work processes.
In the local tertiary institutions, the undergraduate academic program structure 
will be re-engineered. A landmark decision has been made for the tertiary education 
sector to change from a 3-year undergraduate program to a 4-year one in 2012. To 
support student growth resulting from the conversion to the four-year degree program 
and expanding non-local admissions in coming years, it is not difficult to foresee that 
the services will have to undergo some substantial enhancement in order to cope with 
changes. It is therefore crucial that campus infrastructures are extended to support the 
new demands placed upon them. Upcoming works include the construction of student 
halls and amenities, faculty apartments, library extension, lecture theatres, teaching and 
research laboratories, classrooms and offices will also be increased through the 
development of the main academic complex.
An effective SMS should ensure that all the necessary safety procedures and
practices are being properly implemented. As Kletz (1990, p. 151) asserts "'Accidents
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often occur because someone does something which does not break any code of
practice or set of instructions but is not good engineering or operating practice". 
Substantial efforts should be made by HOD and DSRs to ensure the SMS is in place, 
facilities and equipment are properly provided for safe operation.
3.3 DUTY OF CARE AND COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL 
REQUIREMENTS;
The ultimate goal of control over safety is to reduce accidents. In recent 
years, occupational safety has become a paramount issue in Hong Kong. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Branch (OSHB) of the Labour Department, Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) should be responsible for overseeing the 
formulation and implementation of policies, strategies and legislative requirements 
regarding occupational safety, health and welfare. To further enhance safety culture in 
Hong Kong, the legislative requirements of occupational safety and health at work have 
shifted the focus from the concept of prescriptive standards to a self-regulatory 
approach.
Besides the Chapter 59 Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance 
(FIUO) and their 30 sets of subsidiary legislation; the Chapter 509 Occupational Safety
and Health Ordinance "OSHO" and subsidiary regulations was enacted in May 1997.
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The OSHO has extended the coverage of employees' safety and health at work of all
economic activities in industrial and non-industrial establishments including the offices, 
commercial premises, educational institutions, hospitals, clinics, laboratories and other 
workplaces. It imposes a general duty of care on employers, occupiers of premises and 
employees. This ordinance made it obligatory for the employer at each workplace to 
take a reasonable, practicable and a more systematic approach to the management of 
occupational health and safety in workplaces. Employers have to set basic 
requirements in accident prevention, fire prevention, working environment, workplace 
hygiene, first aid, manual handling operation and use of display screen equipment. 
Further more, implementation of SMS was made mandatory with introduction of the 
Chapter 59AF Factories and Industrial Undertakings (F&IU) (Safety Management) 
Regulation which was enacted in 2000. All these regulations set the direction for the 
organization to comply with as a minimum safety standard.
All tertiary institutions in Hong Kong including the University have been 
bought under the jurisdiction of the ordinance and regulations. No exemption has been 
granted to the University! To fulfil legal responsibility and obligation to ensure a safe 
working environment, at the university level, top management are responsible for 
ensuring that they meet their obligations under legislation. At the departmental level,
the HOD is regarded as the occupier who is legally bound to ensure, so far as
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reasonably practicable, the health and safety at work for their stakeholders. In other
words, he or she should bear additional management responsibilities in ensuring healthy 
and safe workplaces for their stakeholders by providing adequate safety information; 
instruction; training, supervision and proper personal protective equipment "PPE". 
HOD should also provide leadership, resources and take the management responsibility 
for bringing the vision to implementation in their areas of control. Failure to provide, a 
safe working environment may jeopardize the safety of stakeholders.
All stakeholders in the University also have general duty of care. They 
should know how to comply with legislative requirements and fulfil legal 
responsibilities including exercising duty of care to other people and to fully cooperate 
with their employers. They have to cooperate with their supervisors and DSRs to 
ensure safe working practices are implemented at all times. Going to jail would not be 
fun as non-compliance with the legislative requirement is a prosecutable offence; it 
could be prosecuted by the Labour Department of HKSAR. The Chapter 509 
Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance "OSHO" and subsidiary regulations, an 
employer or an occupier who fails to comply with relevant regulations intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of 
Hong Kong dollars $200,000 and to imprisonment for 6 months. An employee who
fails to comply with relevant regulations intentionally, knowingly or recklessly commits
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an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of Hong Kong dollars $50,000 and to
imprisonment for 6 months. The concerted efforts made by all parties concerned 
through legislation, enforcement, education, training, promotion and administration 
have significantly improved the safety performance at the University with a remarkable 
reduction in its accident rate. Some department heads, front line supervisors and 
contractor's workers are still unaware of the general duty of care and as a result don't 
treat "Safety" as equally important as other operational parameters.
3.4 COST-CUTTING. RESTRUCTURING AND DOWNSIZING:
Maintaining a healthy and safe environment is fundamental to achieving 
excellence in teaching and research. The University has invested a great deal of 
resources and adopted a reasonable, practicable and proactive approach in ensuring that 
a safe and healthy environment is being provided to all stakeholders on campus. 
Unfortunately, along with other Asian countries, after encountering the worst economic 
crisis in recent years, the Hong Kong region entered into a period of organizational 
downsizing, restructuring and cost-cutting toward the end of 2005.
To meet these challenges, all universities in Hong Kong have to change 
corporate strategies, downsizing, restructuring and cost-cutting to reduce the total costs
for their organizations. Kletz (1990, p.274) points out that ''Reorganization can result,
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and has resulted, in safety procedures being discontinued, not because someone took
a considered decision to stop them but because they were overlooked when the new 
organization was set up and no one was made responsible for them'''.
After trimming payrolls and reducing manpower in recent years, curricula and 
teaching methodologies will have to be enhanced because of the upcoming transition to 
four-year degrees scheme in tertiary institutions in Hong Kong. In order to maintain 
the same level of quality and services, the University has to be more focused on the 
better utilization of all the available resources they already have. Some staff members 
left the University through the voluntary retirement scheme. Those who remain fear 
being laid off and working under stress with "to do more with less manpower". It is 
becoming one of our safety concerns, as cost-cutting, restructuring and downsizing may 
create a situation in which necessary safety measures overstress or exceed the capacity 
of the reduced workforce that is retained.
As the University operations continue to grow in coming years, challenges and 
responsibility for DSRs in implementing SMS at the departmental level have also 
increased. DSRs need to maintain the correct level of skills, knowledge, experience, 
training and attitudes to meet these new challenges including safety. To ensure a safe
place of work, it is important that the DSRs in this tough situation will get all possible
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support to gain self confidence in implementing SMS.
4. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES;
It is now widely recognized that the human factor is a significant contributory 
factor in a large proportion of accidents and incidents. Investigation of the human 
factors has become a contemporary study. The following are examples of attitude 
researches:
1. "EFFECTS OF SAFETY INSTRUCTION UPON SAFETY ATTITUDES 
AND KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ENROLLED IN 
SELECTED AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING COURSES" 
(SEABOCH, 1994);
2. THE EXPLORATION OF A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SAFE 
BEHAVIOUR MODEL FOR CONSTRUCTION WORKERS IN HONG 
KONG - A STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING APPROACH. 
(KAM, 2002);
3. "ATTITUDES OF STAFF TOWARDS FEMALE MANAGERS AT A 
TERTIARY INSTITUTION" (VAN HOEK, 2004); and
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4. "GENDER-BASED ISSUES IN A VAITION, ATTITUDES TOWARDS
FEMALE PILOTS: A CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS" (WILSON, J., 
2005).
In the University's environment, the success of an effective SMS depends on 
several factors, one of which could be influenced by DSRs attitudes. However, DSRs 
with different background characteristics and perceptions imposed different attitudes 
towards the implementation of SMS at departmental level. So, it is important that the 
University should able to identify factors that could influence DSRs safety attitude 
towards the implementation of SMS. In this study, research on safety attitudes sheds 
light on the reasons DSRs hold the attitudes they do and the degree to which attitudes 
predict behaviour in implementing the SMS at the departmental level.
The aim of present study is the exploration of DSRs introspection and various 
cognitive factors which may most likely influence the effectiveness of SMS 
implementation. The main objectives of the study were:-
> To examine critically the possible relationships between DSRs safety 
attitude towards the implementation of SMS at departmental level.
> To provide a clear picture regarding the problems of implementation of
SMS at departmental level reflected in the DSRs safety attitudes survey.
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Results of the survey were used to identify what personal factors of
DSRs associated with and most likely to influence the effectiveness of
SMS. 
> To examine the use of DSRs safety attitudes survey as an alternative
measure of an effective and successful SMS. 
> The results of the research should be able to provide practical
recommendations for the enhancement of current SMS at the University.
The study of DSRs attitudes towards the implementation of SMS at 
departmental level mainly refers to the literature review in Chapter Two (2), Three (3) 
and Four (4).
The literature review of theories and models helps researchers focus on what is 
changeable and the most suitable areas or targets for change. "A theory presents a 
systematic way of understanding events or situations. It is a set of concepts, 
definitions, and propositions that explain or predict these events or situations by 
illustrating the relationships between variables. Concepts are the building blocks of 
the primary elements or a theory. Constructs are concepts developed or adopted for 
use in a particular theory. The key concepts of a given theory are its constructs.
Variables are the operational forms of constructs. They define the way a construct is
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to be measured in a specific situation. Match variables to constructs -when
identifying what needs to be assessed during evaluation of a theory-driven program. 
Finally, models may draw on a number of theories to help understand a particular 
problem in a certain setting or context. They are not always as specified as theory. " 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, 2005, p.4)
In this study, the theories and models approach helps to explain DSRs attitudes 
from different dimensions and to provide the basic structure of the hypothesized "DSRs 
Safety Attitude Model". It is assumed that the more favourable the DSRs attitudes 
towards safety, the stronger the DSRs intention to implement SMS in a positive way. 
An attitude survey would be developed to measure responses of DSRs safety attitudes 
towards the implementation of SMS that probes into the possible relationships of the 
DSRs attitudes and various co-factors such as personal beliefs, perception, behaviour 
and safety culture. The proposed theoretical model with hypothetical constructs and 
observed variables would be developed through the literature review. With respect to 
analyzing data in the pilot tests, the statistical package SPSS 11.0 for Windows was 
employed for conducting factor analysis and calculating Cronbach's Alpha. Structural 
equation modelling (SEM) was then employed to analyze relationships among 
constructs of the structural "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". The final model will
demonstrate that no better-fitting models exist.
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The outcomes of this study constitute an initial step in identifying personal
and contextual variables that impact on DSRs attitudes towards the implementation of 
SMS at departmental level. It also provided useful information into the formulation of 
the University's safety policy and the appointment of DSRs.
5. PROJECT DIRECTION;
Structural Equation Modelling "SEM" software can test traditional models, but
it also permits examination of more complex relationships and models, such as 
confirmatory factor analysis. In this study, the modelling process is followed through 
"The basic approach to performing a SEM analysis" (Figure 1) as recommended by the 
"Statistical Support, a division of Research Consulting at Information Technology
Services" (ITS) at The University of Texas at Austin, USA.
Theory
Model 
Construction
Instrument 
Construction
Data 
Collection
Model 
Testing
Results
FIGURE 1: THE BASIC APPROACH TO PERFORMING A SEM ANALYSIS
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING USING AMOS: SECTION 2: SEM BASICS [ONLINE]. AVAILABLE FROM: 
HTTP://WWW.UTEXAS.EDU/ITS/RC/TUTORIALS/STAT/AMOS/ [ACCESSED 11 MAY 2007]
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The "Step one - Theory":
The literature review of theories and models in Chapter Two (2), Three (3) and Four (4) 
would draw attention on the basic structure of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude 
Model". Kam (2002, p. 103) states that "It is visualized that a proficient application of 
theories can thus help safety professionals to identify the most suitable targets for safety 
programmes, the methods for accomplishing change, and the outcomes for evaluation. 
A suitable choice of appropriate theory and model can assist the explanation why 
people behave, suggest ways to achieve changes and aid in all stages of the behavioural 
intervention programmes. " The HIV/AIDS Program Office of State of Nevada Health 
Division also writes that "An effective health promotion programme must be grounded 
in theory. There are many reasons why theory is important. One of the major 
reasons is that theory explains human behaviour and suggests ways to achieve 
behavioural change. A good theory is applicable across a wide variety of populations 
and settings. If carefully selected and applied, it can help predict what consequences 
various programmes and interventions are likely to have, even in situations never 
before encountered. Because of this, a good theory can save a lot of wasted time, 
effort, and resources." Available from: Comprehensive HIV Prevention Plan - Chapter 6: 
paragraph 1, Potential Strategies and Intervention. The HIV/AIDS Program Office, State of Nevada 
Health Division. http:/health2k.state.nv.us/hiv/prevention/chap6.htm [Accessed 15 August 2008]
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The literature review of theories and models provides the writer insight to identify
and to explain the interactions among these variables (both hypothetical constructs and 
observed variables) with the aim of constructing the hypothesized model.
The "Step two - Model Construction": Considerations regarding construction of the 
hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" will be discussed hi Chapter Five (5). 
Model specification is based on the review of literature to decide which variables to be 
included for construction of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" and how 
these variables are related. After going through the process of literature review, a list 
often (10) variables were identified from eleven (11) psychological theories and models. 
The hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" will be constructed by exploring the 
relationship between ten (10) identified variables that could potentially influence DSRs 
safety attitude towards the implementation of SMS.
The "Step three - Instrument Construction" and the "Step four - Data Collection": In 
Chapter Six (6) "Research Methodology and Statistical Analysis", major steps in 
developing the research instrument "questionnaire" will be discussed. Collection of 
data from the pilot study, tests of validity and reliability of the survey questionnaire will 
be discussed in details.
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The "Step five - Model Testing" and the "Step six - Results": Chapter Seven (7)
presents "Model Testing of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model"; the tests 
would be conducted using Structural Equation Modelling "SEM" for analyzing a series 
of dependence relationships among latent and observed variables simultaneously. All 
structural equation modelling and confirmatory factor analysis would be performed 
using AMOS. Goodness-of-fit tests would be conducted to determine the adequacy of 
the model and variations on the model. Results of model testing will be discussed. 
Recommendations, conclusion and contribution of the study will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight (8).
6. WHAT GOES NEXT?
Up to this point, major roles and challenges of DSRs in implementing SMS at 
the University have been discussed. Problem statement, research aims, objectives and 
project direction of the study were also presented. Chapter Two will focus on the 
discussion of the current general situation of the safety management system (SMS) at 
the University and its implication to DSRs. A literature review on safety management, 
relevant legislative requirements and the University's safety manual will help to identify 
factors that could affect the effectiveness of SMS.
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CHAPTER TWO
MANAGING SAFETY AT THE UNIVERSITY
1. INTRODUCTION;
This chapter is focused on the discussion of the SMS at the University and its 
implications for DSRs. A literature review on safety management, relevant local 
legislation and regulations, Codes of Practice, guidance notes, the University's safety 
manual helped to identify factors that could affect the effectiveness of SMS.
2. THE CHANGING PARADIGM IN MANAGING SAFETY AT WORK:
Under the traditional safety management program, the concept of "directive 
command and control", "compliance oriented", "procedural dominated", "punishment 
reinforced" and "accident driven" have become deeply rooted inside the reasoning logic 
of managerial staff in organizations.
Traditional safety management is heavily reliant on the use of authority.
"Traditionally, safety management meant complying -with the governing safety
standards as promulgated by the state or federal jurisdiction. From this flows safety
programs, processes, and procedures designed to meet the requirements of these
regulations". Available from: Furst, G. (2006) Safety Excellence by Design - Integrated Risk
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Management Safety Excellence by Design - Integrated Risk Management.
http://www.irmi.com/Expert/Articles/2006/Furst05.aspx [Accessed 28 March 2008]
These approaches also emphasize the use of punishment to discourage unsafe 
behaviour and safety rules are seemingly an inevitable part of risk control. The 
organization only acts when accidents or injuries happen. Each time after accidents or 
incidents happened, management will attempt to impose new rules and regulations to 
forbid any unsafe behaviour that led to it. Kelly (1996, pp. 14-17) criticized "the belief 
in tightening control over workers is the effective means in ensuring compliance of 
safety regulations and prevents accidents". Veltri (1991, p.149) reported that "77% of 
companies focused on regulatory compliance, and that investment and resources 
allocated for safety were very minimal".
Up to this end, the shortfalls of traditional safety management program are 
summarized as foliows:-
•$• Near misses and at-risk behaviours are not tracked.
•v- Remedial action for safety is more reactive rather than proactive. 
Management only paid attention on serious accidents, rather than taking 
proactive action in preventing the occurrence.
•$• Safety was considered an independent function rather than a part of
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management function within the organization.
•$• Solutions to safety problems often focus on "hard wares" and legal 
compliances rather than healing root causes.
•$• Use in a top-down management approach, employees were either 
rewarded or punished.
•Y- A strong emphasis was placed on rules, regulations and supervision of 
employees.
Nevertheless, these approaches have been responsible for some significant 
improvements in safety over the years. However, it is evident that the traditional 
approach of "command-and-control" to safety is being questioned with respect to its 
fairness and effectiveness. This approach does not focus on the human factors such as 
attitude and behaviour, as well as the organizational safety culture.
In fact the greatest driver of accidents, incidents and losses is human factor 
issues. The importance of the self-regulatory approach for accident prevention is 
gradually being recognized by The Hong Kong SAR Government. Implementation of 
SMS was made mandatory with introduction of the Chapter 59AF Factories and 
Industrial Undertakings (F&IU) (Safety Management) Regulation which was passed on
24 November 1999 and came into operation in 2000. This regulation requires
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construction sites and other designated industrial undertakings to develop, maintain
and implement SMS at their workplaces.
What is a safety management system (SMS) under the law? According to "A 
Guide to the Factories and Industrial Undertakings (Safety Management) Regulation, 1 st 
Edition October 1999" prepared by the Occupational Safety and Health Branch Labour 
Department of HKS AR, the following are interpretations of "safety management" and 
"safety management system" in this guidebook:-
"Y- "Safety Management" means the management functions connected with the 
carrying on of an enterprise that relates to the safety of personnel in the 
enterprise, including:-
(a) The planning, developing, organizing and implementing of a safety 
policy.
(b) The measuring or auditing of the performance of those functions.
"Safety Management System" means a system which provides safety 
management in an enterprise.
Hurst (1998, p.23) also describes safety management is "management applied
to achieving safety, where safety is taken to be freedom from unacceptable risks that are
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harmful to people either local to the hazard or elsewhere ".
The paradigm in managing safety shifts from a traditional safety approach to a 
self regulatory approach. "A paradigm is commonly considered to be a personal 
perception or mindset -we use to interpret our experiences. In other words, our 
paradigm represents our attitude or expectancy in a particular situation and biases the 
way we view that situation. It also influences what we take from a situation. " (Geller. 
1998, p.2) The implementation of the safety management regulation is moved away 
from the concept of prescriptive standards and a law enforcement approach or 
"hardware approach" towards a new way of self-regulatory approach "software 
approach". This change is in line with some thoughts from Mr. Y.L Yip, the former 
Chief Factory Inspector of the Labour Department and the former Executive Director of 
the Occupational Safety & Health Council in Hong Kong. Yip (1991, pp.27-30) 
observed that there has been a change in the ideology of occupational safety from a 
"hardware approach" to a "software approach". This means more focus on 
management and human factors including safe systems of work, safety cultures and 
tactics for changing attitudes toward safety. Under the regulation, certain workplaces 
are required to develop, implement and maintain an effective SMS to administer safety; 
and to appoint a registered safety auditor to conduct regular audits of the system.
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3. CURRENT GENERAL SITUATION OF THE SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) AT THE UNIVERSITY;
The SMS do not only aim to fulfill regulatory requirements, professional 
standards and moral obligations, it should also minimize losses due to accidents and 
impacts to the company's goodwill. "The best Safety and Health Programs involve 
every level of the organization, instilling a safety culture that reduces accidents for 
workers and improves the bottom line for managers. When Safety and Health are part 
of the organization and a way of life, everyone wins. " Available from: U.S. Department of 
Labour, OSHA. Does a safety and health program really make a difference? 
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/safetyhealth/index.html [Accessed 14 September 2004]
SMS is an integral part of the management function. To protect the 
environment and stakeholders, the University established a practicable SMS for all 
hazardous operations in ensuring operational safety to ensure the compliance with legal 
requirements. The framework of the University's SMS was modeled alongside the 
schema (Figure 2) proposed in the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) publication 
(1991) "Successful Health and Safety Management HS (G) 65".
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FIGURE 2: KEY ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT HS (G) 65
In 2006, The University received an award of merit from the National Safety
Council, USA, recognising the University's outstanding organization and performance 
in safety management. The goal of this scheme is to measure the performance of a
particular campus against a set of international best practices.
A SMS used as a framework by the University contains the following elements:
3.1 Initial Status & Periodic Review
3.2 Policy
3.3 Organizing
3.3.1 Responsibilities and Accountability
3.3.2 Employee Involvement and Commitment
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3.3.3 Competency and Effective OH&S Training
3.3.4 Communication
3.3.5 Documentation
3.4 Planning & Implementing 
3.4.1 Risk Assessment
3.5 Measuring Performance
3.6 Safety Audits
3.1 INITIAL STATUS & PERIODIC REVIEW;
There are many research projects, laboratory experiments, plant maintenance 
and building construction activities in the University's environment. All these 
activities have to be conducted in accordance with the University's policy, strategic plan 
and local legislative requirements. To further strengthen the effectiveness of the SMS, 
the first and most important step is to carry out an initial review of the existing 
arrangements and procedures for managing safety. It provides baseline information 
that will influence decisions and resources to sustain the implementation of the SMS. 
This is known as an initial status review. In 1991, an initial status review of the SMS 
at various departments was internally conducted by the safety professionals of SEPO.
Periodic review provides an opportunity for senior management to revisit the
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status of the implementation of SMS at departmental level and at the University level;
since safety management strategy can be adjusted to cope with changes. Two periodic 
reviews of the SMS were conducted by the external reviewers in 2002 and 2005. 
These reviews were focused on comparing performance against various established 
criteria including:-
•$• Requirements of relevant legislation and regulations, Codes of Practice
issued by the Labour Department in Hong Kong in dealing with SMS; 
'y- In-house guidance on SMS;
•Y" Bench marking with other tertiary institutions' safety performance and best 
practices; especially with those in Hong Kong;
•$- Effectiveness of current resources devoted to the University's SMS.
With so many sets of legislative regulations relevant to the University, good 
compliance is unlikely if tasks were tackled in a non-systematic manner. It is only by 
recognizing that safety is a legitimate management function that it can be addressed 
logically and successfully. External reviewers were pleased to see the existence of a 
positive safety culture and the acceptance of safety responsibility amongst departments. 
In achieving continuous improvement, the University needs to regularly review the 
effectiveness of the SMS at departmental level, as well as at the University's level.
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3.2 POLICY;
A key feature of an effective safety policy is a commitment to give full support 
in managing safety issues. In the University, the top management developed the safety 
policy and asserts its firm commitment to safety. A formal statement of safety policy 
was developed by the University's Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) Committee 
and was endorsed by the President. The policy reflects an absolute commitment to 
achieving a safe, healthy and environmentally friendly working environment in the 
University. The safety policy makes it clear that safety is one of the core values at the 
University. It is clearly expounded in the Statement of Health and Safety Policy in the 
University's Safety & Environmental Protection Manual issued in 1997. If there is 
any conflict with another goal, then safety should not be sacrificed. The policy 
provides adequate protection to all stakeholders, as well as the environment through the 
implementation of a comprehensive SMS. Having a clearly stated safety policy, all 
HODs have an obligation to set up in-house safety rules, guidelines and procedures, to 
appoint DSRs in ensuring OHS issues at departmental level.
3.3 ORGANIZING:
Organizing is a management structure which identifies who is responsible and 
who does what. In the University, the management is accountable for and has a duty
to establish and maintain management control of safety in the campus. To ensure the
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safety of all stakeholders, implementing SMS should be treated with the same priority
as other business and operations. The following paragraphs provide a practical 
approach to organizing and managing safety in the University.
3.3.1 ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY:
Line management should be accountable for safety at work and safety is a 
shared responsibility for each individual. Without a clear line of accountability and 
responsibility for safety, possibly, there may be reluctance in implementing safety rules 
and procedures. The current safety legislation specifies the responsibilities of 
employers, occupiers and employees with regard to safe working practices. These 
suppositions are more likely to be fulfilled if a positive cultural attitude toward safety 
exists. Chapter 59 F&IU (Amendment) Ordinance 1989, the Laws of Hong Kong; 
imposes General Duties on proprietors and persons employed with regard to safety and 
health at work. It clearly states that "It shall be the duty of every proprietor of an 
industrial undertaking to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health and 
safety at -work of all persons employed by him at the industrial undertaking". For 
persons employed in industrial undertakings:- "it shall be the duty of every person 
employed at an industrial undertaking -while at -work- (a) to take reasonable care for the 
health and safety of himself and of other persons who may be affected by his acts or
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omissions at work; and (b) as regards any duty or requirement imposed on a
proprietor of the industrial undertaking or on any other person by this Ordinance for 
securing the health and safety of persons employed at the industrial undertaking, to 
co-operate with him so far as is necessary to enable that duty or requirement to be 
performed or complied with. "
In addition, the Chapter 509 Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance 
(OSHO), the Laws of Hong Kong; also imposes responsibility for safety of employers 
and employees at work. "Every employer must, so far as reasonably practicable, 
ensure the safety and health at work of all the employer's employees. ".... "An employee 
while at work- (a) must, so far as reasonably practicable, take care for the safety and 
health of persons (including the employee) who are at the employee's workplace and 
who may be affected by the employee's acts or omissions at work; and (b) as regards 
any requirement imposed in the interests of safety or health on the employee's employer 
or any other person by this or any other Ordinance, must, so far as reasonably 
practicable, co-operate with the employer or other person so far as may be necessary to 
enable the requirement to be complied with. "
32
Chapter 2 33 
Under the laws, the University has a legal duty of care towards all
stakeholders in the campus. In ensuring that the commitments in safety policy are 
being implemented, the accountability and responsibility for safety starts with the 
President, HODs and flows through the management chain to staff members at all 
levels.
In the University, the HOD of at school or departmental level is required to 
have a tailor-made SMS structure to cope with operations, with assigned responsibilities 
for ensuring the safety of all stakeholders. Indeed, the success of SMS not only 
depends upon the departmental management being held accountable for performing 
their tasks, it should be shared amongst stakeholders in the University. Therefore, job 
descriptions should list appropriate safety responsibilities of all staff. Everyone in the 
University should recognize that "Safety is everyone's business" and "Safety is a shared 
responsibility". As Wells Jr. (2003, p.26) states "the accountability is one of the 
hardest mindsets to break or build. When it comes to enforcement of the law, society 
takes the attitude of 'I saw nothing!' or 'Leave me alone and I'll leave you alone'. 
Attitudes such as these can be extremely dangerous -when allowed to exist in the 
•workplace. When a program is incorporated where employees want to participate and
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are re-warded for finding hazards or identifying problems, you are building a positive
mindset."
A positive safety culture would be well developed, when the individuals really 
hold themselves accountable for their areas of responsibility. It is only through the 
joint effort of management and all stakeholders that a win-win situation can be created. 
Once safety is recognized as an equally important element in the overall success of the 
University, the SMS used to accomplish the goals will be more uniformly applied. 
Safety is not an option. No one in the University can afford not to be safe. 
Fortunately, there are clear signs that many departments are practising greater 
responsibility and accountability in managing safety.
3.3.2 COMMITMENT AND INVOLVEMENT:
Management commitment and involvement leads to the development of 
positive safety cultures right through an organization. Smith et al. (1978, pp.5-15) 
found that "/ow accident companies to have higher levels of management commitment 
and involvement than high accident plants'". Employee involvement supports a 
positive safety culture where safety is everyone's business. Management and 
employees at all levels of the organization should always work safely, in order to
34
Chapter 2 35 
achieve the same safety target. As the Health and Safety Executive (1997) states,
"Employee co-operation and management commitment are promoted as key factors for 
achieving effective safety management."
Thoresen et al. (2003, pp.914-945) indicated that "Some individuals like their 
jobs and experience a sense of connection or commitment to their -work and the 
organization, whereas others dislike their jobs and experience a sense of disdain for 
their organizations and their working lives." In the University's environment, it is 
recognized that people with different educational background, personality, interests, 
aptitudes, culture and prior work practices are working together. People's attitude 
toward safety work may not the same, DSRs are no exception.
Managerial staff should have a prime influence on the organization's safety 
culture. In ensuring safety at work in the University, the HOD needs to demonstrate 
continuously their commitments to safety and working closely with stakeholders. For 
example, the allocation of sufficient resources for the proper functioning of SMS; the 
establishment of organizational structures whereby departmental management and 
employees at all levels are supported in their safety duty; attend safety meetings, 
participate in safety inspections and the appointment of DSRs for overseeing the proper 
functioning of the SMS at departmental level.
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Total involvement of the workforce in safety is the most effective way to
make safety improvements in the organization. Making use of workforce's knowledge 
and experience to ensure safe work practices is regarded as the best way, as they are the 
people who know the specific tasks, procedures and working conditions best. They 
will have insights into how it impacts on safety. The mechanisms for involving the 
workforce are optional and all depend on the nature of business, such as nomination of 
DSRs and the setting up of departmental safety committee. A commitment to 
stakeholders' involvement should be clearly specified in the general safety policy. The 
University enjoys good collaboration and excellent support from staff members for 
developing, maintaining and implementing SMS. The challenge here is to continue to 
build on this foundation despite changes in personnel and operations which are usually 
encountered in academic institutions. Without their commitment and involvement to 
safety, it is unlikely that the University will meet the target of safety performance.
3.3.3 ENSURING COMPETENCE THROUGH EFFECTIVE SAFETY 
TRAINING:
It is often the case that experienced staff members do have accidents or 
incidents because of complacency. Desired safety attitudes and behaviour need 
continual reinforcement to overcome the strong desire to take risks at work. Therefore,
management should believe that training is vital in managing safety. Wells Jr. (2003,
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p.26) considers "There are four main areas of a safety program that, when
implemented correctly, can help create and maintain a safety culture. Heavy focus has 
to be placed on training, participation, accident prevention, and accountability "when 
evaluating any existing safety program."
It is important that everyone in the workplace should be properly trained, as 
training can help to develop the knowledge and skills needed to understand workplace 
hazards and safe procedures. In any workplace, only properly trained and authorized 
persons should be allowed to do the job. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Ordinance (OSHO) underlined the importance of training in ensuring that people handle 
risk properly and behave safely at work. Under the OSHO, employers have legal 
duties to provide both a safe place of work and training for their employees. On the 
other hand, employees have to fully cooperate with their employers hi ensuring the 
safety at work.
In Hong Kong, tertiary institutions are too often only providing knowledge and 
skill in particular subjects. As a result, many graduates will enter the job market 
without the mindset of safety awareness to recognize workplace hazards. To provide 
safety information on the variety of physical, chemical and biological hazards
encountered, the HOD must be aware that staff members and students should be trained
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to recognize potentially hazardous conditions, materials and equipment which may
pose risks. The University provides safety training to students in the School of 
Engineering as a mandatory part of the engineering curriculum since 1996. It is hoped 
that through safety training, students should learn to observe the procedures, rules and 
regulations that govern industrial operations and to develop safe work habits.
3.3.4 COMMUNICATION;
Communication is an essential tool used to share information, knowledge, 
beliefs and values so that people will change attitudes to act in a safe or unsafe manner. 
Effective communication brings the safety policy, updated information on safety goals 
and standards to the attention of stakeholders. HOD needs to be involved in safety and 
foster open communication, while ensuring compliance with SMS at departmental level. 
They should allow DSRs a degree of autonomy for safety initiatives. In the University, 
the safety organization consists of the Environment, Health and Safety Committee 
(EHSC), the Safety and Environmental Protection Office (SEPO) and a network of 
DSRs to assist HODs. The EHSC is chaired by the Vice President of Administration 
and Business and has several senior administrators, academic members and safety 
professionals from SEPO. Members of the committee should meet regularly to 
establish safety policy, to provide overall strategies and direct the safety management
programs. Safety communication meetings also organized by SEPO on a regular basis
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with aims to assist HOD in developing appropriate safety procedures, preventive
measures and to disseminate safety information. In the meetings, members are 
encouraged to share their safety concerns and freely discuss safety matters.
Ineffective communication can lead to misjudgment and misinterpretation of 
work-related instructions. One of the challenges among departments is bridging the 
communication gap amongst the multicultural workforce. In recent years, English, 
Cantonese and Mandarin are popular languages spoken at the University, because of the 
increase of staff members and students from Mainland China and overseas. In an 
attempt to minimize the languages barriers, the University has set up some on-line 
safety training programs with a Chinese version which can be found from the 
University's intranet.
In providing a wider communication channel to interested parties for 
information dissemination in the world, safety related information such as safety 
manual, safety bulletin, MSDS, safety rules, statutory requirements, safety practices and 
professional standards can be easily accessed through a search in the intranet or internet. 
Communication of the various components of the SMS must be continuous and 
available to all faculty, staff and students. To enhance further the communication
channel, there should be some systems for reminding people of the lessons of past
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accidents. In the University, both formal and informal communication channels
between HOD, DSRs, front-line supervisors and colleagues at departmental level are 
crucial for safety information to be disseminated. HODs should model desired safety 
behaviours, communicate safety expectations to their subordinates and other 
stakeholders, recognize good performers and seriously deal with poor performers. 
They should hold meetings on a regular basis to not only emphasize safety, but the 
importance of employee participation in meeting safety objectives. The bottom line in 
any form of communication is to get the message across so that all concerned parties 
receive it, understand it and take the appropriate preventive measures to prevent 
accident.
3.3.5 DOCUMENTATION:
Proper documentation is an indicator of good management. A systematically 
documented system is needed to ensure that the management can identify safety tasks, 
assign competent personnel to perform the SMS effectively, and have the practices 
documented for consistency. Under the Chapter 59AF Factories and Industrial 
Undertakings (Safety Management) Regulation, records of all relevant documents 
concerning the fourteen (14) elements of SMS, where appropriate, are required to be 
kept in departments for future audits. These 14 elements are:-
1. Safety policy.
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2. Safety organization.
3. Safety training.
4. In-house safety rules and regulations.
5. Safety committee
6. Program for inspection of hazardous conditions.
7. Job hazard analysis.
8. Accident / incident investigation.
9. Safety promotion.
10. Process control program.
11. Personnel protection program.
12. Health assurance program.
13. Evaluation, selection and control of sub-contractor.
14. Emergency preparedness.
3.4 PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION:
Various operations at the University may involve the use of new technologies, 
dangerous equipment, hazardous materials, dangerous work procedures to be carried out 
by staff members and students. In any change of operations, technologies, processes 
and equipment, error may occur that has the potential to impose additional hazards.
HSG (65) of Health and Safety Executive (1991) describes an effective plan as
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"concerned with prevention through identifying, eliminating, and controlling hazards
and risks ". In fact, devising workplace precautions is part of the planning process and 
a primary outcome of risk assessment. Safety planning is to identify how best to 
deploy resources to control risk including identification of risks, probability of 
occurrence and their potential impact, followed by the implementation of control 
measures to reduce risks to an acceptable level.
All safety programs in the University's operations need to be developed and 
implemented effectively. Departments have adopted the "Hazard Control Plan" 
approach to address safety concerns of new operations. These include identification of 
suitable control programs and safe technologies to do the job, review of research 
proposals with relevant operating rules and procedures. Personnel engaging in 
hazardous operations must first compile a safety work plan to identify all such agents 
and operations. Through careful planning, organizing and close monitoring, SMS 
would be implemented effectively and in-line with the established standards.
3.4.1 RISK ASSESSMENT:
The inter-relationships amongst workers, workplace environment, equipment, 
and material involved in the work process might create hazards. Risk assessment is a
careful examination of what could harm people, how high the risk level and the
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associated risk control measures. Only when we understand the risks involved in
our activities, then we could derive appropriate control measures, so as to control risks, 
to protect the workforce and the properties before risk exposure occurs. From the 
safety point of view, risk assessment provide a systematic means by which the potential 
risks can be assessed and managed to ensure that they are minimized accordingly. 
Current legislation in Hong Kong also makes explicit what employers are required to do 
to ensure health and safety at work and to carry out risk assessment for some of 
specified operations. When conducting a risk assessment, the assessor should not only 
focus on physical hazards, it is important to take the human attitudes and behaviour 
towards to safety into consideration. Depending on risk level, systems to control 
particular risks associated with high hazards have to be monitored at more frequent 
intervals. If additional hazards are identified after the work has started, the responsible 
party should stop the work until new hazards have been assessed and properly 
controlled to an acceptable level.
An educational establishment should provide a safe workplace and learning 
environment in the campus. The University emphasizes identifying hazards and 
collecting relevant information at an early stage before the commencement of a research 
project. As research work involves innovative ideas, new technologies and work
protocols, definitely, the risk assessment program is needed. A risk assessment
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program has been established to anticipate, recognize, evaluate and control the variety
of health, safety and environmental risks associated with the variety of activities on 
campus. For the success of implementation of a risk assessment program, it very 
much depends on the commitment and support of the HOD! They have to ensure that 
appropriate arrangements to control health and safety risks are in place at departmental 
level. Faculty members should play significant roles in ensuring research safety by 
taking part in reviewing risk assessments and project safety proposals for various 
research proposals prior to undertaking any hazardous activity. SEPO always works 
with all concerned parties such as Principal Investigators, supervisors and lab users in 
safety review of research proposals.
Good safety practices are vital in any kind of work. Each of the individuals 
working at the University should bear a safety responsibility to perform tasks and to 
comply with safety procedures for controlling hazards. They should bring to the 
attention of their superiors, if deficiencies are found. An ultimate goal of risk 
assessment is to enable staff members and students to perform their tasks in a safe 
manner.
3.5 MEASURING SAFETY PERFORMANCE:
Stranks (1994, p. 82) states that "The basis of successful safety management is
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the installation and maintenance of effective systems aimed principally at the
prevention of accidents, ill-health and other forms of incident which result in loss to an 
organization. Such systems should identify the standards to be maintained and the 
systems for monitoring and measuring in the achievement on these standards. " Safety 
performance is just like a mirror to reflect the effectiveness of SMS and the 
implementation against predetermined safety plans, procedures and standards used to 
control hazards.
To ensure the effectiveness of the SMS, measuring safety performance is 
needed in order to provide feed back to management and staff members the information 
regarding lost-time injury accidents, incidents and near-misses in an organization. 
Fitzgerald (2006, p.42) points out that "we need to be clear on the aspects of safety 
performance we are seeking to influence, and implement the right mix of indicators to 
monitor our performance. Accident statistics such as lost time injury frequency rate, 
accident frequency rate, severity rate have been regarded as the most common 
quantifiable indicators used in measuring the overall safety performance of an 
organization. Obviously we do need accident statistics to show us whether or not the 
accident record is improving and how it compares with other organizations of similar 
nature. By reviewing and monitoring past accident records and analyzing trends over
time, patterns with common causes can be identified. It provides the top management
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a yardstick in measuring the effectiveness of SMS and reviews of safety problems
involved.
In reality, the significance of accident statistics as a measure of safety 
performance is in question. The accident figures themselves are not reliable safety 
performance indicators, because they are only based on the summary of all reportable 
accidents. Obviously, if accidents, incidents and near-misses are under-reported or 
unreported, then the measurement of safety performance system would break down 
totally and thus preventive lessons will never be learned from mistakes. Pransky et al. 
(1999, pp.171-183) point out that "Under-reporting is sometimes the consequence of 
safety incentive programs that reward managers and employees for achieving good 
safety records". It can lead to such accident, incident or near-miss case not being 
reported so as to maintain a good safety performance. There were many near-misses 
that often go unreported especially if a blame culture exists in an organization. At the 
University, this potential problem is minimized by a comprehensive accident reporting 
system managed by SEPO with full support from the campus medical clinic, Security 
Control Centre and Personnel Office.
When there have been no accidents for sometime, people become complacent,
careless and relaxed in implementing safety procedures and then there would be a
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sudden jump to one or more serious accidents. In ensuring a safe environment at the
University, there is no room for complacency. Staff at management level have always 
been committed and stayed vigilant in maintaining a healthy and safe environment for 
all stakeholders in the campus. It is believed that our concerted efforts will pay good 
dividends!
3.6 SAFETY AUDITS;
Safety audit is a way to understand how the HOD and DSRs are ensuring the 
compliance with the University's policy, set standards, legal requirements, operating 
procedures and in-house safety rules at departmental level. "A health and safety audit 
is a systematic examination to determine whether activities and related results conform 
to planned arrangements, whether these arrangements are implemented effectively, and 
are suitable for achieving the organization's policy and objectives. A health and 
safety audit system provides a framework for the examination of managerial and 
operational procedures and practices. It thus provides verification of, and a degree of 
reassurance about, the overall adequacy of protective plans and actions. Auditing 
supports health and safety management at all levels because it is an independent 
measure of health and safety performance. " (University Health and Safety Management: 
Code of Best Practice, 2001)
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The University assembled a comprehensive, systematic and user- friendly
audit program to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses and effectiveness of SMS from 
various departments. This in-house safety audit program could be downloaded from 
the University's website and DSRs have the choice to select relevant audit contents for 
self-monitoring the effectiveness of departmental SMS.
4. CHAPTER SUMMARY:
Many expectations are built into the current occupational safety legislation that 
specifies the responsibilities of managers and employees with regard to safe working 
environment and practices. These suppositions are more likely to be fulfilled if a 
positive attitude toward safety exists. To cope with legislative requirements, 
ever-changing technologies and research projects, the whole SMS should be reviewed. 
At the University, a strong sense of safety culture gives the necessary impetus for 
continuous improvement and the mechanism of self-regulating. Attitude towards 
safety at work appears to be more pro-active. The adoption of SMS, codes of practice 
and in-house safety rules by these departments are all strong indicators of a good safety 
culture.
It is evident that the traditional "command-and-control" safety management
approach is being questioned with respect to its fairness and effectiveness. An
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effective SMS is the sum of a good safety culture, shared responsibilities, effective
procedures and adequate resources in ensuring the health and safety of all stakeholders. 
The departmental SMS will only be effective, if fully implemented and embraced by 
HOD, DSRs and everyone in the department. An important element of successful and 
effective SMS should address the issues of human factors - because accidents often 
result from unsafe acts due to human errors. From the safety management point of 
view, accidents can be reduced by controlling unsafe behaviour. It appears that 
currently in the University there is evidence of a strong move towards management 
system based approaches in safety. The top management in the University has 
provided the campus community with reasonable resources and embedded 
accountability to occupational safety, health and environmental protection as into 
organizational culture. HOD and DSRs should always make safety equally important 
to teaching, research and experiments. They should be able to understand attitudes and 
behaviour of their colleagues and students. There is no room for complacency for 
safety! Continuing effort is to needed to operate an effective SMS to help ensure a 
safe and environmentally sound study and work environment at the University.
In Chapter Three, discussion will focus on accident causation and human 
factors. A comprehensive review of relevant literature could highlight the importance
of human factors in accident causation and lead to the identification of variables for the
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construction of hypothesized model in this research project.
50
Chapter 3 50
CHAPTER THREE
HUMAN FACTORS AND ACCIDENT CAUSATION 1
I. INTRODUCTION:
An injury-free workplace requires attention to the workplace environment, 
tools, equipment, work processes and the person (such as knowledge, experience, 
competence, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour). These factors are interactive. 
Influencing one factor eventually has impact on others. Risk situations could be 
caused by improper design, inadequate instructions, unsafe conditions (such as 
temperature extremes, poor lighting, too wet or too noisy) and unintentional/intentional 
actions of operators.
Human error is a significant contributory factor in a large proportion of 
accidents. It is now widely recognized that human error such as lapses of attention, 
mistaken actions, misperceptions, mistaken priorities and willful violations are 
frequently reported as one of the causal factors in accidents across a range of industrial 
and non-industrial sectors. Some people are inherently risk-takers, because of their 
perception of risk. They tend to trade off a slight increase in risk to their safety, in 
order to complete the job faster. Stranks (1994, p.32) suggested that "personal factors, 
such as attitude, motivation, perception, personality, training and the potential for
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human error, are significant elements in any consideration of human factors and
safety ". It is important that organizations should be able to identify the link between 
the errors people made and the accidents that result.
Many organizations are striving for the improvement of safety performance. 
An understanding of human and organizational factors such as safety culture in the 
workplace and knowing how to tackle human error is therefore of key importance for 
accident prevention. The development of proper safety habits, attitudes, knowledge, 
and skills represents the best opportunity for making significant inroads into resolving 
accident problems. Reviews of selective literature on relevant theories and models are 
conducted which lay the theoretical background of the research. These reviews will 
cover the key areas of, the 'Concept of an iceberg', 'Heinrich's and Bird's accident 
triangles', 'Accident proneness theory', the 'Domino theory', the 'Multiple causality 
(causation) theory', 'Human factors theory of accident causation', the 
'Accident/incident theory', the 'Systems theory of causation' and the 'Synoptic accident 
model'.
2. SAFETY PHILOSOPHY: "ACCIDENTS ARE UNAVOIDABLE" VS 
"ACCIDENTS ARE PREVENTABLE";
In ancient times, most people deeply believed that "Life is unpredictable" and
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"Accident is unavoidable!" "Acts of God" will make it happen when time's come
for punishment! Kletz (1990, p.88) points out that"/« many eastern countries there is 
a more fatalistic attitude to death than in the West. One dies when one's time comes 
not before and not after, so why bothers to take precautions? " The thinking was 
similar to that in the situation just like the natural disaster like "Tsunami" that 
devastated coastal areas in countries around the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004. 
As a result, hundreds of thousands of people were killed, lost their families and many 
buildings, infrastructure in the region were damaged. In this respect, before the 
disaster, people in the region never realized the natural disaster "Tsunami" could occur 
at their places. They were quite reluctant to take precautionary measures to alert 
people to the danger. Many people in this modern world still have the same beliefs 
and attitudes just as Murphy's Law describes that "If anything can go wrong, it will". 
Available from: Murphy's Laws Site [Online], http://www.murphys-laws.com/murphy/murphv-true.html 
[Accessed 21 February 2005] This kind of people tends to blame their injuries on 
accidents.
It is indeed, human life is invaluable! In modem safety management, the 
basic assumption of safely philosophy is that "Accidents are preventable". Within the 
philosophy, prevention of accidents can be achieved through the development of an 
effective SMS that incorporates hazard identification, risk assessment, implementation
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of prevention measures, performance monitoring and review. Actually, when we
examine the accident causation in the following paragraphs, we will find that most 
accidents are preventable by changed of people's attitudes towards safety in a positive
way!
3. WHAT IS AN ACCIDENT?
The term "accident" has been defined thus:
•v" Accident as "unplanned event giving rise to death, injury, damage or other 
loss". (British Standard BS8800, 1996)
•v" Accident as "something that happens by chance and is beyond control". 
(Kletz. 1990,p.4)
•v- Accident as "event that happens unexpectedly and causes damage, injury, 
etc". (Oxford Advanced Learner's English-Chinese Dictionary, 4th 
edition, 1994)
Numerous definitions of the term 'accident' are given in the literature. There 
is a reasonable degree of consensus that an accident is some kind of unexpected or 
unplanned event, which results in injury, fatality, loss of property and damage to the 
company's goodwill.
4. COSTS OF AN ACCIDENT:
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''''The magnitude of the global impact of occupational accidents and diseases,
as well as major industrial disasters, in terms of human suffering and related economic 
costs, has been a long-standing source of concern at the workplace, national and 
international levels. Significant efforts have been made at all levels to come to terms 
with this problem, but nevertheless ILO estimates are that over 2 million workers die 
each year from work-related accidents and diseases, and that globally this figure is on 
the increase. " (ILO, 2003, p.l)
Accident are costly, as Kletz (1990, p.85) describes that "Accidents cost
money; they also cost lives and injuries!" An examination of a serious accident can 
give you a better understanding of what makes up total accident costs. To calculate 
total costs of an accident, Health and Safety professionals often use the concept of an
iceberg (Figure 3) to explain the relationship between direct and indirect costs.
FIGURE 3: THE CONCEPT OF AN ICEBERG
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Picture available: http://www.dailvgalaxv.com/.../2007/10/217icebergj3.jpg. [Accessed 30 March 
20081
The visible part of an iceberg is represents direct costs which are always above 
the water-line. Direct costs includes the damage to equipment, loss of products, legal 
claims plus an injured person's sick pay, medical costs, compensation payments and 
insurance premium. These are tangible costs generally paid by the insurance company 
using premium dollars. In recent years, the effects of legal claims practices have 
already been seen in the insurance companies. Legal claims have increased, because 
some injured employees tend to take advantages of the "No win, No fee" package 
offered by solicitors or some of labor unions in the local community.
Indirect costs are the largest expenses and are usually undervalued in many 
organizations. It just looks like a hidden part of an iceberg below the water-line that is 
not easy to estimate, but are still present nonetheless. It can be a thousand times 
greater than the value of the direct costs. Examples of such hidden costs including 
compensation to injured persons, training new workers, repairing damaged property, 
delay of production and paid high insurance premiums to maintain insurance coverage. 
Further more, lower morale and poorer customer relations will produce negative 
impacts on the company's goodwill.
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To reduce the financial burden (both direct and indirect costs) from
accidents, management in organizations have to be more focused on all safety aspects. 
Building a positive safety culture, further enhance management commitment and 
communication with employees at all level are required. The HOD is encouraged to 
integrate the departmental SMS into a business plan that educates employees, students 
and other stakeholders in accident prevention. Only through a combination of 
successful SMS and sustained organizational safety culture among each other, will 
safety performance continue to improve.
5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCIDENT TRIANGLE:
In 1959, H. W. Heinrich reported that "300 out of 330 unsafe acts or 
dangerous occurrences do not result in an accident or injury. Of the 30 that do result 
in injuries, 29 cause only minor injuries, and only one causes a major injury". 
Therefore, every time we avoid 330 unsafe acts we prevent a serious injury. 
Implication of accident ratios is illustrated in Figure 4 with a triangle indicating a single 
serious incident at the peak and a broad base of non-injury incidents. However, Geller 
(2005, p.41) points out that "The number ofat-risk behaviours per injury is much larger 
300, as verified empirically by Frank Bird in 1966, who also found property damage to 
be a reliable predictor or leading indicator of personal injury ". The accident ratio of
Frank Bird's studies produced a well known Bird's Triangle (Figure 5), i.e. 600
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Near-misses: 30 property damage accidents: 10 minor injury: 1 serious or disabling
injury. (Bird et al, 1990) It is visualized that the base of Bird's Triangle of Accident 
"Near-misses" is behaviourally related. Near misses are something we tend to ignore.
1 Major Injury 
29 Minor Injuries 
300 No Accident /Injury 
330 Unsafe Acts
1 Serious Injury 
10 Minor Injuries 
30 Damage Only
600 Near-misses
FIGURE 4: HEESRICH'S TRIANGLE OF ACCIDENT FIGURE 5: BIRD'S TRIANGLE OF ACCIDENT
What is a "near-miss" in safety management perspective? Stranks (1994, 
p.91) defined a "near-miss" as "an unplanned and unforeseeable event that could have 
resulted, but did not result in human injury, property damage or other form of loss". 
A "near-miss", though it bears no immediate grave consequences, does have the same 
potential to develop into a major disaster resulting in serious fatalities. Sometimes, it's 
just a fraction of an inch or a split second that separates the near miss from a fatal 
accident. The upper parts of the accident triangles in figure 4 & 5 demonstrate that the 
severity of the accidents and the lower parts show a significant percentage of accidents 
can be linked directly to unsafe behaviour. The metaphor of the accident triangle
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offers a graphic representation which people can be encouraged to accept that serious
injuries are built on numerous unsafe acts or near misses.
The relationship between accidents of different consequences depicted by the 
"Accident Triangle" has prompted safety professionals to focus on people's at-risk 
behaviours, as unsafe acts are the common pathway to accidents. From the safety 
point of view, the two accident triangles also implied that unsafe acts or at-risk, 
behaviour doesn't always cause accidents. Therefore, people often behave unsafely 
because they have never been hurt before while doing their job in an unsafe way.
Johnson et al. (2004, p. 148) points out that "The role of human factors has 
been recognised as one of the most important factors contributing to avalanche 
accidents". Krause (1995, p. 166) also describes that "/« most cases employee 
behaviour is the final common pathway of an incident, the workers know that for some 
time those at-risk behaviours have been part of the way work is conducted at their site. 
In other words, the at-risk behaviours that are the common pathway of incidents at a 
facility are part of the plant culture, the work system at the site ". Taking a short cut, 
starting up equipment without proper warning signal, removal of machine guarding, 
defeating the purpose of safety devices, failure to use personal protective equipment 
(PPE), etc. are common at-risk behaviours at work.
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HSE (1993 a) substantiates that to eliminate the underlying causes of
accidents at the base of the accident triangle "at-risk behaviour" is crucial. Although 
at-risk behaviour contributes to 95 percent or more of most injuries, this does not mean 
an individual's at-risk behaviour is the only root cause of the injury. In any 
organization, targeting responses on reportable accidents/incidents only is a reactive 
approach which removes the management from the opportunity of visualizing the 
pattern of all types of accidents/incidents including near misses in totality. There were 
many "near-miss" cases involving unsafe acts and or unsafe conditions not being 
reported!
In fact that the numeric discrepancy of different accident ratios is immaterial; 
but the philosophy behind these accident ratios brings out a very important message that 
most accidents do not lead to personal injury but represent failures in management 
control. The relationships in the ratio indicate quite clearly that management direct 
most of efforts and resources at the relatively few events resulting in serious injury. 
Management who focus too much on the reportable lost time injury figures alone are 
narrow-minded, and they may fail to notice the root causes of accidents and learn the 
lesson from accidents. In order to identify the root cause, management should take 
action to investigate, examine and record all these accidents, incidents and "near-miss"
cases. Safety improvements must be made by bringing safety to the hearts and minds
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of individuals.
6. COMPLEXITY OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION:
Why do accidents happen? Causation of accidents is very complex and 
inextricably linked to human factors. People must understand the root causes, 
adequately in order to prevent accidents. In fact, root causes of accidents can be 
classified as "immediate" and "contributing". The immediate causes could be unsafe 
acts of the operator (for example: emergency responder performing emergency rescue hi 
a poorly ventilated confined space without wearing proper self-contained compressed 
air breathing apparatus) or unsafe working conditions (for example: perform gas 
welding in a confined space with presence of flammable vapor). The contributing 
causes could be management-related factors, the physical environment and mental 
condition of the operator. A combination of causes must converge in order to result in 
an accident. The above description is in-line with Stranks (1994, p.85) "the indirect 
causes (personal factors and source causes) contribute to the direct causes (unsafe acts 
and unsafe conditions) that result in an accident".
Many attempts have been made to develop a predictive theory of accident
causation, but people should understand that there is probably no single best model of
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accident causation that has been universally accepted. Staff at management level
can only help to reduce the incidence of workplace accidents if they have an 
understanding of the principles of accident causation and human factors. The 
following sections aim to clarify accident phenomena and help to explain the causation 
of accidents in relation to human factors.
6.1 ACCIDENT PRONENESS THEORY:
One of the most controversial theories of accident causation is the accident 
proneness theory. Accident-prone is used to describe "people -who, as a result of their 
personal failings, have more than fair share of accidents'". (Kletz 1990, p.7)
In an organization, within a given set of workers, there exists a subset of 
workers who are more liable to be involved in accidents and are classified as 
accident-prone. "In everyday experience it is commonly observed that certain 
individuals have repeated accidents whereas others rarely if ever meet with any mishap. 
From such observations as these it has been proposed by many different sources that 
certain people are accident-prone. In other -words, accidents don't just "happen"; they 
occur because certain people have a tendency to make them. " Available from: Rawson A. 
J. Accident Proneness. http://www.psychosomaticmedicine.Org/cgi/reprint/6/l/88.pdf [Accessed 16 April
2008] However, because susceptibility to accidents varies from person to person, there
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is no profile of characteristics that can positively identify accident-prone employees.
It assumes that through the nature of a worker's carelessness, they are making 
bad choices and are thus hurting themselves due to a poor sense of safety at work. 
Accidents were blamed solely on accident-prone people rather than the work process. 
It is unfair to blame accident-prone people only, if poor work systems contain traps for 
them. Kletz (1990, p.7) points out that "accident-prone people are responsible for 
only a small proportion of the total number of'accidents'1 ''. From the management point 
of view, in some cases, people who are labeled as "accident-prone" may be unsuitable 
for their occupation.
6.2 THE DOMINO THEORY;
According to W.H. Heinrich (1931), who developed the domino theory, 88% 
of industrial accidents are caused by unsafe acts committed by fellow workers, 10 % of 
industrial accidents are caused by unsafe conditions of physical or social environment 
and 2% of industrial accidents by "acts of God" that are not controllable!
The domino theory was developed in the form of five standing dominoes 
(Figure 6) showing a linear series of five inter-connected causal factors in the sequence
of events leading up to an accident and its consequences. A five-step accident
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sequence occurred in which the first domino falls over; the remaining dominoes will
also fall in a particular sequence.
1
Social
Environment
& Ancestry
2,
Fault of the
Person
3
Unsafe Acts
4
Accident
> 5
Injury
FIGURE 6 DOMINO THEORY - ACCIDENT CAUSATION
Goetsch (1993, p.31) points out that "This is how Heinrich 's theory of accident 
causation works"... "Heinrich's theory has two central points: (1) Injuries are caused 
by the action of preceding factors; and (2) removal of the central factor negates the 
action of the preceding factors and, in so doing, prevents accidents and injuries. " The 
removal of a single domino in the row would interrupt the sequence of toppling and the 
end result, the falling of the last domino cannot take place. "The accident is avoided, 
according to Heinrich, by removing one of the dominoes, normally the middle one or 
unsafe act. This theory provided the foundation for accident prevention measures 
aimed at preventing unsafe acts or unsafe conditions. " Available from: Health and Safety
Executive, Lecture Notes 'Accident Aetiology',
http://www.hse.gov.uk/quarries/education/documents/topic3.doc [Assessed 18 September 2008]
Heinrich suggested that unsafe acts by people had a direct causal relationship to
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accidents. Accident prevention should aim to eliminate the unsafe acts represented
by the third domino so that the chain can be broken. Unsafe acts could result from a 
lack of training, lack of communication, lack of technical knowledge about machine 
operation, lack of work experience, being inattentive, having alcohol, smoking and 
overriding safety procedures. Based on this logic, every endeavor should be made to 
identify and remove a single domino "Unsafe acts" in the row before the accident and as 
a consequence break the sequence.
The Domino theory is a more advanced concept when compared to the 
Accident Proneness theory. When taking a closer look at the sequence, it is not 
difficult to visualize that they have encompassed the element of "Personal Liability to 
Accident" as suggested by the Accident Proneness Theory. Although now discredited 
by many, its underlying principle is still valid. However, the Domino theory can be 
criticized as it assumes an accident results in injury, has narrowness of focus on 
behaviour and a mechanistic philosophy. The theory is less focused on physical and 
technical factors. Goetsch (1999, pp.35-37) argues that the key to accident prevention 
would be the elimination of the third domino. This implies that the "person" is largely 
responsible for "carrying" the sequence of events to its conclusion in the accident.
Generally, people would carry out different processes using of different tools,
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equipment, machinery and materials in the workplace to generate products or services.
These factors are interactive when a process is undertaken. Changes in any one may 
lead to subsequent adjustment of the others. In real life, the chances for an accident 
resulting from a series of events happening immediately one after the other are very rare. 
In most cases it requires a chain of root causes that reaches from top management to the 
lowest level of the work process.
Goetsch (1993, p.30) also points out that "Heinrich's theory has been 
discounted by more contemporary research that it is now considered outdated. 
However, since some of today's more widely accepted theories can be traced back to 
Heinrich's theory, students of industrial safety should be familiar with his work". 
Heinrich's theory has been gradually outdated, because the theory is lacking the concept 
of continual improvement and workers are excluded from participation in safety 
management. There was a feeling that sound controls and management of the physical 
causes of risk could override human incompetence.
6.3 THE MULTIPLE CAUSALITY (CAUSATION) THEORY:
Petersen (2000, pp.37-40) presented his theories of Multiple Causation in 1971. 
The Multiple Causation theory (Figure?) has the merit over the Domino theory in that it
postulates that for a single accident there may be many contributory factors, causes and
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sub-causes. These factors combine together in a random style, causing accidents.
The theory provides a multi-dimensional space for an objective evaluation of the 
possible events and their intersection that led to an accident. He has illustrated how 
the narrow interpretation of the Domino theory has severely limited us in diagnosing the 
underlying causes of an accident in relation to the socio-personal-environment 
interfaces.
Accident
FIGURE 7: MULTIPLE CAUSALITY THEORY (SOURCE: STRANKS. 2002. p.117)
Professor Dan Petersen extended the causation theory from the unsafe acts 
and/or unsafe conditions to the management system. Petersen (2000, pp.37-40) points 
out that "Safety has moved from the Domino Theory which stated that accidents are 
caused by unsafe acts and/or unsafe conditions, to newer theories which suggest that 
accidents are caused by a combination of management system failure and human error; 
furthermore, human error is often caused by a management-created environment that 
rewards risk-taking". He recognized that it is the responsibility of top management to 
develop and maintain the SMS so that hazards associated with the organization's 
operation can be effectively controlled.
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Evans (1983, pp.21-23) also agreed that very rarely does an accident arise
from a single case, but, results from the combined effects of physical circumstances or 
human factors. He stresses that both the physical and psychological factors must be 
considered in recognizing that accidents result from unsafe systems of work either by 
error in design or by default. It is therefore vital to identify root causes and remove 
them to prevent a recurrence. These factors include safe systems of work, human, 
behaviour, man-machine interface and many others. According to this theory, the 
contributory factors can be grouped into the following two categories:-
1. Behavioural: This category includes factors pertaining to the worker, 
such as improper attitude, lack of knowledge, lack of skills and 
inadequate physical and mental condition.
2. Environmental: This category includes improper guarding of other 
hazardous work elements and degradation of equipment through use and 
unsafe procedures.
6.4 HUMAN FACTORS THEORY OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION:
It is clear from the literature view that the major factors in most accidents are 
human factors. Stranks (1994, p.32) states that "personal factors, such as attitude, 
motivation, perception, personality, training, and the potential for human error, are
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significant in any consideration of human factors and safety". Human factors can
impact on safety issues regardless of how well educated, trained and experienced people 
are. Its implication in accident causation has been spelled out in accident causation 
theories described in previous sections. Whatever the causation of accident is, the 
message is very clear that managing the safety at work requires an understanding of 
human factors. Careful consideration of human factors can improve safety by 
reducing the number of accidents/incidents and near-miss cases at work.
HSE has defined human factors as "the environmental, organisational and job 
factors, and human and individual characteristics which influence behaviour at work". 
Available from: Health and Safety Executive, Human Factors Homepage. 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/index.htm [Accessed 17 Nov 2006]
Human factors can be regarded as a multidisciplinary activity concerned with 
peoples' characteristics and capabilities in relation to the following:-
•$• Organizational factors such as poor safety culture, poor management of 
safety at work and poor communication.
-$• Environmental factors such as an unfamiliar workplace environment, 
uneven floor and inadequtae lighting.
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•$• Job factors such as poor maintenance of equipment, heavy workload,
unclear procedures in operation, and
•v- Personal factors such as attitude, competence levels, individual medical 
problems.
Stranks (1994, p.2) further points out that in considering the relationship of 
human factors to accident prevention, it is important to identify the basic features of the 
typical pre-accident situation. These are:-
•$• The objective danger at this point in time, that is, the shortcomings or 
deficiencies in the physical conditions - the badly fenced machine, slippery 
floor, unfenced floor opening, etc.
•v" The subjective perception of risk on the part of the individual or potential 
"accident victim".
Human factors may help to avoid accidents at work. Referring to the Human 
Factors Theory of Accident Causation that accidents are attributed to a chain of events 
which might be ultimately caused by human error. Goetsch (1999, p. 145) states that 
"TTze theory proposes that the nature of interaction between the worker, the machinery 
in operation, and the worksite environment is important". The key is to analyze how
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the human interacted with the machine and the equipment; and what effect the
environment had on the accident. Having these components interact optimally reduces 
the frequency of accidents.
6.5 THE ACCIDENT/INCIDENT THEORY;
"The accident/incident theory is an extension of the human factors theory. It 
was developed by Dan Petersen and is sometimes referred to as the Petersen 
accident/incident theory". (Goetsch, 1993, p.32) It introduces such as new elements 
as ergonomic traps, the decision to err, and systems failures. Based on Petersen's 
theory, factors of overload (i.e. pressure, fatigue, motivation, drugs, alcohol, worry etc.); 
ergonomic traps (i.e. incompatible workstation, incompatible expectations); and / or a 
decision to err (i.e. misjudgment of the risk, unconscious desire to err, logical decision 
based on the situation) may lead to human error and accident.
There are many different potential safety management problems in 
organizations, such as management's failure to establish a comprehensive safety policy, 
roles and safety responsibility are not clearly defined; safety procedures are ignored and 
employees do not receive proper safety training. Goetsch (1993, pp. 32-33) pointed 
out that the system failure component is an important contribution of Petersen's theory
in a number of ways; "Firstly, it shows the potential for a causal relationship between
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management decisions/management behaviour and safety. Secondly, it establishes
management's role in accident prevention as well as the broader concepts of health and 
safety in the workplace. "
6.6 THE SYSTEMS THEORY OF CAUSATION;
The Systems Theory of Causation was developed by R. J. Firenzie. "This 
theory views that a situation in which an accident might occur as a system comprised of 
the following components: person (host), machine (agency), and environment. The 
likelihood of an accident occurring is determined by how these components interact. 
Changes in the patterns of interaction can increase or reduce the probability of an 
accident occurring. " (Goetsch, 1993, p.35) When a person interacts with a machine 
within workplace environment, each of the components has a bearing on the probability 
that an accident will occur.
Rasmussen et al. (1987, p.24) pointed out that "for the improvement of safety, 
an often fruitful point of view is to describe human errors as instances of man-machine 
or man-task misfits'". The Systems Theory of Causation views the workstation as a 
system comprised of various components that must interact harmoniously. People 
who had developed safe work practice always show more sensitivity to the changing
workplace environment in terms of lighting, smell, noise, heat, air quality, slippery
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floors, machinery, dangerous moving parts, housekeeping and other irregularities.
6.7 THE SYNOPTIC ACCIDENT MODEL:
Management and employees at all levels should always cooperate to strive for 
the betterment of safety performance. Toward this end, the accident causation models 
and theories discussed in previous sections indicated that most accidents are related to 
human factors such as individual risk-taking behaviour, personal beliefs and perceptions, 
judgment and competence.
Now, we use the Synoptic Accident Model (Figure 8) to scrutinize key 
components contributing to accident causation from senior management level (e.g. 
commitment and responsibility), middle management level (e.g. training), shop-floor 
level (e.g. practices) and the organization culture.
According to the Synoptic Accident Model (Taylor et al., 2004, pp. 197-198), 
looks at the accident process in two ways:-
-v" Vertically through a series of transparent 'screens' where individual 
elements in a lower screen derive from 'macro' issues in a higher screen, 
and where the effects of macro issues are seen in a lower screen.
•$• Horizontally at the 'shop-floor' level, where the interaction between
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people and four other elements of the work system occurs. The sixth
element, management, is projected from above, even though participative 
management may be used. The term 'shop floor' is used to indicate that 
all management is part of the workplace.
Senior
management
level
Commitment 
Policy
Accountability/responsibility 
Funds
Organizational structure 
Leadership 
Audit/control
•/~ Procedures
Staff selection 
Training 
Consultation 
Purchasing 
Planning, organizing 
Leading, controlling
Middle
management/ 
supervisor level
Design /^~~ N Construction
Shop-floor 
level
/People
I -p,/ Experience 
/ Organizational culture
FIGURE 8: "THE SYNOPTIC ACCIDENT MODEL" AVAILABLE FROM: TAYLOR, ET AL. (2004. P.198)
If there is an error in the work process and no appropriate response at the right 
time; the interaction of individuals with the work environment, equipment, tools,
materials, work practices and other contributing factors such as management
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supervision leads to adverse effects on work systems. These trigger a sequence of
events ending in an accident.
7. HUMAN ERROR IN ACCIDENT CAUSATION;
Error could occur when someone forgets to do something, which is usually 
caused by a distraction or a lack of training. This is reflected in the persistence of the 
division of accident causes known as the "80:20 rule" (80% of accidents being due to, 
human and 20% to technical causes). Since errors of people at work can in turn trigger 
a sequence of events ending in an accident, a study of human errors may shed light on 
the implication of human factors in accident causation.
What is the meaning of "Error"? Reason (1990, p.9) states that "Slips and 
lapses are errors which result from some failure in the execution and/or storage stage 
of an action sequence, regardless of whether or not the plan which guided them was 
adequate to achieve its objective". Human error can be regarded as the failure to 
achieve the desired outcomes in the way that was planned, due to unintentional or 
intentional behaviour. Kletz (2001, pp.4-5) classified human errors as follows:-
•$- Errors due to a slip or a momentary lapse of attention. The intention is 
correct but the wrong action or no action is taken.
•$• Errors due to poor training or instructions. Some one does not know
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what to do or, worse, think he knows but does not. These are called
mistakes. The intention is carried out but is wrong. We need to 
improve the training or instruction or simplify the jobs.
•$• Errors which occur because a task is beyond the physical or mental 
ability of the person asked to do it, perhaps beyond anyone's ability. 
There is a mismatch between the ability of the person and the 
requirements of the task. We need to change the work situation.
*Y- Errors due to a deliberate decision not to follow instruction or accepted 
practices. These are often called violations but non-compliance is a 
better term, as people often believe that the rule is wrong or that 
circumstances justify an exception. We should ask why the rules were 
not followed.
Goetsch (1993, pp.31-32) blames "human error factors", which he describes as 
"overload, inappropriate activities, and inappropriate responses". They are detailed as 
follows :-
-Y* Overload: Means imbalance between a person's capacity at any given 
time and the load that person is carrying in a given state. Undue stress 
caused by overload might make unsafe acts and errors. Due to
economic down trends in today's environment, no matter in commercial
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firms, industrial sectors, hospitals or universities, employees have to
encounter problems of budget cuts and manpower reduction in 
organizations such as downsizing, outsourcing, increase in span of 
control, salary cuts, frequent re-engineering of structure and high 
performance expectation. All these factors can refer to the task to 
perform physically, physiologically and psychologically.
*v- Inappropriate response: Means a person who detects a hazardous 
condition but does nothing to correct it; he or she has responded 
inappropriately.
•$• Inappropriate activities: Means a person who undertakes a task he or 
she doesn't know how to do.
The concept of human error was broadened through the literature review and 
detailed discussion. Upon a close scrutiny of Kletz's and Goetsch's suggestions, it is 
not difficult for us to comprehend that human errors are a result of various cognitive 
dimensions. For accident prevention, management needs to understand the human 
factors and the other factors which tend to make errors.
8. INSPIRATIONS GAINED FROM THE REVIEW OF THEORIES AND
MODELS IN HUMAN FACTORS AND ACCIDENT CAUSATION:
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In this chapter, the relevant accident causation theories and models have
been reviewed and summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1; INSPIRATIONS GAINED FROM THE REVIEW OF 
THEORIES AND MODELS IN CHAPTER THREE
THEORY AND MODEL
REVIEWED 
IN CHAPTER THREE
INSPIRATIONS GAINED
The Concept of an Iceberg Have a better understanding of what makes up total 
accident costs.
Heinrich's Triangle of 
Accident and Bird's 
Triangle of Accident
"Accident Triangle" has prompted safety 
professionals to focus on people's at-risk behaviours.
Accident Proneness Theory This theory suggests that "within a given set of 
workers, there exists a subset of workers who 
repeatedly have accidents and are classified as 
accident prone".
The Domino Theory This theory suggests that the key to accident 
prevention would be the elimination of the third 
domino "unsafe acts". This implies that the 
"person" is largely responsible for "carrying" the 
sequence of events to its conclusion in the accident.
The Multiple Causality 
(Causation) Theory
It postulates that for a single accident there may be 
many contributory factors, causes and sub-causes. 
The theory suggests that accidents are caused by a 
combination of management system failure and 
human error; furthermore, human error is often 
caused by a management-created environment that 
rewards risk-taking".
Human Factors Theory of 
Accident Causation
This theory suggests that accidents are attributed to a 
chain of events which might be ultimately caused by 
human error. It is noted that "personal factors, such 
as attitude, motivation, perception, personality, 
training, and the potential for human error, are 
significant in any consideration of human factors and 
safety ".
The Accident/Incident This theory suggests that factors of overload;
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Theory
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ergonomic traps; and / or a decision to err may lead 
to human error and accident.
The Systems Theory of 
Causation
This theory suggests that a situation in which an 
accident might occur could be considered as a system 
comprising the following components: person (host), 
machine (agency), and environment.
The Synoptic Accident 
Model
This model scrutinized key components contributing 
to accident causation from senior management level 
(e.g. commitment and responsibility), middle 
management level (e.g. training) and shop-floor level 
(e.g. practices). If there is an error in the work 
process and no appropriate response at the right time; 
the interaction of individuals with the work 
environment, equipment, tools, materials, work 
practices and other contributing factors such as 
management supervision leads to adverse effects on 
work systems. These trigger a sequence of events 
ending in an accident. Culture in the organization 
also affects the overall safety performance.
The review of relevant theories and models listed in Table 1 could help to
develop survey questionnaire items and construct the hypothesized "DSRs Safety 
Attitude Model" in this study. It is widely recognized that "Human Factor" is a
significant contributory factor in a large proportion of accidents and incidents.
9. CHAPTER SUMMARY:
This chapter tends to emphasize the crucial role of human factors in accidents. 
A well-designed workplace with a well established SMS does not guarantee an
injury-free workplace, if human factors are not properly addressed. Accidents
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continue to occur and most of these cases were triggered by deeply ingrained unsafe
behaviours or poor safety attitudes at work. Today, some people still have the wrong 
perception in mind that "safety is not their business". If so, the whole SMS in the 
organization is doomed. Safety management will only be effective where a positive 
safety culture exists throughout all stakeholders in the organization. Reviews of 
literature on relevant theories and models in this chapter provided a substantial, 
theoretical background to develop the research instrument in this study.
DSRs are full time employees with added safety management responsibility in 
ensuring relevant policies, safety rules, operating procedures and legal requirements 
are adhered to. Clearly, DSRs are different from each other. In Chapter Four, a 
comprehensive review of literature on human attitudes, behaviour, safety culture and 
other behavioural aspects of safety would be conducted. Available information 
would provide an in-depth understanding of the importance of individual differences 
of DSRs and lay the theoretical background of the research. A list of latent and 
observed variables would be identified for construction of the hypothesized "DSRs 
Safety Attitude Model".
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CHAPTER FOUR
ATTITUDE, BEHAVIOUR AND SAFETY CULTURE
1. INTRODUCTION;
The relationship between attitude and behaviour has long been of interest to 
social psychologists. There is some degree of consensus that organizational factors. 
such as safety culture influence an individual's safety attitude, which in turn influence 
an individual's intention to perform safety behaviour. Attitude towards behaviour is 
interpreted as a person's overall evaluation of performing the behaviour as either 
positive or negative. In any organization, individual's negative safety attitude, unsafe 
behaviour, poor safety culture interaction with other contributing factors could possibly 
trigger a sequence of events ending in an accident. This chapter aims to examine 
relationships between attitude, behaviour and safety culture through the literature 
review of various psychological theories and models. A total of eleven (11) 
psychological theories and models regarding attitude, behaviour and safety culture listed 
in Table 2 would be reviewed. Variables for construction of the hypothesized "DSRs 
Safety Attitude Model" would be identified.
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TABLE 2: A LIST OF 11 THEORIES AND MODELS -
ATTITUDE, BEHAVIOUR AND SAFETY CULTURE
THEORY AND MODEL - ATTITUDE, BEHAVIOUR AND SAFETY CULTURE""
A MODEL OF "SEPARATE ENTITIES VIEW"
THE "SELF-PERCEPTION THEORY"
THE MODEL OF THEORY OF REASONED ACTION (TRA)
THE MODEL OF THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR (TPB)
THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL
THE COGNITIVE-DISSONANCE THEORY
THE SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY (SCT)
BANDURA'S MODEL OF RECIPROCAL DETERMINISM
THE RECIPROCAL MODEL OF SAFETY CULTURE
THE PERFORMANCE MAP
SAFETY CULTURE MATURITY MODEL
2. WHAT IS AN ATTITUDE?
Attitudes studies have been accompanied by a long history of research, the 
definition of attitude is voluminous, but a universally agreed definition is not yet 
available. The following are some of the definitions viewing attitude from different 
perspectives:-
 $  Attitude as "aw enduring organizational, motivational, emotional, 
perceptual, and cognitive process with respect to some aspect of an 
individual's world". (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948, p. 152)
"Y- Attitude as a "tendency or disposition to evaluate an object or the symbol of 
that object in a certain way". (Katz and Stotland, 1959, p.428)
 $  Attitude as "a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through
experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's
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response to all objects and situations with which it is related". (Fishbein,
1967,p.8)
•$• Attitude is "a disposition to respond favorably or unfavorably to an object, 
person, institution, or event". (Ajzen, 1988, p.4)
After examining the above cited definitions, attitude can be regarded as a , 
person's feelings, evaluations, or an expression of how people would like to feel, think, 
with important motivational consequences in a more or less favourable or unfavourable 
way. Many modern social psychologists describe the term 'attitude' as a fairly 
persistent and enduring disposition to evaluate an object, place and person either 
positively or negatively.
Attitude is a useful indicator of a safety culture. Cox and Cox (1991, 
pp.93-106) point out that "constructive attitudes are probably the most important single 
index of the effectiveness of a safety culture as they, result from all other contributory 
features". Indeed, one negative attitude towards safety by an individual can infect an 
entire group and create an epidemic in the workplace, so as to impose an adverse effect 
on overall safety performance in the organization. One of the aspects that this study 
will examine is whether attitudes, and specifically attitude functions, influence DSRs
attitudes towards the implementation of SMS in the University.
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2.1 FORMATION AND CHANGE OF ATTITUDE;
How do people acquire attitudes? "Attitudes are formed as a result of 
continuing experience of situations during a lifetime". (Stranks, 1994, p.36) and "The 
most effective -way of creating a strong sense of efficacy is through mastery 
experiences". (Bandura, 1994, pp.71-81) For the formation of attitudes, it is a 
continuous interaction with different people and different situations. They are directly 
associated with:-
•v- "Self-image - the image that an individual -wishes to project to the 
outside world, for example, affluent, stern, well-mannered, fair-minded".
•v- "The influence of groups and group norms - that is the standards upheld 
by a particular group".
•$• "Individual opinions - including superstitions, such as "All accidents 
are 'Acts of God', implying that nothing can be done in terms of 
preventing accidents ".
A model of "separate entities view" (Figure 9) was developed by Fishbein and 
Ajzen regarding components of attitudes which links the cognitive component embodies 
the person's "beliefs" and the affective component "attitudes" to the behavioural
intention.
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FIGURE 9; SEPARATE ENTITIES VIEW DEVELOPED BY FISHBEBV AND AJZEN
Oskamp et al. (2005, pp.10-11) states that "In Fishbein andAjzen 's theory, the 
term attitude is reserved solely for the affective dimension, indicating evaluation or 
favorability toward an object. The cognitive dimension they label as beliefs is defined 
as indicating a person's subjective probability that an object has a particular 
characteristic. The behavioural dimension they refer to as behavioural intentions is 
defined as indicating a person's subjective probability that he or she will perform a 
particular behaviour toward an object. "
Change of attitude is rather difficult, but is possible. What produces attitude 
change? Stranks (1994, p.36) suggests that change of attitudes must take place in a 
series of well-controlled stages: - 1) by attracting the attention of the individual to the 
fact that a change of attitude is needed; and 2) by convincing this person that their 
current attitude is inappropriate or wrong. Traindis et al. (1971, p. 142) also states
that attitudes change when:-
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•Y- A person receives new info from others or media- Cognitive change.
•$• Through direct experience with the attitude object- Affective change.
•Y" Force a person to behave in a way different from normal- Behavioural 
change.
It is important to keep in mind these three dimensions of an attitude including , 
cognitive, affective and behavioural especially when considering a change in attitude.
Formation and change of attitude are interrelated. Acceptance of new 
attitudes very much depends on how the person is perceived and the credibility of the 
communicator. In reality, people are always adopting, modifying and relinquishing 
attitudes and decisions to fit the ever-changing environment, situation and needs. It is 
because present attitudes interfere with an important outcome, such as performance, 
organizational culture, job requirement, communication, information and partnering 
with others. The "Self-perception Theory" is developed by psychologist Daryl Bern. 
Bern (1972, p.2) defines the self-perception theory as "Individuals come to know their 
own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by inferring them from 
observations of their own overt behaviour and/or the circumstances in which this 
behaviour occurs."
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As far as we know perception is an important feature of human behaviour
in that people behave in accordance with the way they perceive work situations, 
processes and fellow workers in the organization. People infer their own attitudes and 
other internal states such as feelings from watching themselves behave in various 
situations. This is particularly true when internal cues are so weak.
An employee's attitude and behaviour could be influenced by the perception 
they have of the priority given to occupational safety by their superiors. Clarke (1999, 
pp. 185-198) considers the "Perceptions of senior managers' attitudes and behaviours in 
relation to the safety and well-being of the workforce, will form the basis for the safety 
behaviour of workers, and therefore, the safety performance of the company." 
Rundmo (2000, pp.47-59) clearly points out that "Management attitudes towards safety 
have the potential to affect not only decision-making at top and middle management 
level, but also those decisions made by employees ".
Misperception is one of the causes of human error and frequently results in 
accident at work. It is obviously dangerous at the "man-machine-environment" 
interface in the workplace. People may differ in their safety perceptions, depending on 
their roles, hierarchical level and many other factors within the organization. For
example, a professor may estimate the level of risk in laboratories quite differently from
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the students. At this point, human error such as taking shortcuts in order to get the
job done faster - the "Hurry-Hurry Culture" is a common causation of accident. The 
at-risk behaviour allows people to under estimate the level of risks involved.
In any organization, people understand that the reasons for attitude formation 
and change could possibly lead to better attitudes and greater commitment to safety. 
Thus, there is a need to regulate how these perceptions, positive attitudes and safe 
behaviours are transmitted to subordinates to ensure that management commitment to 
safety is accurately perceived. SMS can provide an effective safety framework that the 
organization and its employees place at the centre of creating safe working practices.
Based on theoretical consideration in sections 2.1 and 2.2, identified variables 
"attitude", Belief and "Perception" are consolidated in Table 3.
TABLE 3: KEY VARIABLES IDENTIFIED FROM A MODEL OF 
"SEPARATE ENTITIES VIEW" AND THE "SELF-PERCEPTION THEORY"
IDENTIFIED VARIABLES
ATTITUDE, BELIEFS
ATTITUDE, PERCEPTION
THEORY AND MODEL
A MODEL OF "SEPARATE ENTITIES VIEW"
THE "SELF-PERCEPTION THEORY"
3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOUR;
Individuals instinctively seek comfort! They may behave in a way that 
unintentionally threatens their own life and endangers others while at work.
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"Accidents can be caused by any one (or combination) of the following behaviour.
First, a lapse of attention. Second, a genuine mistake. Third, deliberately cutting 
corners in an effort to maximize productivity. Fourth, simple rule-breaking. Fifth, 
environment factors such as poor maintenance, housekeeping or the failure of systems 
and equipment. " Available from: The Psychology of Industrial Safety, Article 12 "Behavioural Safety 
- An Overview". http://www.rvdermarsh.co.uk/BehaviouralSafet.html [Accessed 17 August 2004]
When someone takes a risk or behaves unsafely at work, they will often have a 
good reason for doing so. An understanding of individual attitude and behaviour is an 
essential prerequisite to the exploration of how individuals work safely in the 
organization. The definition of attitude has already been explained in details in 
Section 2. The following are some of the definitions viewing behaviour from different 
perspectives:-
•$• Behaviour as the total response a person makes to any situation -with 
which they are faced. (Stranks, 1994, p.61)
•$• Behaviour is simply anything someone does or says. (McSween, 1995,
p.227) 
<• Behaviour to acts or actions by individuals that can be observed by
others. (Geller, 1996, p. 115)
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The first generation of researchers to examine the link between attitude and
behaviour departed from the assumption that attitude had a "directive or dynamic 
influence on individual response to all objects and situations". (Airport, 1935, 
pp.798-844) A first landmark study that looked at the relationship between attitudes 
and behaviour was done by LaPiere. In 1934, LaPiere found that virtually all 
businesses served Chinese couples courteously, yet most owners held negative attitudes. 
Owner's attitudes as verbally expressed (intentions) were inconsistent with their actual 
behaviour (action), i.e., between what people say they would do and what they actually 
do.
Ajzen & Fishbein (1980, p. 18) summarized the case of LaPiere (1934) 
investigation of racial prejudice against Orientals: - "/« the early 1930s, LaPiere 
accompanied a young Chinese couple in their travels through the United States. 
Calling upon 251 restaurants, hotels, and other establishments, they were refused 
service only once. About 6 months later, LaPiere 'sent a letter to each establishment 
visited, asking the same question: Will you accept members of the Chinese race as 
guests in your establishment? Of the 128 establishments that replied, over 90%
I
answered "NO".
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LaPiere has given an account of this "weak attitude-behaviour consistency"
in this study. As he had expected, there was no consistency between the symbolic 
attitudes (responses to the letter) and actual behaviour. Inconsistent support for 
attitudes as predictors of behaviour was found. The Chinese couple received courteous 
service in virtually every establishment, but responses to the letter were almost 
universally negative. In general, the attitude-behaviour relationship is important in all 
aspects of society. We have so far understood the characteristics of attitudes and 
behaviour. The next logical question is "What are the relationships between attitudes 
and behaviour?" Glendon et al. (2006, pp. 195-198) articulated four possible types of 
relationship between attitudes and behaviour, they are:-
•$• Attitudes influencing behaviour;
•$• Behaviour influencing attitude;
•$• Attitudes and behaviour influencing each other;
•$• Other factors.
The following sections will focus on the discussion regarding relationships 
between attitudes and behaviour.
3.1 DOES ATTITUDE INFLUENCE BEHAVIOUR?
Attitude is regarded as an important influence on human behaviour and is a
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strong predictor of future behaviour. It is assumed that if you can change someone's
attitude, then a change to their behaviour will follow. Tye (1994, p.36) considers that 
"changing workers safety attitudes is the pre-requisite in changing their behaviour". 
Everley (1995, pp. 19-22) also reports that "there exist divided opinions among safety 
practitioners in that some believe employees' behaviour can be modified through 
discipline and re-ward, while others believe that it is necessary to change employees,' 
attitudes through empowerment and involvement, in order for a long-term behavioural 
change to occur". Louw (1998, p. 818) agrees that "zY is generally accepted that 
attitudes must change, before behaviour can change". How do attitudes guide 
behaviour? Ajzen and Fishbein introduced the models of Theory of Reasoned Action 
(TRA) and Theory of Planned behaviour (TPB) to explain how and why attitudes guide 
people's behaviour.
Ajzen and Fishbein first introduced the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) in 
1967 which provides a framework of "Reasoned Action Model" (Figure 10) to explain 
how and why attitudes guide people's behaviour.
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FIGURE 10: REASONED ACTION MODEL -FISHBEIN & AZJEN. 1975
TRA is a widely validated intention model that has proven successful in 
predicting behaviours that are under a person's volitional control. Ajzen & Fishbein 
(1980, p.7) points out that "It is possible to predict and gain some understanding of a 
person's intention by measuring his attitude toward performing the behaviour, his 
subjective norm, and their relative weights". It is hypothesized that a person's 
behaviour is predicted reasonably by his/her behavioural intention, which in turn, is 
predicted by his/her attitude toward the behaviour and subjective norm. The personal 
beliefs (behavioural and normative) are referred to as cognitive structures which will
influence individual attitude and subjective norms, respectively. Personal beliefs of
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the action towards a target are learned through past experiences, perception, level of
educational background, work stress and social influences. Changes in an individual's 
behavioural and normative beliefs will ultimately affect the individual's actual 
behaviour. TRA is concerned with rational, volitional, and systematic behaviour. 
Fishbein et al. (1994, pp.61-78) stated that "Based on the premise that humans are 
rational and that the behaviours being explored are under volitional control, the theory 
provides a construct that links individual beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviour". 
When making a decision, rational people are rationally thinking about all their actions 
and the possible outcome.
TRA explains the constructs affecting human behaviour. In order to 
understand the concept of TRA, we should examine the links between key components 
in detail :-
^ "Intention" to "Behaviour":
A person's intention to perform a given behaviour is the immediate 
determinant that behaviour. In TRA, Ajzen & Fishbein introduced the 
concept of intention links between attitude, subjective norm and behaviour 
to strengthen the relationship. "We found that intention to perform a 
given behaviour is related to particular kinds of attitudes and beliefs,
93
Chapter 4 94 
namely, attitudes toward the behaviour and subjective norms concerning
performance of the behaviour." (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p.511) "We 
have agreed that a person's intention to perform a behaviour is 
determined by her attitude toward the behaviour and by her subjective 
norm". (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p.59) It has provided a conceptual 
explanation of human actions.
"Personal Beliefs" to "Attitude toward the Behaviour" and 
"Subjective Norm":-
"A person's intention is a function of two basic determinants, one personal 
in nature and the other reflecting social influence. The personal factor is 
the individual's positive or negative evaluation of performing the 
behaviour; this factor is termed 'Attitude toward the Behaviour'. The 
second determinant of intention is the person's perception of the social 
pressures put on him to perform or not perform the behaviour in question. 
Since it deals with perceived prescriptions, this factor is termed 
'Subjective Norm'. " (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p.6)
Beliefs are viewed as underlying a person's attitudes and subjective norms,
and they ultimately determine intentions and behaviour.
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Schermerhorn et al. (1955, p.141) indicate in a diagram how the collective
components of attitudes are related to each other as depicted in Figure 11.
Beliefs and values create that predispose 
———————————> attitudes ———————> behaviour
FIGURE 11: COMPONENTS OF ATTITUDES (SCHERMERHORN ET AL. 1955. p.141)
> The first antecedent of behavioural intention is "Attitude toward the 
Behaviour" which is formed on the basis of "behavioural beliefs" about 
consequences. Ajzen & Fishbein (1980, p.6) described attitude toward 
the behaviour as "a person's judgment that performing the behaviour is 
good or bad, that he is in favor of or against performing the behaviour". 
It is assumed that favorable attitudes predispose positive responses to the 
object and unfavorable attitudes predispose negative responses. "The 
beliefs that underlie a per son's attitude toward the behaviour are termed 
behavioural beliefs. (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p.7). Attitude does not 
determine behaviour directly; it is an individual's positive or negative 
behavioural belief (salient beliefs) about performing a specific 
behaviour.
"When employees' attitudes are favorable, employees follow safe
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procedures, report and fix (when possible) safety hazards, participate
in safety initiatives, -warn coworkers about safety hazards and risky 
behaviours, and teach and model safe work practices for newer 
employees. When employees are scared, angry, and/or apathetic on the 
job, they hide injuries, take shortcuts, resist safety improvement efforts 
and quit providing safety feedback to others". (Williams, 2003, p.32)
The second antecedent of behavioural intention is "Subjective Norm" 
which is formed on the basis of "normative beliefs". A subjective norm 
is the person's perception of the social pressures (e.g. peer pressure) put 
on him/her to perform or not to perform a behaviour. Ajzen & Fishbein 
(1980, p.6) say that "the person's perception of the social pressures put 
on him to perform or not perform the behaviour in question. Since it 
deals with perceived prescriptions, this factor is termed subjective 
norm. " Subjective Norm is a main influencer of a person's intentions 
which come from the person's belief.
"The person's beliefs that specific individuals or groups think he should 
or should not perform the behaviour. These beliefs underlying a
person's subjective norm are termed normative beliefs". (Ajzen &
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Fishbein, 1980, p.7) Normative beliefs are a combination of a
person's beliefs regarding other people's views of a behaviour and the 
person's willingness to conform to those views. The evaluation of those 
opinions will vary from population to population. For example, if an 
individual employee does not believe that colleagues are concerned with 
safety, then he/she is less likely to consider safety as important. It is a 
common practice that people will consult others before making any 
decisions, for example, to accept a new employment hi other 
organization.
"It is reasonable to feel positively about performing a behaviour if you believe 
that its performance will lead to more good than bad outcomes. It is also reasonable 
to feel social pressure to not perform a behaviour if you believe that people with whom 
you are motivated to comply think you should not perform it. Finally, it is reasonable 
to weigh your personal feelings (attitude) and the perceived social pressure (subjective 
norm) in arriving at and carrying out your intention. Taken together, the processes 
involved in this sequence comprise a theory of reasoned action." (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980,p.244)
In real life, many day-to-day decisions are not taken in this manner. Some
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criticism has been leveled against this conception of how the link between attitudes
and behaviour works since it only accounts for the rational decision-making. If 
behaviours are not fully under volitional control (i.e. not entirely under his/her control), 
even though a person may be highly motivated by his/her own attitudes and subjective 
norm, he/she may not actually perform the behaviour due to intervening environmental 
conditions.
To address the inadequacies and overcome limitation of TRA on volitional 
control, the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) was developed by Azjen in 1988. 
The TPB extends this idea and takes into account performance of behaviours which are 
not entirely under the individual's control, by including the concept of perceived 
behavioural control. Azjen modified the TRA by adding a third antecedent of 
intention to the original model of TRA which is called "Perceived Behavioural Control" 
(PBC) to predict behaviours in which individuals have incomplete volitional control.
"The concept of perceived behavioural control is similar to the concept of 
self-efficacy -- person's perception of his or her ability to perform the behaviour. 
Perceived behavioural control over opportunities, resources, and skills necessary to 
perform a behaviour is believed to be a critical aspect of behaviour change processes. "
Available from: Grizzell, J. (2003), Theory of Reasoned Action and Theory of Planned Behaviour.
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httD://www.csupomona.edu/~ivgrizzell/best_practices/bctheory.html#Reasoned Action [Accessed 15
September 2007]
Ajzen described this concept as the individual's perception of control over the 
behaviour, an estimate based on past experiences and on the anticipation of obstacles 
that may prevent the behaviour. PBC is included in TPB that has both a direct effect 
on actual behaviour and an indirect effect on actual behaviour through intentions. The
framework and the relations among variables of TPB are depicted in Figure 12.
Copyrkht © 2002 Icek Aizen
FIGURE 12: CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR - ICEK AJZEN (2002, p.l)
The TPB offers an account of the proximal determinants of behaviour and has
become the dominant social-psychological model for relating attitudes to behaviour. 
The TPB would argue that behaviour results from an individual's intention to perform a 
particular behaviour, and that intention itself is a function of three determinants
including "Attitude toward the Behaviour" i.e. whether he/she is in favor of performing
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the behaviour, "Subjective Norm" i.e. how much social pressure that he/she
perceives and "Perceived Behavioural Control" i.e. whether he/she perceives ease or 
difficulty in control of performing the behaviour. Ajzen (1988, pp.132-133) points out 
that "the more favorable the attitude and subjective norm with respect to a behaviour, 
and the greater the perceived behavioural control, the stronger should be the 
individual's intention to perform the behaviour under consideration".
Beliefs play a central role in the TPB and both "Outcome Beliefs", 
"Normative Beliefs" and "Control Beliefs" may indirectly contribute to "Behavioural 
Intention". Ajzen (2002, p.l) explains that "In their respective aggregates, 
behavioural beliefs produce a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the behaviour; 
normative beliefs result in perceived social pressure or subjective norm; and control 
beliefs give rise to perceived behavioural control. In combination, attitude toward the 
behaviour, subjective norm, and perception of behavioural control lead to the formation 
of a behavioural intention". It is important to realize that these beliefs are influenced 
by a wide variety of cultural, personal, and situational factors. If a person holds strong 
control beliefs about the existence of factors that will facilitate a behaviour, then the 
individual will have high PBC.
"Clearly, a multitude of variables could potentially influence the beliefs people
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hold: age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, education, nationality, religious
affiliation, personality, mood, emotion, general attitudes and values, intelligence, group 
membership, past experiences, exposure to information, social support, coping skills, 
and so forth" (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005, p.54)
Note that the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour depicted in 
Figure 13 is a causal chain of effects starting with the formation of behavioural, 
normative, and control beliefs. "The solid arrow pointing from actual control to the 
intention-behaviour link indicates that volitional control is expected to moderate the 
intention-behaviour relation such that the effect of intention on behaviour is stronger 
•when actual control is high rather than low". (p.49) and "the dotted arrows in the 
diagram indicate that, although a given background factor may in fact influence 
behavioural, normative, or control beliefs, there is no necessary connection between 
background factors and beliefs." (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005, p.55) In the meantime 
researchers and academia are using these models as the backbone for trying to 
understand the attitude-to-behaviour relationships.
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FIGURE 13 THE THEORIES OF REASONED ACTION AND PLANNED BEHAVIOUR, AJZEN ET AL. f 2005. p.49)
Based on the literature review, both Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) offer rich insights into attitude-behaviour relations. 
They assume that human beings are basically rational and make systematic use of
information available to them when making decisions.
The major difference of TPB is the addition of a third determinant "PBC". 
The TPB seeks to explain the underlying forces to why a planned behaviour is or is not 
performed by implementing the behavioural beliefs, normative beliefs, and control 
beliefs. Consequently, Ajzen introduced the concept of intention as a link between 
attitude and behaviour to strengthen the relationship. In this way, attitudes can be used
to predict an individual's intention to perform a behaviour, which in turn can be used to
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predict the occurrence of the actual behaviour.
From the literature review, personal beliefs are viewed as underlying a 
person's attitudes and subjective norms, and they ultimately determine intentions and 
behaviour. The effectiveness of SMS implementation at departmental level will be 
guided by the attitudes that DSRs hold, by their assessment of social norms and by 
perceived behavioural control (e.g. barriers to implementation). Change of DSRs 
personal beliefs can change of their attitudes, so as to change their behaviour. The 
concept of the Health Belief Model (HBM) could help to explain how person's 
perception or self-efficacy to influence his or her ability to perform the behaviour. The 
Health Belief Model (HBM) was first developed in the 1950s by social psychologists 
Hochbaum, Rosenstock and Kegels working in the U.S. Public Health Services.
"The health belief model stipulates that a person's health-related behaviour 
depends on the person's perception of four critical areas: the severity of a potential 
illness, the person's susceptibility to that illness, the benefits of taking a preventive 
action, and the barriers to taking that action. The model also incorporates cues to 
action (e.g., leaving a -written reminder to oneself to walk) as important elements in 
eliciting or maintaining patterns of behaviour. The construct of self-efficacy, or a
person's confidence in his or her ability to successfully perform an action, has been
103
Chapter 4 104 
added to the model, perhaps allowing it to better account for habitual behaviours,
such as a physically active lifestyle."" Available from: Grizzell J. Health Belief Model, 
http://www.csupomona.edu/~ivgrizzelll3estjractices/bctheorv.htmltfHealth Belief Mode [Accessed 15 
September 2007].
The HBM is a psychological model that uses conceptual frameworks to 
explain and predict a given health-related behaviour from certain patterns of belief 
about the recommended health behaviour and the health problems that the behaviour 
was intended to prevent or control. In this study, DSRs personal beliefs and 
perceptions would be investigated through an attitude survey.
Based on the theoretical consideration in section 3.1, identified variables 
"Attitude", Beliefs", "Perception", "Norm" and Self-efficacy" are consolidated in Table 
4.
TABLE 4: KEY VARIABLES IDENTIFIED FROM THE MODEL OF THEORY OF REASONED 
ACTION (TRA), THE MODEL OF THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR (TPB) AND
THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL
IDENTIFIED VARIABLES
ATTITUDE, BELIEFS, NORM
PERCEPTION, SELF-EFFICACY
THEORY AND MODEL
THE MODEL OF THEORY OF REASONED ACTION (TRA) 
AND THE MODEL OF THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR 
(TPB)
THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL
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3.2 DOES BEHAVIOUR INFLUENCE ATTITUDE?
It's now widely accepted that 80-95% of all accidents are triggered by the 
unsafe behaviour of employees. "The reason to focus on behaviour is that when an 
incident occurs, behaviour is the crucial final common pathway that brings other 
factors together in an adverse outcome. Therefore, ongoing, upstream measurement 
of the sheer mass of these critical at-risk behaviours provides the most significant 
indicator of workplace safety. And the only satisfactory mechanism to drive this 
activity is employee involvement". (Krause, 1995, p.6) Hence it is important to 
identify unsafe behaviours that cause accidents.
Krause (1995, p.34) also opines that in a business or industrial setting there 
are two powerful reasons to focus on behaviour first:-
•$• Behaviour can be measured and therefore managed, whereas attitude
presents measurement problems. 
"Y* Changes in behaviour can lead to changes in attitude.
Based on Krause's opinion, behaviour has the power to change attitude. 
Although people are not usually aware that changed behaviour can change attitude and 
personal beliefs, this effect of behaviour on attitude is also a common fact of life.
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The Cognitive-dissonance Theory first proposed by social psychologist
Leon Festinger in 1956 is an example of how the perspective of social cognition has 
been applied to explain the effect of behaviour on influencing attitudes. What is 
cognitive dissonance? "Cognitive dissonance can be seen as an antecedent condition 
which leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction just as hunger leads to 
activity oriented toward hunger reduction." (Festinger, 1962, p.3) When an 
unpleasant state resulting from inconsistency between attitudes and behaviour occurs, 
this state is knows as Cognitive Dissonance. Suedfeld (1971, p. 17) offers an 
example - "if one studies hard for a test, he expects to do well. But if he studies hard 
and fails, dissonance is aroused.'"
Robbins (1996, p. 190) states that "people seek consistency amongst their 
attitudes and behaviour. However, inconsistency occurs, if people's behaviour 
changes but attitudes don't, then people feel uncomfortable. It is the uncomfortable 
tension that comes from holding two conflicting thoughts at the same time. Individuals 
will be motivated to engage in various kinds of cognitive restructuring to remove such 
feelings of tension and uncertainty."
"Thus, our self-directed behaviour informs our self-perception and our core
values. And our self-perception and personal values influence our behaviour. We
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strive for our behaviour to be consistent with our values, and vice versa. When we
perceive an inconsistency between behaviour and the values that define us, we 
experience tension or "cognitive dissonance" (the academic label used by the many 
social psychologists -who researched this phenomenon). We direct our self-talk to 
reduce this negative state. " Available from: Geller S. (2005). Psychology of Safety: What's on your 
mind? http://www.ishn.com/CDA/Archives/GbOdbf7161 c7010VgnVCM 1 QOOOOf932a8cO [Accessed 1 
September, 2005]
The Cognitive Dissonance Theory focuses on consequences of incompatibility 
between two related cognitions. The easiest way to remove these unpleasant tensions 
and to reduce cognitive dissonance is change their attitude.
Explanations on the major difference between the "Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory" and "Self-perception Theory" were given by Eiser et al. "TTze dissonance 
theory suggests that there is an underlying state of psychological tension that 
pressurizes the individual into changing an attitude, whereas the self-perception theory 
suggests a more passive process whereby people simply change their perceptions of 
their attitudes. (Eiser etal., 1988, p.36)
Based on theoretical considerations from section 3.2, identified variable
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"Perception" is consolidated in Table 5.
TABLE 5: KEY VARIABLE IDENTIFIED FROM THE COGNITIVE-DISSONANCE THEORY
IDENTIFIED VARIABLE
PERCEPTION
THEORY AND MODEL
THE COGNITIVE-DISSONANCE THEORY
3.3 DO ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOUR INFLUENCE EACH OTHER?
Social Cognitive theory favors a model of causation involving triadic 
reciprocal determinism. "In this model of reciprocal causation, behaviour, cognition 
and other personal factors, and environmental influences all operate as interacting 
determinants that influence each other bidirectionally. (Bandura, 1989, p.2) "In the 
social cognitive view people are neither driven by inner forces nor automatically 
shaped and controlled by external stimuli. Rather, human functioning is explained in 
terms of a model of triadic reciprocality in which behaviour, cognitive and other 
personal factors, and environmental events all operate as interacting determinants of 
each other. " (Bandura, 1986, p. 18)
Bandura's model of Reciprocal Determinism is shown in Figure 14 to explain 
the interaction between the three domains in the development of the social self: Personal, 
Behavioural, and Environmental. "This model of reciprocal determinism involves 
"personal factors in the form of cognitive, affective, and biological events, behavioural
patterns, and environmental events that all operate as interacting determinants that
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influence each other bidirectionally" (Bandura, 2001, p.266).
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Through feedback and reciprocity, individual's cognitions might change over 
time as results of maturation and experience. Bandura points out that that behaviour, 
environmental influences, and internal personal factors (including beliefs, thoughts, 
preferences, expectations, and self-perceptions) all causes are interactive, dynamic, and 
reciprocal. Influencing one factor eventually has impact on the other two when under 
the situation where peoples' behaviours influence both their attitudes and the situation, 
and that people attitudes will influence their behaviours and the situations.
Person Internal Psychological Factors
CONTEXT \
Situation
External
Observable
Factors
Behaviour
FIGURE 14: BANDURA'S MODEL OF RECIPROCAL DETERMINISM (1977.1986)
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The relationships between person, behaviour and environment (situation)
are:-
A bi-directional interaction occurs between the person and behaviour 
characteristics. "The person-behaviour of reciprocal causation reflects 
the interaction between thought, affect and action. Expectations, 
beliefs, self- perceptions, goals and intentions give shape and direction 
to behaviour. What people think, believe, and feel, affects how they 
behave. " (Bandura, 1989, p.3) It is concerned with what people think 
and believe affects how they behave and vice-versa.
A bi-directional interaction also occurs between the environment and 
personal characteristics. "The environment and personal segment of 
reciprocal causation is concerned -with the interactive relation between 
personal characteristics and environmental influences. Human 
expectations, beliefs, emotional bents and cognitive competencies are 
developed and modified by social influences that convey information and 
activate emotional reactions through modeling, instruction and social 
persuasion. " (Bandura, 1989, p.3) It is concerned with "the interactive 
relation between personal characteristics and environmental influences.
Environment refers to social and physical environment. Social
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environment such as classmates, family members, friends, superiors
and subordinates. Physical environment such as ambient temperature, 
humidity or lighting at the workplace.
A bi-directional interaction also occurs between the behaviour and 
environment. "The behaviour and environment segment of reciprocal 
causation in the triadic system represents the two-way influence between 
behaviour and the environment. In the transactions of everyday life, 
behaviour alters environmental conditions and is, in turn, altered by the 
very conditions it creates. "(Bandura, 1989, p.3) The link between 
"behaviour and environment" is concerned with the aspect of the 
potential environment that becomes the actual environment for given 
individuals and thus depends on how they behave.
Behaviour change usually results in attitude change and some change in the 
environment. The stronger the situational pressures, the less likely an individual's 
attitude will predict behaviour. To conclude that some external factors, such as work 
stress, financial constraints, company rules, organization culture and peer pressure may 
prevent people from behaving in conformity with his/her attitudes and situation.
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Geller (1996, pp.11-12) also explains that "the internal (unobserved) states
of mind continually influence observable behaviours, while changes in observable 
behaviours continually affect changes in per son states of attitudes "... "This spiraling of 
behaviour feeding attitude, attitude feeding behaviour, behaviour feeding attitudes and 
so on can lead to employees becoming totally committed to safety achievement, as 
reflected in their daily behaviour". Numerous studies have shown that individual's 
unsafe behaviour is the most common cause of accidents at work. Change individual's 
unsafe behaviour by enhancing individual's attitude towards safety may possible to 
prevent accidents in any type of work. To assure employees' commitment to safety at 
work, management should understand the link between employees' safety attitudes and 
safety culture in the organization.
Based on the theoretical consideration in section 3.3, identified variable 
"Beliefs" and "Perception" are consolidated in Table 6.
TABLE 6: KEY VARIABLES IDENTIFIED FROM THE SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY (SCT) 
AND BANDURA'S MODEL OF RECIPROCAL DETERMINISM
IDENTIFIED VARIABLES
BELIEFS, PERCEPTION
BELIEFS, PERCEPTION
THEORY AND MODEL
THE SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY (SCT)
BANDURA'S MODEL OF RECIPROCAL DETERMINISM
WHAT IS SAFETY CULTURE?
In recent years, there is a much stronger argument for considering the human
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dimension of accident causation at organizational level, rather than the individual
worker level. The interaction of individuals with the work environment, tools, 
equipment, material, process and other contributing factors will possibly trigger a 
sequence of events ending in an accident. Employees recruited from different 
countries will have a different culture. They may have different risk perceptions and 
attitudes towards safety at work because of individuals' differences arising from 
different tasks, family backgrounds, educational qualifications, working experiences, 
training, seniority of position held and social contexts. Therefore, fostering safety 
culture is a must! To understand safety culture, we should know what the culture is? 
Culture is a shared phenomenon with a complex construct which has many definitions, 
for example :-
*Y> Culture is "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as 
it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that 
has -worked -well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught 
to new members as the correct -way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems. " (Schein, 1992, p. 12)
•$• Culture is "the relatively stable set of inner values and beliefs generally held 
by groups of people in countries or regions and the noticeable impact those 
values and beliefs have on the peoples' outward behaviours and
environment". (Peterson, 2004, p. 17)
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•$• Culture is "a combination of an organization's attitudes, behaviours,
beliefs, values, ways of doing things, and other shared characteristics of a 
particular group of people". Available from: Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, Safety and Health Management Systems eTool. 
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/safetyhealth/index.htnil [Accessed 14 September, 2004]
Each organization has its own unique culture as Kletz (1990, p.87) describes 
that "companies and nations both have cultures (beliefs, values and forms of behaviour) 
that have an influences on safety". Culture in the organization will differ from 
different groups of people and vary from department to department. Different 
subculture is formed around functional groups and departments. In reality, "People 
who share the same culture play the social game by the same rules. People from 
different cultures, however, play by different rules. " (Hofstede et al., 2002, p. 169)
Organizational culture may be expressed through shared practices amongst 
people within the organization, hi simple terms, it is the common perceptions and 
modes of action that characterize one organization against others. Schein (1992, p. 10) 
provides a useful summary on organizational culture, i.e. "...the accumulated shared 
learning of a given group, covering behavioural, emotional, and cognitive elements of
the group members' total psychological functioning. For shared learning to occur,
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there must be a history of shared experience, which in turn implies some stability of
membership in the group. Given such stability and a shared history, the human need 
for parsimony, consistency, and meaning -will cause the various shared elements to form 
into patterns that eventually can be called a culture ". From the safety management 
perspective, the foundation of culture is just as important as the bridge metaphor for the 
architecture of safety (see Figure 15). Eckenfelder (2003, p.34) describes that "the 
bridge metaphor shows that while all safety areas are important, culture is the 
foundation and should be dealt with directly."
The Architecture of Safety
Systems
Compliance
Costs and Losses
FIGURE IS: BRIDGE METAPHOR FOR THE ARCHITECTURE OF SAFETY (ECKENFELDER. 2003, p.34)
Many researchers in the field consider the concept of safety culture is however,
equally applicable to major accident hazards where most of accidents were caused by 
human error. The term "Safety Culture" first appeared in the 1987 OECD Nuclear
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Agency report on the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and drew the attention of government
agencies. Kletz (1990, p.63) describes that "the -world's worst nuclear accident 
occurred at Chernobyl in the Ukraine in 1986 -when a water-cooled reactor overheated 
and radioactive material was discharged to atmosphere. Although only about 30 
people were killed immediately several thousand more may die during the next 30 years, 
a one-millionth increase in the death rate from cancer in Europe. " As a consequence . 
of the enquiry into the Chernobyl nuclear disaster where errors and violations of the 
operating procedures at the plant were the major causes of the accident. A poor safety 
culture in that organization was identified. Since then, the term "safety culture" is 
increasingly being used to describe the overall safety performance, attitudes and 
behaviour to safety within an organization.
Numerous definitions of safety culture have abounded in the literature as 
folio ws:-
•$• Safety culture "reflects the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values that 
employees share in relation to safety". (Cox and Cox 1991, p.93)
•$- Safety culture is "the product of individual and group values, perceptions, 
competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to 
and the style and proficiency of an organisation's health and safety
management". (HSC, 1993;p.23)
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4- Safety culture as "representing the basic values, beliefs and
assumptions concerning safety that are embedded in the organization".
(Clark, 2000, p.75) 
•$- Safety culture is "a sub-facet of organizational culture, which is thought to
affect member's attitudes and behaviour in relation to an organization's
ongoing health and safety performance". (Cooper, 2000, pp.111-136) 
"v- Safety culture is "a concept which includes the fundamental values, beliefs
and practices of safety management system, and also the actions and
behaviours for enhancing these values, beliefs and practices". (OSHC,
2006, p.44)
Cooper (2000, pp.111-136) suggested that the "Bandura's model of reciprocal 
determinism has been adapted to reflect the concept of safety culture, that contains 
three elements which encompass subjective internal psychological factors, observable 
ongoing safety-related behaviours and objective situational features", (see Figure 16)
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FIGURE 16: RECIPROCAL MODEL OF SAFETY CULTURE APPLIED TO EACH ELEMENT (COOPER, 2000)
Cooper further explains the psychological, behavioural and situational
elements of the model can also be broken down into exactly the same reciprocal 
relationships, thereby allowing the multi-faceted nature of the safety culture construct to
be systematically examined.
4.1 THE IMPACT OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE ON SAFETY:
Organizational culture on safety represents the amalgamation of individual
beliefs, values, perceptions, attitudes and behavioural patterns, as well as group norms 
that may affect the overall safety performance in an organization. A causation diagram
of Eckenfelder's Performance Map (Figure 17) clearly explained the relationships
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among beliefs, values, culture, attitudes, behaviour, performance and culture.
The Performance Map
A Causation Diagram
Correct Principles j
FIGURE 17: THE PERFORMANCE MAP. (ECKENFELDER. 2003. p.32)
Eckenfelder (2003, p.32) states that "7if shows that work on beliefs and values 
can lead to an organization culture that supports safety and health ". ''''Any time you 
change -what people believe and value, you change their culture and in turn their 
attitudes. Beliefs and values change every day; that changes culture and consequently 
attitudes." Attitude is an important indicator of the organizational safety culture. 
Reason (1998; pp.293-306) points out that "many cf the relevant definitions of safety 
culture emphasize shared attitudes, values and beliefs and stress the interactions with 
the organization's safety structures and control systems and appropriate behavioural 
norms".
Pidgeon (1991, pp. 129-140) presented three organizational properties of a
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good safety culture. He pointed out that "there are three essential elements of a
good safety culture: norms and rules for handling hazards (these are explicit or tacit 
corporate guidelines for defining what is and is not to be regarded as a significant risk); 
attitudes towards safety (individual and collective beliefs about hazards and the 
importance of safety, together with the motivation to act on those beliefs); reflexivity on 
safety practice (a search for new meanings in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity 
about risky. Based on the literature review, it is the safety culture of the organization 
that will influence the effectiveness in implementing the SMS and underlying 
perceptions, attitudes, and habitual practices of employees at all levels towards safety.
We believe that most accidents stem from human errors. The next big step 
change in safety has begun and is based on developing positive safety cultures that 
could influence human attitude and behaviour towards safety at work.
4.2. PARADIGM SHIFT TO CULTIVATE A POSITIVE SAFETY 
CULTURE!
A "Blame Culture" definitely would deteriorate the overall safety performance 
in the organization, because everyone is in a negative frame of mind. "It is our nature 
to be more comfortable if we can find something or someone else to blame for
mistakes." (Peam et al., 1998, p. 11) It is quite often that after an accident has
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happened, staff members at management level almost have a tendency to blame the
accident on the errors of people involved. People who made errors would very likely 
bear the whole consequences. "The accident at Unit 2 of the Three-Mile Island 
nuclear plant (TMI-2) raised awareness of human error and cognitive shortcomings of 
operators and shifted the attention of safety analysis from technical aspects to human 
errors, where blame and responsibility were assigned to the person directly involved in 
the unsafe act. " (Coquelle et al., 1995, pp. 193-202) In fact, blaming the person who 
triggers the accident does not help to prevent its recurrence, as it is difficult to find out 
the true causes. In the long run, it can create communication barrier and reduce the 
degree of safety empowerment. Employees may stop trying to share their safety 
concerns in the organization. It is unfair to blame the operator who misjudges, 
misreads or is careless without detailed investigation. Management needs to cultivate 
a "Positive Safety Culture" and to discourage a "Blame Culture" in the organization.
A positive safety culture serves as a solid foundation for the SMS. It is a 
"collective acceptance" of safety practices with wholehearted supported from all levels 
of individual, group, division and organization. Steve et al. (1996, p.90) states that "At 
the heart of a positive health and safety culture is the idea that everyone has a role to 
play and a stake in making their organization safer and healthier". To say an
organization has a positive safety culture, it is essentially the recognition of consistency
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and efficacy of safety practices throughout the whole organization. It is a long
term process and is dependent upon maintaining a high level of employee's 
involvement and management commitment.
Dr Hillary Bennett states that "Creating a positive safety culture is recognized 
by Human Factors psychologists as an essential aspect of effective safety management 
in any workplace ". and "Psychologists based at the Keil Centre in Edinburgh have 
produced a model - the Safety Culture Maturity Model (SCMM) to assist organizations 
establish their current level of safety culture and identify the actions required to 
improve their safety culture thus providing a structured safety culture improvement 
process. " Available from: Bennett H., Create a positive safety culture. The way forward to safer 
•workplaces, p.l http://www.assess.co.n2/pages/SCMMarticle.doc [Accessed 6 April 2008]
The model presented in Figure 18 is set out in a number of iterative stages 
included level 1- emerging, level 2 - managing, level 3 - involving, level 4 - cooperating 
and level 5 - continually improving. In the model, organizations progress through 
increasing levels of safety culture maturity in a continuous improvement process. 
Fleming (2000, p.4) states that "It is proposed that organizations progress sequentially 
through the five levels, by building on the strengths and removing the weaknesses of the
previous level. It is therefore not advisable for an organization to attempt to jump or
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skip a level."
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Safety culture maturity model
Continually
improving
Level 5
Cooperating 
Level 4
Involving 
Level 3
Managing 
Level 2
Emerging 
Level 1
Develop 
consistency 
and fight 
complacency
Engage all staff to 
develop cooperation 
and commitment to 
improving safety
Develop
management
commitment
Realise the importance 
of fitmtline staff and 
develop personal 
responsibility
Tbe Ke;: Centr. 1999
FIGURE 18: SAFETY CULTURE MATURITY MODEL 
FROM THE KEIL CENTRE FOR THE HSE OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGY REPORT 2000/049. P.S
A positive safety culture could be developed on the basis of mutual trust; by 
sharing perceptions of the importance of safety; develop personal responsibility, 
cooperation and commitment to improving safety; by confidence in the efficacy of 
preventive control measures. Once developed, it is difficult to change! The 
following are the advantages of cultivating a positive safety culture in the organization:-
•$• It sets the tone for everything that supports safety for the accident 
prevention;
•<f- It shares management commitment to safety;
•$• It leads to an effective conduct of work safely;
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•$• It enhances a sense of accountability and responsibility towards safety
amongst employees;
•$• It encourages employees to report accidents, incidents and near-misses, so 
as to help all concerned parties to identify underlying causes and make 
recommendations to prevent recurrence.
Up to this stage, the University's SMS, models of accident causation, human 
factors and organizational safety culture were critically examined. It was found that 
accident causation is inextricably linked to human factors such as attitudes and 
behaviours. The causes of accidents can vary as different people perform different 
tasks at different workplace environments. Believe that safety culture is the 
foundation for accident prevention. Departmental management plays a substantial role 
in cultivating a positive safety culture. They should improve employees' attitudes by 
focusing on their beliefs and values that lead to an organization culture, as such the 
desired behaviours will then occur. It is in fact that SMS is an important influence on 
the safety culture, attitudes and behaviour which in turn impacts on the effectiveness of 
the SMS and the overall safety performance in an organization. It is thought that an 
effective SMS and a positive safety culture would help to prevent accidents!
Because individuals' differences and characteristics influence the way things
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get done in an organization, it has been found that some DSRs are more interested in
safety, but some of them are less supportive of safety. DSRs are different in personal 
dimensions such as sex, age, education attainment, experiences, job nature and length of 
service in the University. All these factors may lead to the development of different 
safety attitudes towards the implementation of SMS. Therefore, understanding DSRs 
safety attitudes and cultivating safety culture in the University are critical to achieving 
and maintaining excellence in safety performance. One way of evaluating such issues 
is through the measurement of attitudes to safety held by the DSRs. Measuring DSRs 
attitudes provides an indication of shared views on particular aspects of their 
departments, so as to identify areas for further improvement of SMS.
Based on a theoretical consideration in sections 4, 4.1 and 4.2, identified
variables "Commitment", "Communication", "Management", "Attitude", "Beliefs",
"Safety Culture" and "Responsibility" are consolidated in Table 7.
TABLE 7: KEY VARIABLES IDENTIFIED FROM THE RECIPROCAL MODEL OF SAFETY
CULTURE - SAFETY MANAGEMENT DIMENSION, THE PERFORMANCE MAP AND
SAFETY CULTURE MATURITY MODEL
IDENTIFIED VARIABLES
COMMITMENT, COMMUNICATION, 
MANAGEMENT
ATTITUDE, BELIEFS, SAFETY 
CULTURE
COMMITMENT, RESPONSIBILITY
THEORY AND MODEL
THE RECIPROCAL MODEL OF SAFETY CULTURE - 
SAFETY MANAGEMENT DIMENSION
THE PERFORMANCE MAP
SAFETY CULTURE MATURITY MODEL
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5. KEY VARIABLES EXTRACTED FROM 11 PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORIES AND MODELS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF "DSRS 
SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL"
This study has so far examined eleven (11) psychological theories and models 
regarding attitude, behaviour and safety culture. Based on theoretical considerations, a 
list of ten (10) variables were extracted from eleven (11) theories and models for 
construction of the "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" which is summarized in Table 8.
TABLE 8; SOURCES OF TEN (10) VARIABLES IDENTIFIED FROM ELEVEN (11)
THEORIES AND MODELS
TEN (10) 
VARIABLES
SOURCES OF EACH VARIABLE IDENTIFIED FROM:
MANAGEMENT THE RECIPROCAL MODEL OF SAFETY CULTURE - SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT DIMENSION
PERCEPTION THE "SELF-PERCEPTION THEORY"
THE SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY (SCT)
BANDURA' S MODEL OF RECIPROCAL DETERMINISM
THE COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORY
THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL
COMMITMENT SAFETY CULTURE MATURITY MODEL
THE RECIPROCAL MODEL OF SAFETY CULTURE - SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT DIMENSION
COMMUNICATION THE RECIPROCAL MODEL OF SAFETY CULTURE - SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT DIMENSION
126
Chapter 4
BELIEFS
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THE PERFORMANCE MAP
A MODEL OF "SEPARATE ENTITIES VIEW"
THE MODEL OF THEORY OF REASONED ACTION (TRA)
THE MODEL OF THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR (TPB)
THE SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY (SCT)
BANDURA'S MODEL OF RECIPROCAL DETERMINISM
NORM THE MODEL OF THEORY OF REASONED ACTION (TRA) 
THE MODEL OF THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR (TPB)
RESPONSIBILITY SAFETY CULTURE MATURITY MODEL
SELF-EFFICACY THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL
SAFETY CULTURE THE PERFORMANCE MAP
ATTITUDE THE PERFORMANCE MAP
A MODEL OF "SEPARATE ENTITIES VIEW"
THE MODEL OF THEORY OF REASONED ACTION (TRA)
THE MODEL OF THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR (TPB)
THE "SELF-PERCEPTION THEORY"
6. RESEARCH QUESTIONS;
The aim of present study is the exploration of DSRs introspection and various 
cognitive factors which may most likely influence the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the SMS. The study attempts to answer the following research
questions :-
1: Does the hypothesized model fit the data?
2: To what extent does safety culture affect DSRs safety attitude on the
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implementation ofSMS at departmental level?
3: To what extent does safety culture affect DSRs perceptions on the
implementation ofSMS at departmental level? 
4: To what extent does the "Personal Beliefs" of DSRs affect their safety
attitudes on the implementation ofSMS at departmental level?
7. CHAPTER SUMMARY;
The critical review of literature has helped lead the writer towards an 
understanding of the importance of individual differences of DSRs. A total of ten (10) 
variables were identified from eleven (11) theories and models in this chapter. 
Research questions also developed. Available information also provides a substantial 
theoretical framework to develop the research instrument and construction the 
hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". Relationships between ten (10) 
identified variables in the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" will be 
discussed in Chapter Five (5).
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE HYPOTHESIZED 
"DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL"
1. INTRODUCTION;
This chapter focuses on the construction of the hypothesized "DSRs safety 
Attitude Model". It is Step 2 "Model Construction" of the basic approach to performing a 
SEM analysis. After going through the process of literature review, a list of ten (10) 
variables were identified from eleven (11) psychological theories and models through the 
process of model specification. The model will be constructed by exploring the 
relationship between ten (10) identified variables that could potentially influence DSRs 
safety attitude towards the implementation of SMS. In this study, the "Structural equation 
modeling (SEM) approach would be employed as a statistical methodology to test the 
hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model".
2. WHAT IS THE STATISTICAL INSTRUMENT "STRUCTURAL 
EQUATION MODELLING" (SEM)?
What is Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)? Different interpretations of SEM 
are presented and considered.
•$• "Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a statistical methodology that takes 
a confirmatory (i.e., hypothesis-testing) approach to the analysis of a 
structural theory bearing on some phenomenon. Typically, this theory 
represents "causal" processes that generate observations on multiple 
variables. " (Bentler, 1988, pp.317-335)
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•$• "The SEM model is an a priori hypothesis about a pattern of linear
relationships among a set of observed and unobserved variables. The 
objective in using SEM is to determine whether the a priori model is valid, 
rather than to 'find'a suitable model. " (Gefen et al., 2000, pp. 1-78)
In its broadest sense, SEM uses various hypothesized models to depict 
relationships among variables, so as to understand how sets of variables define constructs 
and how these constructs are related to each other. "The researcher first specifies a model 
based on theory, then determines how to measure constructs, collects data, and then inputs 
the data into the SEM software package. The package fits the data to the specified model 
and produces the results, which include overall model Jit statistics and parameter 
estimates." Available from: "Structural Equation Modeling using AMOS: SEM Basics" 
http://www.utexas.edu/its/rc/tutorials/stat/amos/ [Accessed 11 May 2007]
2.1 SEM NOMENCLATURE IN THIS STUDY;
"v* "SEM users represent relationships among observed and unobserved 
variables using path diagrams. Ovals or circles represent latent variables, 
while rectangles or squares represent measured variables. Residuals are 
always unobserved, so they are represented by ovals or circles." Available
from: "Structural Equation Modeling using AMOS: SEM Basics" 
http://www.utexas.edu/its/rc/tutorials/stat/amos/ [Accessed 11 May 2007]
•$• "Structural equation models are schematically portrayed using particular 
configurations of four geometric symbols — a circle (or ellipse), a square 
(or rectangle), a single-headed arrow, and a double-headed arrow. By
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convention, circles (or ellipses) represent unobserved latent factors,
squares (or rectangles) represent observed variables, single-headed 
arrows (—>) represent the impact of one variable on another, and 
double-headed arrows (<-+) represent covariances or correlations between 
pairs of variables. " (Byrne, 2001, p.8)
•y- "Manifest or observed variables are directly measured by researchers, 
while latent or unobserved variables are not directly measured but are 
inferred by the relationships or correlations among measured variables in 
the analysis. " Available from: Structural Equation Modeling using AMOS: SEM 
Basics, http://www.utexas.edu/its/rc/tutorials/stat/amos/ [Accessed 11 May 2007]
•$• ''''The researcher imposes the structure of the hypothesized model on the 
sample data, and that tests how well the observed data fit this restricted 
structure. Because it is highly unlikely that a perfect fit will exist between 
the observed data and the hypothesized model, these will necessarily be a 
differential between the two; this differential is termed the residual. " (Byrne, 
2001,p.7)
After going through the basic concept of an SEM approach in this study, what 
comes next will be focused on construction of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude 
Model".
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3. CONSTRUCTION OF THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRS SAFETY
ATTITUDE" MODEL;
Model construction is focused on the rationale of the schematic construction of 
the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". Steps in construction of the 
hypothesized model listed in Table 9 will be discussed in details.
Table 9: STEPS IN CONSTRUCTION OF THE HYPOTHESIZED 
"DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL"
SECTION
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.4
3.4.1
3.4.2
3.4.3
3.4.4
3.4.5
3.4.6
3.4.7
3.4.8
3.5
3.6
STEPS IN CONSTRUCTION OF THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE 
MODEL"
MODEL SPECIFICATION
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO LATENT VARIABLES "SAFETY CULTURE" AND 
"DSR SAFETY ATTITUDE"
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDENTIFIED VARIABLES (LATENT & OBSERVED) IN 
THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDES MODEL":
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A LATENT VARIABLE "SAFETY CULTURE" AND FIVE 
(5) OBSERVED VARIABLES "MANAGEMENT", "PERCEPTION", "COMMITMENT", 
"COMMUNICATION" AND "NORM"
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A LATENT VARIABLE "ATTITUDE" AND THREE (3) 
OBSERVED VARIABLES "RESPONSIBILITY", "SELF-EFFICACY" AND "BELIEFS"
IDENTIFIED VARIABLES (LATENT & OBSERVED) CONVERTED TO FACTOR 
STRUCTURE OF THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDES MODEL"
SAFETY CULTURE — > SAFETY MANAGEMENT [SM]
SAFETY CULTURE — > DSRs PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY TRAINING [ST]
SAFETY CULTURE — > PERCEIVED MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT TO SAFETY 
[MC]
SAFETY CULTURE —> SAFETY COMMUNICATION [SC]
SAFETY CULTURE —> DSRs PERCEPTIONS OF GROUP SAFETY NORMS [SN]
DSR SAFETY ATTITUDE — > DSRs PERCEIVED SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY [SR]
DSR SAFETY ATTITUDE — > DSRs PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY IN MANAGING 
SAFETY [PE]
DSR SAFETY ATTITUDE — > DSRs PERSONAL BELIEFS IN ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
[PB]
THE SCHEMA OF "DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL"
THE STRUCTURAL "DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL"
3.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION;
"Model specification involves using all of the available relevant theory, research, 
and information and developing a theoretical model. Thus, prior to any data collection or
analysis, the researcher specifies a specific model that should be confirmed -with
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variance-covariance data. In other words, available information is used to decide which
variables to include in the theoretical model (which implicitly also involves which variables 
not to include in the model) and how these variables are related. Model specification 
involves determining every relationship and parameter in the model that is of interest to the 
researcher." (Schumacker et al., 2004, p.62)
Model specification is based on the review of literature; available information is 
used to decide which variables to be included for construction of the hypothesized "DSRs 
Safety Attitude Model" and how these variables are related. From the review of literature 
in the previous chapter, different psychological theories and models from different 
academics could lead the writer towards an understanding of the importance of individual 
differences of DSRs in the University.
Through the process of model specification, a list often (10) identified variables 
considered to have substantial influences upon DSR safety attitude is consolidated for 
construction of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". (See Table 10)
TABLE 10: THE TEN (10) IDENTIFIED VARIABLES FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
HYPOTHESIZED "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL"
TEN (10) IDENTIFIED VARIABLES
MANAGEMENT
PERCEPTION
COMMITMENT
COMMUNICATION
BELIEFS
NORM
RESPONSIBILITY
SELF-EFFICACY
SAFETY CULTURE
ATTITUDE
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3.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO LATENT VARIABLES "SAFETY
CULTURE" AND "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE";
The literature review sheds light on reasons DSRs hold different safety attitudes 
towards the implementation of SMS in the University. DSRs may have different intensity 
of attitudes to safety, because of their perceptions of safety culture. There is some degree 
of consensus that organizational factors such as safety culture influence an individual's 
safety attitude, which in turn influences individual's intention to perform safe behaviour.
The hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" in this study, "Safety Culture" 
and "Attitude" are referred as latent variables. From the literature review, "Attitude" is 
seen as indicative of the organization's "Safety Culture". The linkage of two (2) latent 
variables "Safety Culture" —> "DSRs Safety Attitude" is supported from the following
sources:-
•v- "A good safety culture is reflected in the positive safety attitudes and 
perceptions of the workforce. " (Pidgeon, 1991, pp. 129-140)
"v- "Safety culture reflects the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values that 
employees share in relation to safety". (Cox and Cox, 1991, p.93)
•$• "Safety culture relates to the attitudes, beliefs, values and norms which 
underpin these practices. " (Hale et al., 1998, p.68)
•$• "Safety culture is a sub-facet of organizational culture, -which is thought to 
affect members' attitudes and behaviour in relation to an organization's 
ongoing health and safety performance". (Cooper, 2000, pp. 111-136)
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4- "Attitudes are influenced by the prevailing health and safety culture within
the organization, the commitment of the management, the experience of the 
individual and the influence of the peer group". (Hughes, 2003, p.71)
It is observed that organizational culture can have an influence on safety 
performance and safety culture is a subset of an overall organizational culture. A high 
level of safety culture will produce a positive impact upon the DSRs safety attitude towards 
the implementation of SMS at departmental level. It is assumed that the latent variable 
"DSR Safety Attitude" is directly influence by another latent variable "Safety Culture" in 
the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". For easy reference, a pictorial 
representation of the relationship between two latent variables "Safety Culture" and "DSR 
safety Attitude" is depicted in Figure 19. By convention, symbols and notations in the 
diagram included an ellipse to represent a latent variable and single-headed arrow (—>) 
representing the impact of one variable on another.
FIGURE 19: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO LATENT VARIABLES 
"SAFETY CULTURE" AND "DSR SAFETY ATTITUDE"
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The next step is to explain relationships of latent and observed variables in the
hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model".
3.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDENTIFIED VARIABLES (LATENT 
& OBSERVED) IN THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDES 
MODEL";
Individual differences of DSRs arising from personal beliefs, perceptions about 
risk, perceived self-efficacy in managing safety and social contexts may lead to the 
development of different safety attitudes towards the implementation of SMS.
For construction of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model", the two 
latent variables "Safety Culture" and "Attitude" are to be inferred through numbers of 
observed variables along their paths. Schumacker et al. (2004, pp. 11-12) states that 
"Latent variable is an unobserved variable that is not directly measured, but is computed 
using multiple observed variables " and "Observed variable is a raw score obtained from a 
test or measurement instrument on a trait of interest".
In this study, "Safety Culture" and "Attitude" are referred as latent variables; 
"Management", "Perception", "Commitment", "Communication", "Beliefs", "Norm",
r>
"Responsibility" and "Self-efficacy" are referred as observed variables. For easy 
reference, a fresh list of eight (8) observed variables and two (2) latent variables with the 
aim of constructing a hypothesized model is summarized in Table 11.
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TABLE 11: A LIST OF EIGHT (8) OBSERVED VARIABLES AND TWO (2) LATENT VARIABLES
LATENT VARIABLES
OBSERVED VARIABLES
SAFETY CULTURE, ATTITUDE
MANAGEMENT, PERCEPTION, COMMITMENT, 
COMMUNICATION, BELIEFS, NORM, 
RESPONSIBILITY, SELF-EFFICACY
The relationship between latent variables and observed variables will be 
discussed in the following sections.
3.3.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A LATENT VARIABLE "SAFETY 
CULTURE" AND FIVE (5) OBSERVED VARIABLES "MANAGEMENT". 
"PERCEPTION". "COMMITMENT". "COMMUNICATION" AND 
"NORM";
From the literature review, "Safety Culture" is a latent variable represented by the 
five (5) observed variables included "Management", "Perception", "Commitment", 
"Communication" and "Norm" based on the following rationales:-
*v- "Safety culture is defined as the shared values, beliefs, assumptions, and 
norms 'which may govern organizational decision making, as well as 
individual and group attitudes about safety. " (Ciavarelli & Figlock, 1996, 
pp.1033-1035)
•v- "The safety culture of an organization is4he product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organization's health and safety management. Organizations with a 
positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on 
mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by
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confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures. " (HSE, 1997)
"Y- "'Many of the relevant definitions of safety culture emphasize shared 
attitudes, values and beliefs and stress the interactions with the 
organization's safety structures and control systems and appropriate 
behavioural norms". (Reason, 1998; pp.293-306)
•$• Safety management, management commitment, communications, and safety 
training are key elements in the Safety Management Dimension of the 
Reciprocal Model of Safety Culture. (Cooper, 2000, pp. 111-136)
Five (5) observed variables included "Management", "Perception", 
"Commitment", "Communication" and "Norm" are directly influence by "Safety Culture". 
Linkages between a latent variable "Safety Culture" and five (5) observed variables are 
summarized in Table 12:-
TABLE 12; LINKAGES BETWEEN A LATENT VARIABLE "SAFETY CULTURE" AND
FIVE OBSERVED VARIABLES
w LATENT VARIABLE
SAFETY CULTURE
OBSERVED VARIABLES
> MANAGEMENT 
> PERCEPTION 
> COMMITMENT 
> COMMUNICATION 
> NORM
For easy reference, pictorial representation of linkages between a latent variable 
"Safety Culture" and five observed variables is depicted in Figure 20. By convention, 
symbols and notations in the diagram included ellipse represent latent variable, rectangle 
represent observed variable and single-headed arrow (—») represent the impact of one 
variable on another.
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FIGURE 20: LINKAGES BETWEEN A LATENT VARIABLE "SAFETY CULTURE" AND FIVE OBSERVED VARIABLES 
"MANAGEMENT". "PERCEPTION'% "COMMITMENT". "COMMUNICATION" AND "NORM"
3.3.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A LATENT VARIABLE "ATTITUDE" 
AND THREE (3) OBSERVED VARIABLES "RESPONSIBILITY". 
"SELF-EFFICACY" AND "BELIEFS";
From the literature review, "Attitude" is a latent variable represented by three (3) 
observed variables included "Responsibility", "Self-efficacy" and "Beliefs" based on the 
following rationales:-
-v" Any time you change what people believe and value, you change their 
culture and in turn their attitudes. (Eckenfelder, 2003, p.32)
<• "Attitudes are formed as a result of continuing experience of situations 
during a lifetime." (Stranks, 1994, p.36); and "The most effective way of 
creating a strong sense of efficacy is through mastery experiences". 
(Bandura, 1994, pp.71-81) "The health belief model stipulates that a 
person's health-related behaviour depends on the person's perception of four 
critical areas: the severity of a potential illness, the person's susceptibility to
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that illness, the benefits of taking a preventive action, and the barriers to
taking that action. The model also incorporates cues to action (e.g., 
leaving a written reminder to oneself to -walk) as important elements in 
eliciting or maintaining patterns of behaviour. The construct of 
self-efficacy, or a person's confidence in his or her ability to successfully 
perform an action, has been added to the model, perhaps olio-wing it to 
better account for habitual behaviours, such as a physically active lifestyle."
Available from: Grizzell J., Health Belief Model, 
http://www.csupomona.edu/~ivgrizzellfbest practices/bctheorv.html [Accessed 15 
September 2007]
•$- Workers' safety attitudes and perceptions of risk at the workplace will be 
influenced by their personal beliefs about risk and safety; personal 
involvement; individual responsibility. (Clarke et al., 2004, p.53)
Three (3) observed variables included "Responsibility", "Beliefs" and 
"Self-efficacy" are directly influenced by "Attitude". Linkages between a latent variable 
"Attitude" and three (3) observed variables are summarized in Table 13:-
TABLE 13; LINKAGES BETWEEN A LATENT VARIABLE "ATTITUDE" AND
THREE OBSERVED VARIABLES
LATENT VARIABLE
ATTITUDE
OBSERVED VARIABLES
> RESPONSIBILITY
> BELIEFS 
> SELF-EFFICACY
For easy reference, pictorial representation of linkages between a latent variable 
"Attitude" and three (3) observed variables is depicted in Figure 21. By convention, 
symbols and notations in the diagram included ellipse represent latent variable, rectangle
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represent observed variable and single-headed arrow (—») represent the impact of
variable on another.
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FIGURE 21: LINKAGES BETWEEN A LATENT VARIABLE "ATTITUDE" AND THREE OBSERVED VARIABLES 
"RESPONSIBILITY". "BELIEFS" AND "SELF-EFFICACY"
After exploring the possible relationship between the ten (10) identified variables, 
the summary of eight (8) observed variables grouped under two (2) latent variables is 
listed in Table 14.
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TABLE 14; THE EIGHT (8) OBSERVED VARIABLES GROUPED UNDER 
TWO (2) LATENT VARIABLES
TWO (2) LATENT VARIABLES
SAFETY CULTURE
ATTITUDE
EIGHT (8) OBSERVED VARIABLES
> MANAGEMENT 
> PERCEPTION 
> COMMITMENT 
> COMMUNICATION 
> NORM
> RESPONSIBILITY
> BELIEFS 
> SELF-EFFICACY
What comes next is to convert latent and observed variables to factor structure for 
construction of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model".
3.4 IDENTIFIED VARIABLES fLATENT & OBSERVED) CONVERTED TO 
FACTOR STRUCTURE OF THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRS SAFETY 
ATTITUDES MODEL";
One of the most important issues in SEM is the distinction between observed 
variables and latent variables. "Observed variable are the variables that are actually 
measured, such as manifested performance on a particular test or the measures to specific 
items or questions on an inventory or questionnaire. In the contrast, latent variables are 
the hypothetically existing constructs of interest in a study. " (Raykov et al., 2000, pp.8-9)
A hypothetical construct is described as "A conjectured entity, process, or event 
that is not observed directly but is assumed to explain an observable phenomenon. It is 
not merely a summary of the relationships between observable variables but contains 
surplus meaning over and above such relationships ". Available from: A Dictionary of Psychology, 
Hypothetical Construct. http://wwrw.encvclopedia.com/doc/lO87-hvpotheticalconstruct.html [Accessed 22 
April 2008]
142
Chapter 5 143 
Jackson et al. (2005, pp.3-13) opine that "With SEM, one can model not only the
relationship between measured variables, but also the relationship between unmeasured, 
hypothetical constructs. " To construct the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" 
for SEM analysis, all identified variables are converted to factor structure. (See Table 15)
TABLE 15; SUMMARIZES OF IDENTIFIED VARIABLES CONVERTED TO FACTOR STRUCTURE
TWO (2)
LATENT VARIABLES
(Hypothetical Constructs)
EIGHT (8) OBSERVED VARIABLES
SAFETY CULTURE MANAGEMENT-*
SAFETY MANAGEMENT [SM]
PERCEPTION—*
DSRs PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY TRAINING [ST]
COMMITMENT—*
PERCEIVED MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT To
SAFETY [MC]
COMMUNICA TION —>
SAFETY COMMUNICATION [SC]
NORM—*
DSRs PERCEPTIONS OF GROUP SAFETY NORMS 
[SN]
ATTITUDE^*
DSR SAFETY ATTITUDE
RESPONSIBILITY —>•
DSRs PERCEIVED SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY [SR]
SELF-EFFICACY ^ >
DSRs PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY IN MANAGING 
SAFETY [PE]
BELIEFS —>
DSRs PERSONAL BELIEFS IN ACCIDENT CAUSATION
At this stage, the factor structure of two latent variables and eight (8) observed 
variables would be discussed in the following sections from 3.4.1to 3.4.8.
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3.4.1 SAFETY CULTURE -» SAFETY MANAGEMENT TSM1;
An effective SMS can helps to strengthen safety culture and to reduce the 
incidence of illness and injury in the organization. Taylor et al. (2004, p.511) states that 
"TTze management system creates a safety culture that reinforces safe and healthy work 
practices while training helps provide the knowledge, skills and practice necessary to 
sustain this culture ". The purpose of developing, maintaining and implementing SMS is 
not only to fulfill the legal requirements and morally responsibility, but to instill a 
consistent and positive safety culture in the organization.
Hale et al. (1998, p.68) state that "Safety management relates to the actual 
practices, roles, and functions associated with remaining safe". In the University, an 
effective SMS requires active and continuing participation by management and 
stakeholders to achieve a good safety performance. The University's management 
commitment is clearly expounded in the Statement of Health and Safety Policy hi the 
University's Safety & Environmental Protection Manual issued in 1997. "It is the policy 
of the University to provide for the protection of its personnel, attending students, visitors, 
facilities and surrounding environment through the development and implementation of a 
comprehensive safety and environmental protection programme." Available from: The Hong 
Kong University of Science & Technology, Safety & Environmental Protection Manual (1997 version) 
Chapter 1: Policies and Management, http://www.ab.ust.hk/hseo/sm06/chl.htm [Accessed 28 February 2008]
In ensuring compliance with legal requirements, the University's policy, in-house 
safety rules and Codes of Practices, as well as to perform morally obligations to 
stakeholders, all HODs have management responsibility for the overall strategic planning 
including the provision sufficient resources to DSRs for the implementation of SMS.
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Cultivating safety culture should be in-line with the development of SMS and other
business operations in the University. DSRs have to foster safety culture and monitoring 
the performance of safety at work. Through the dedication and support from all 
stakeholders in past years, the effect of safety management initiatives throughout the 
University has been become more visible. In this study, DSRs perceptions of safety 
management in the University will be examined through the questionnaire survey.
3.4.2 SAFETY CULTURE -» DSR'S PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY TRAINING
[ST1;
What is the major difference between safe employees and employees who are 
classified as "accident-prone"? The major difference is that safe employees always follow 
safety procedures and work safely with a high degree of safety consciousness. This is the 
matter of individuals' safety perception. In psychology and the cognitive sciences, 
"perception is the way in which people interpret the environment or the way in which a 
person believes or understands a situation". (Hughes, 2003, p.71)
Stranks (1994, p.55) points out that "How people perceive risk is associated with 
a number of behavioural factors - attitude, personality, memory, their ability to process 
information, the level of training received, the level of arousal and individual skills 
available". The consequences of failing to understand safety training can be severe 
because they can go directly into potentially hazardous situations. As Kletz (1990, p. 165) 
describes "Someone does not know what to do or, worse still, thinks he knows but does not". 
Therefore, safety training in the University has its role in providing an important 
foundation upon which to develop basic competencies that will help staff members and 
students understand hazards of their job and perform it more safely.
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Safety training is not a panacea in managing safety at work. It should be
regarded as a long term management strategy which can help to develop people's 
competence in managing safety at the workplace. Safety training can also help to promote 
positive safety culture among the workforce by changing individual's beliefs and attitudes 
towards safety through the systematic acquisition of knowledge, skills that result in 
improved overall performance in the organization. Wells Jr. (2003, p.26) points out that 
"There are four main areas of a safety program that, when implemented correctly, can help 
create and maintain a safety culture. Heavy focus has to be placed on training, 
participation, accident prevention, and accountability when evaluating any existing safety 
program," Providing adequate safety training to employees is a legal responsibility of 
employers, under the OSHO of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It is 
important that people in the workplace should be properly trained. In this study, DSRs 
perceptions of safety training in the University will be examined through the questionnaire 
survey.
3.4.3 SAFETY CULTURE -» PERCEIVED MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT 
TO SAFETY fMCI;
Management commitment to safety refers to the degree to which an 
organization's senior management prioritizes safety in decision-making and allocates 
adequate resources to safety. Cooper (1995, p.2) defines 'commitment to safety' as 
"Individual's identification with and involvement in safety activities, characterized by a 
strong acceptance of and belief in the organizations safety goals and a willingness to exert 
effort to improve safety in the workplace ".
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Safety is an ever-present priority in the organization due to the large potential for
injuries, illness and property damages. Cultivating safety culture and developing proper 
attitudes toward safety at work are a commitment of senior management in the organization. 
Mearns et al. (2003, pp.641-680) points out that "Safety management practices as an 
indicator of the safety culture of upper management." From a practical point of view, 
management can demonstrate their commitment to safety by prioritizing safety in 
decision-making, providing visible management commitment (for example, participating in 
workplace safety walks on ad hoc basis) and the allocation of reasonable resources (i.e. 
manpower, money and time) to safety.
Kam (1995, p.35) commented that "No safety program or system -will be 
successful without unfailing support from the management"; and "Only -with the devoted 
and sincere support, the morale of the employees will be boosted and the safety system and 
safety programme will be on a smooth path to success. "
Cultivating a good safety culture requires the strongest possible management 
commitment from senior management and this commitment will, in turn, produce higher 
levels of motivation throughout the organization. Hughes (2003, p.66) points out that 
"TTze most important factor affecting the culture is the commitment to health and safety 
from the top of an organization."'' Indeed, the strongest commitment to safety from senior 
management not only has positive effects on safety culture, but also reaps tangible rewards 
in terms of high efficiency, high profitability, high reliability and good company goodwill.
The commitment exhibited by senior management can impact a variety of areas 
including DSRs' perceptions that safety is valued in the University. ReVelle et al. (1981,
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p.34) pointed out that "Management's influence on the worker is too important to be
ignored, neglected, or treated casually. Even -without proper care and feeding, 
management's attitudes will be transmitted to the employees, for good or for ill". Where 
DSRs perceive managerial attitudes toward safety to be less than adequate, they might 
become less committed to the workplace safety. Furthermore, overall safety performance 
can be improved by being committed across all levels of the organization to the goal of 
eliminating the causes of accidents. "A positive health and safety culture needs the 
involvement of the whole workforce just as a successful quality system does. There must 
be a joint commitment in terms of attitudes and values. The workforce must believe that 
the safety measures put in place will be effective and followed even when financial and 
performance targets may be affected." (Hughes, 2003 p.64) In this study, DSRs 
perceptions of management commitment to safety in the University will be examined 
through the questionnaire survey.
3.4.4 SAFETY CULTURE -» SAFETY COMMUNICATION [SCI;
Employees must work safely to protect themselves and others. Effective 
communication could help to foster safety culture amongst employees at all levels. 
"Organizations with good safety cultures can be characterized by a good safety 
communication system that flows from top to bottom, oi-directionally through both formal 
and informal communication channels throughout an organization. " (Cooper, 1995, p.4)
In reality, an accident in one department has lessons for other, but very often the 
right people do not get the right message effectively. If hazards, risks and causation of 
accident are not communicated at and through all levels of the organization, there will be
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little understanding of the risks control to prevent its recurrence. To remove the barrier,
management in the organization should cultivate a positive safety culture and enhancing 
effective safety communication amongst stakeholders.
"A positive safety culture is characterized by 'communications founded on 
mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence in the 
efficacy of preventive measures". (HSC, 1993) In the University, a fundamental element 
of a positive safety culture is characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by 
shared perceptions of the importance of safety between departmental management, DSRs, 
staff members, students and contractors. Under an open discussion and constructive 
communication atmosphere, people would freely discuss safety related matters 
demonstrating actively caring, so as to reduce interpersonal conflicts. In this study, DSRs 
perceptions of safety communication in the University will be examined through the 
questionnaire survey.
3.4.5 SAFETY CULTURE -» DSR'S PERCEPTIONS OF GROUP SAFETY 
NORMS rSNI;
Perception is the way people interpret things or the way in which a person 
believes or understands a situation. Cooper (2003, p.39) states that "Perception is a key 
component of human behaviour. It is the mechanism with which a per son evaluates inputs 
from the external environment, which, in turn, determines his/her behavioural response. In 
conjunction with personality or disposition, attitudes and previous experiences, perceptions 
comprise a person's unique appraisal of the environment. These perceptions are critical 
antecedents that precede behaviour as they form a vital part of the human survival 
instinct." Many accidents have occurred because people were not aware the existence of
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risks.
In many situations, group safety norms developed by the workgroup will greatly 
influence the individual's perception and value on safety. "Group characteristics, such as 
the reference group (e.g., safety personnel, managers, employees) to which the person 
belongs, will affect his/her perceptions of risk. " (Harding et al., 1984, pp.131-141) The 
model of TPB clearly explains that the more positive attitudes, subjective norms and PBC; 
the stronger the intention to perform the behaviour. There are many common examples of 
this, including the use of personal protective equipment in construction sites (such as 
wearing of full-body safety-harness while working at height). "The goal of safety culture 
is to develop a norm in which employees are aware of the risks in their workplace and are 
continually on the lookout for hazards. " (Ostrom et al., 1993, pp.163-172) It is important 
to understand that perceptions can lead to increases in safety awareness or ignoring safety 
instructions or taking short cuts at work. Management should attempt to encourage group 
norms that positively affect the safety culture in the entire organization.
Pidgeon (1998, pp.202-216) found that "Norms by which a risk is judged are 
continuously negotiated and re-negotiated through the working practice of the team. 
These negotiations may lead to risk acceptance if improvements in safety are not 
prioritized". Hence, a strong safety culture and positive group safety norms should lead 
to more positive reactions to various safety issues, including safety practices. A SMS is 
generally developed to support other safety management initiatives. Therefore, group 
safety norms should also influence the effectiveness of SMS implementation. In a work 
situation, if employees do not believe that management or colleagues are concerned with 
safety, then they are less likely to consider safety as important. In this study, DSRs 
perceptions of group safety norms in the University will be examined through the
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questionnaire survey.
Up to this end, the relationship between a latent variable (hypothetical construct) 
"Safety Culture" and five (5) observed variables included "Safety Management [SM]", 
"DSRs Perceptions of Safety Training [ST]", "Perceived Management Commitment to 
Safety [MC]", "Safety Communication [SC]" and "DSRs Perceptions of Group Safety 
Norms [SN]" had been discussed in detail.
The relationship between a latent variable (hypothetical construct) "DSR Safety 
Attitude" and (3) observed variables included "DSRs Perceived Safety Responsibility 
[SR]", "DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in Managing Safety [PE]" and "DSRs Personal 
Beliefs in Accident Causation [PB]" will be discussed in the following sections.
3.4.6 DSR SAFETY ATTITUDE -» DSRS PERCEIVED SAFETY
RESPONSIBILITY fSRI;
DSRs are responsible for ensuring that all operations are performed with the 
utmost regard for the safety and health of all personnel involved. The effectiveness of 
SMS is very much depends on individual's attitude of DSR towards safety and how they 
valued their safety responsibility. Clarke et al. (2004, p.53) states that "Workers'safety 
attitudes and perceptions of risk at the -workplace will be influenced by their personal 
beliefs about risk and safety; personal involvement; individual responsibility". Greater 
acceptance of individual responsibility for safety will motivate the more positive attitudes 
towards the implementation of SMS. Cheyne et al. (1998, pp.255-271) indicates that 
"Individual responsibility mediates the relationship between personal involvement and 
safety activities; physical work environment has a direct effect on safety activities, while the 
relationship with workplace hazards is also mediated by individual responsibility".
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Managing safety is not an easy task. If HOD wants safety to be an integral part 
of the department's shared values, then, DSRs are the group of people to make it happen. 
The strength of DSRs' attitudes and added responsibility to safety played major roles at 
departmental level. Everyone in the workplace may possibly be influence by DSRs 
attitude and responsibility towards safety. If DSRs are responsible persons, they have 
consideration for every safety aspect in the workplace. As committed by the management 
that the University will dedicate all reasonable resources and effort possible to protect its 
employees, students, facilities, and the environment. HODs have to avoid undercutting 
DSRs authorities and resources to carry out safety duties. The support from management 
and staff at all levels is reflected from group safety norms; management commitment and 
communication do impose a reciprocated effect upon the safety responsibility of the DSRs. 
In this study, DSRS perceived behavioural control regarding safety responsibility will be 
examined through the questionnaire survey.
3.4.7 DSR SAFETY ATTITUDE -> DSR'S PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY IN
MANAGING SAFETY [PE1;
In terms of self-efficacy, Geller (2003, p.6) states that "Self-efficacy refers to a 
person's belief that he or she can perform a certain procedure or technique. It reflects 
self-confidence and a 'can do 'attitude. "
What is perceived self-efficacy? Bandura (1994, pp.71-81) defines "Perceived 
self-efficacy" as "People's beliefs about their capabilities to produce designated levels of 
performance that exercise influence over events that affect their lives". Bandura (2001,
pp. 1-26) added that ''''Perceived self-efficacy is the foundation of human agency and plays
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an important role in the causal structure of social cognitive theory, because efficacy beliefs
affect adaptation and change ". This has been examined in detail in the Social Cognitive 
Theory (self-efficacy) and Theory of Planned Behaviour.
DSRs self-efficacy could possibly affect their attitude toward the implementation 
of SMS. The success of an effective SMS in the University very much depends on DSRs 
personal beliefs regarding self-efficacy in managing safety at their workplaces.
Most laboratories in the University are chasing new technologies that are 
replacing traditional methods for research projects from time to time. The rapid pace of 
social and technological change requires DSRs to acquire new competencies and to obtain 
the most update information and technology in dealing health and safety issues at their 
workplaces. Ones sense of self-efficacy is determined by an array of personal, social, and 
environmental factors and it reflects ones confidence in the ability to perform specified 
tasks at designated levels. In this study, DSRS personal beliefs regarding self-efficacy in 
managing safety will be examined through the questionnaire survey.
3.4.8 DSR SAFETY ATTITUDE -» DSR'S PERSONAL BELIEFS IN 
ACCIDENT CAUSATION [FBI;
Accident causation is complex and generally caused by someone's failure to 
perform or not to perform something in a certain way. The factors affecting the way 
people behave safely in a hazardous situation are largely associated with personal beliefs 
about the causes of accidents. In trying to understand the basis of personal beliefs about 
the causes of accidents, people must begin by looking at their own beliefs and attitudes. 
Cooper (1995, p.3) points out that "Beliefs about the causes of accidents are an important
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element of an effective safety culture because they guide peoples thinking and actions when
accidents occur or when trying to solve safety problems". In general, people's attitudes 
are accumulated over their lifetimes and are formed by direct personal experiences, as well 
as influenced by safety culture in the organization. People's attitudes tend to be very 
stable and more resistant to change once developed. As Robbins (1996, p. 180) describes 
that "Attitudes are established in the early years of an individual's development by teachers, 
parents and peer group members; in other words, attitudes are modeled after those of the 
persons whom people admire, respect or even fear".
Cooper (1997a, pp.185-202) points out that "Specific attitudinal biasing factors 
that affect risk perception in safety include people's personal commitment to safety, their 
beliefs about the causes of accidents and how stressful they find their jobs". DSRs 
personal beliefs in accident causation resulted from their previous experiences. The 
positive or negative experiences towards a specific object or person have a serious 
influence on how a person will feel about that object. Gordon (1991, p.54) points out that 
"The strength of an attitude depends mainly on the type of experience the individual who 
holds that attitude has had with the person, object or situation that he/she holds an attitude 
about: the more direct the experience, the stronger the attitude". In this study, DSRs 
personal beliefs in accident causation will be examined through the questionnaire survey.
At this stage, the factor structure of two (2) latent variables (hypothetical 
constructs) and eight (8) observed variables was discussed in detail. The next stage goes 
to the formation of "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" schema.
3.5 THE SCHEMA OF "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL";
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For the construction of "DSRs Safety Attitude Model", the two (2) latent
variables (hypothetical constructs) are "Safety Culture" and "DSR Safety Attitude". At 
this stage, the model schema is built on two (2) latent variables (hypothetical constructs) in 
which "DSR Safety Attitude" (the target variable) is directly influence by "Safety Culture" 
and the eight (8) observed variables are being grouped under these two (2) latent variables 
(hypothetical constructs). Followings are details of grouping of variables:-
•fr "Safety Culture" directly influences on "Safety Management [SM]", "DSRs 
Perceptions of Safety Training" [ST], "Perceived Management Commitment 
to Safety" [MC], "Safety Communication" [SC] and "DSRs Perceptions of 
Group Safety Norms" [SN] in a positive way. It is therefore, the five (5) 
observed variables [SM], [ST], [MC], [SC] and [SN] that are grouped under 
a latent variable (hypothetical construct) "Safety Culture".
•v- "DSR Safety Attitude" (the target variable) directly influences on "DSRs 
Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]", "DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in 
Managing Safety" [PE] and "DSRs Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation" 
[PB]. It is therefore, the three (3) observed variables [SR], [PE] and [PB] 
are grouped under a latent variable (hypothetical construct) "DSR Safety 
Attitude".
In building a SEM model schema, each of symbols and notation within the 
framework represents an important component in the analytic process. For easy reference, 
pictorial representation of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" schema is 
depicted in Figure 22. By convention, symbols and notations in the model schema 
included ellipse represent latent variable, rectangle represent observed variable and
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single-headed arrow (—>) represent the impact of one variable on another.
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The Hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" Schema
Safety 
Culture
DSR
Safety
Attitude
FIGURE 22: THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL" SCHEMA
The model schema is formed to explain the direct and indirect effects amongst 
eight (8) observed variables and two (2) latent variables. In this study, the latent variable 
"DSR Safety Attitude" is treated as the target variable. The next stage is goes to build the 
structural "DSRs Safety Attitude Model".
3.6 THE STRUCTURAL "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL";
The goal in building a structural model with logical paths seeks to confirm 
whether theoretical underlying constructs are reflected in the observed data. "In SEM, the 
terms independent and dependent variables are abandoned; instead variables are referred 
to as "exogenous" or "endogenous." Endogenous variables are those modeled as
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dependent on other variables, while exogenous are not dependent on other variables."
(Jackson et al., 2005, pp.3-6) From this point and onward, independent (observed) and 
dependant (latent) variables in the structural model are referred to as exogenous and 
endogenous variables respectively.
In this study, the structural model contains with eight (8) exogenous variables are 
representing underlying two endogenous variables (latent variables) namely "Safety 
Culture" and "DSRs Safety Attitude". An endogenous variable "Safety Culture" was 
measured by five (5) exogenous variables included SM, ST, MC, SC and SN. Another 
endogenous variable "DSRs Safety Attitude" (also the target variable) was measured by 
three (3) exogenous variables included SR, PE and PB.
Raykov et al. (2000, p.l) points out that "Structural equation modeling provides 
researchers with a comprehensive method for the quantification and testing of theories. 
Other major characteristics of structural equation models are that they explicitly take into 
account the measurement error that is ubiquitous in most disciplines and contain latent 
variable ".
The error terms represent residual variances within variables not accounted for by 
pathways hypothesized in the model. "Structural error terms, also called residual error 
terms or disturbance terms, which reflect the unexplained variance in the latent 
endogenous variable(s) due to all unmeasured causes." Available from: Garson, D., Structural 
Equation Modeling, http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm [Accessed 7 December 2007]
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"One of the advantages to SEM, is that latent variables are free of random error.
This is because error has been estimated and removed, leaving only a common variance. " 
Available from: Stocking, R. Structural Equation Modeling / Path Analysis. 
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~efc/classesfoiol710/pathySEMwebpage.htm [Accessed 7 December 2007] In 
structural "DSRs Safety Attitude Model", the only error term of endogenous variable 
(latent variable) e9 and error terms of eight (8) exogenous variables through el to e8 are 
imposed.
The paths from error terms are:-
> el to "Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]"
+ e2 to "DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in Managing Safety [PE]"
•0- e3 to "DSRs Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation [PB]"
•> e4 to "Safety Management [SM]"
^ e5 to "DSRs Perceptions of Safety Training [ST]"
•*• e6 to "Perceived Management Commitment to Safety [MC]"
<• e7 to "Safety Communication [SC]"
<> e8 to "DSRs Perceptions of Group Safety Norms [SN]"
+ e9 to "DSRs Safety Attitude"
Hence, the structural "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" is developed (in Figure 23) 
by incorporating error terms (residuals).
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The structural "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" is a hypothesized schema depicting
the possible relationships that are believed to exist between variables after theoretical 
evaluations. The direction of arrows on logical paths and the underlying latent construct 
is believed to "cause" the observed variables. Causal effects are represented by 
single-headed arrows in the path diagram.
The Structural "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" 
With Error Terms Imposed
ST
MC sc
V t
L
SN
k *
/
e9'
FIGURE 23: THE STRUCTURAL "DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL" WITH ERROR TERMS IMPOSED
4. WHAT GOES NEXT?
Model specification is the exercise in justifying a specified model after the 
theoretical evaluation from literature review. The schema of structural "DSRs Safety 
Attitude Model" is finally constructed by exploring the relationship between ten (10) 
identified variables that could potentially influence the DSR safety attitude towards the 
implementation of SMS at departmental level. The model is a hypothesized schema
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depicting the possible relationships that are believed to exist between variables. For
consistency, the term hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" will continue to be used 
in this study.
The Chapter Six (6) will proceed to the "Step Three - Instrument Construction" 
and "Step Four - Data Collection" in according to the basic approach to performing a SEM 
analysis. Based on causal effects amongst ten (10) identified variables in the structural 
model, it will describe how the questionnaire was designed to cope with all the research 
hypotheses. Methods of data collection, the testing of validity and reliability of the 
questionnaire will be discussed in detail. To solve the statistical problems a mathematical 
technique called Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is to be employed.
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CHAPTER SIX
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTION:
The structural "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" was constructed through various 
complex processes in the previous chapter. This chapter will proceed to the "Step Three - 
Instrument Construction" and the "Step Four - Data Collection" in accordance with the 
basic approach to performing a SEM analysis. This is a substantial part containing a 
detailed description regarding the instrument construction, method of data collection and 
analysis included the testing of validity and reliability of the survey questionnaire. To 
minimize the chance of a middle option in attitude survey, a self-reported six (6) points 
Likert type "DSRs Safety Attitudes Survey" questionnaire was developed to collect data 
from the targeted group (i.e. DSRs). The survey questionnaire was piloted in 2006 and data 
collected from the pilot survey was analyzed to evaluate the factorial structure for each 
distribution.
With respect to analyzing data in the pilot test, Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 11.0 for Windows was employed to test validity and reliability of 
the survey questionnaire. With the pilot data, the validity test was conducted by using 
factor analysis to single out those items which doubly loaded to two or more factors; or 
alienated factors that did not belong to a specific group. After the validity test, only 
forty-three (43) items out of seventy-seven (77) original questionnaire items retained for 
the field survey. Reliability test for internal consistency of all forty-three (43) items also 
conducted. Results reflects Cronbach's alpha 'a' values ranging from 0.8764 to 0.9349;
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over the recommended level of 0.70 and no significant cross-loading among the eight (8) 
exogenous variables.
With good evidence of validity and reliability being obtained from the pilot test, the 
survey questionnaire was then restructured into forty-three (43) items for the field survey. 
Data collected from 144 valid questionnaires in the field survey was tested. Reliability 
was also re-tested and the result confirmed Cronbach's alpha 'a' values ranging from 
0.8297 to 0.9192, over the recommended level of 0.70. The data is highly consistent 
internally and will be subjected to model testing in Chapter Seven (7).
2. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS;
Ethics approval to conduct the study was obtained from the University of HULL. 
There were no aspects of this study that involved any risk or imposed any adverse effect to 
the participants. Confidentiality for all respondents was ensured! There was no 
requirement to put respondent's name and department in each questionnaire.
3. MAJOR STEPS INVOLVED IN THE INSTRUMENT CONSTRUCTION 
AND DATA COLLECTION FOR SEM ANALYSIS;
This section focused on the "Step Three - Instrument Construction" and the "Step 
Four - Data Collection" in accordance to the basic approach to performing a SEM analysis. 
Schumacker et al. (2004, p.2) clearly point out the goal of SEM analysis is "to determine 
the extent to which the theoretical model is supported by sample data". Major steps 
involved in developing the research instrument and data collection for SEM analysis is 
shown in Table 16 for easy reference.
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TABLE 16; MAJOR STEPS INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT AND
DATA COLLECTION FOR SEM ANALYSIS
STEPl
STEP 2
STEPS
STEP 4
STEPS
STEP 6
STEP?
DESIGN OF QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PILOT TEST
IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLE SIZE
COLLECTION OF DATA FOR PILOT TEST
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS - VALIDITY 
TESTING OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
RESTRUCTURE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
AND RELIABILITY
FOR FIELD SURVEY.
COLLECTION OF FIELD DATA
RE-TEST OF RELIABILITY
3.1 STEP 1; DESIGN OF QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PILOT TEST;
In this study, the purpose of the questionnaire design for the pilot test was 
threefold:-
4- To develop instruments for measuring responses of DSRs safety attitudes 
towards the implementation of SMS that probed into the possible 
relationship between DSRs safety attitudes and various co-factors.
<J> To gain an in-depth understanding of factors that influenced DSRs safety 
attitudes towards the implementation of SMS; and
4- To determine if any change in the survey design was necessary.
What are the reasons behind to use a self-reported six (6) points Likert type 
survey questionnaire for an attitude survey in this study*?
«v" "The role of the questionnaire is to elicit the information that is required to 
enable the researcher to answer the objectives of the survey. To do this the 
questionnaire must not only collect the data required, but collect the data in 
the most accurate way possible. " (Brace, 2004, p.7)
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•^ "An attitude survey can be used to test a respondent's conviction or 
emotionals about an object or subject. It is therefore used to determine 
what a person's physical behaviour towards a psychological object might 
be." (Wilson,2005,p. 138)
*v- "Attitudes can be measured in a number of ways. The most widely used 
methods involve some form of self-report. For example, the subject might 
be given an attitude questionnaire with items that relate to the matter at 
hand. " (Gleitman, 1991, p.459)
*0" The commonly used approach to measuring attitude is the itemized rating 
scale. "The Likert scale (frequently known as an 'agree-disagree' scale) 
was first published by psychologist Rensis Likert in 1932. The technique 
presents respondents with a series of attitude dimensions, for each of which 
they are asked whether, and how strongly, they agree or disagree, using one 
of a number of positions on a five-point scale. " (Brace, 2004, p.86)
•$• "Likert scale is a widely used technique for scaling attitudes. Respondents 
are presented with a number of items, some positively phrased and some 
negatively phrased, which have been found to discriminate most clearly 
between extreme views on the subject of study". Available from: Marshall G
(1998). Likert Scale. http://wvyw.encvclopedia.com/doc/lO88-Likertscale.html [Accessed 
15 April 2008]
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Dillion et al. (1994, p.318) highlights two advantages of the Likert scale:
1. The construction and administration of the scale is relatively easy.
2. The simplicity of the instructions and the rating task make it possible to 
use the postal service to collect data.
> Oskamp et al. (2005, p.49) states that "Likert method was the first approach 
that measured the extent or intensity of the respondent's agreement with 
each item, rather than simply obtaining a 'yes-no 'response. In this method, 
again, a large number of opinion statements on a given topic are collected, 
but each one is phrased in such a way that it can be answered on a 6-point 
rating scale." Brace (2004, p.85) points out that "Some practitioners 
prefer to use a scale with an even number of points. They eliminate the 
neutral mid-point in an attempt to force those who would otherwise choose 
it to give an inclination one way or the other." It is suggested that the 
exclusion of a neutral point will draw the respondent to make a decision one 
way or the other.
In this study, to minimize the chance of middle option, a self-reported 6-point 
Likert type "DSRs Safety Attitudes Survey" questionnaire for a pilot test was developed to"j
collect information from the targeted group (i.e. DSRs). The questionnaire composed of 
two main parts (i.e. Part A and Part B).
The Part A "Respondent's Data" contains seven (7) demographic factors 
concerned with respondent's particulars and job aspects including gender, job position, 
departmental safety role, age group, educational level, years of services in the University
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and years of service as Departmental Safety Representative.
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The Part B "DSRs Safety Attitude Survey" contained seventy-seven (77) items 
for eight (8) exogenous (observed) variables focused on perception, personal beliefs and 
perceived behavioural control (self-efficacy) of DSRs towards the implementation of SMS 
at departmental level. Distribution of seventy-seven (77) questionnaire items in Part B - 
DSRs Safety Attitude Survey is highlighted in Table 17.
TABLE 17; DISTRIBUTION OF 77 SURVEY QUESTIONS IN 
PART B - DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE SURVEY
TWO (2) 
(ENDOGENOUS
VARIBLES)
SAFETY CULTURE
DSR SAFETY 
ATTITUDE
EIGHT (8) EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
IN FACTOR STRUCTURE
To evaluate DSRs perceptions, a total of fifty-three (53) 
items representing respondents' (DSRs) level of 
agreement to the statement would be developed in the 
questionnaire for pilot study.
SAFETY MANAGEMENT [SM]
Eleven (11) items [SM 01-11]
DSRS PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY TRAINING
[ST]
Ten (10) items [ST 01-10]
PERCEIVED MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT
TO SAFETY [MC]
Eight (8) items [MCO 1-08]
SAFETY COMMUNICATION [SC]
Ten (10) items [SCO 1-10]
DSRS PERCEPTIONS OF GROUP SAFETY
NORMS [SN] 
Fourteen (14) items [SN 01-14]
To evaluate the Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) of 
DSRs, a total of eight (8) items representing 
respondents' (DSRs) level of agreement to the statement 
would be developed in the questionnaire for pilot study.
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DSRS PERCEIVED SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY
[SR]
Eight (8) items [SR 01-08]
To evaluate the "Personal Beliefs" of DSRs, a total of 
sixteen (16) items representing respondents' level of 
agreement to the statement would be developed in the 
questionnaire for pilot study.
DSRS PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY IN 
MANAGING SAFETY [PE]
Six (6) items [PEO 1-06]
DSRS PERSONAL BELIEFS IN ACCIDENT 
CAUSATION [PB]
Ten (10) items [PB 01-10]
Respondents need to be helped to express attitudes. To minimize the chance of 
middle option, a self-reported six (6) points Likert type scale "DSRs Safety Attitudes 
Survey" questionnaire is developed for pilot test. To indicate level of agreement or 
disagreement from respondents, the scale is on a continuum ranging from "Strongly 
Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Slightly Disagree (3), Slightly Agree (4), Agree (5) to Strongly 
Agree (6) " to score each of the seventy-seven (77) items for 8 exogenous variables.
Appendix I summarises a total of forty-one (41) out of seventy-seven (77) 
questionnaire items for pilot survey adopted or modified from the following sources:
•$• Seaboch (1994) - "Effects of Safety Instruction Upon Safety Attitudes and 
Knowledge of University Students Enrolled in Selected Agricultural 
Engineering Course - Appendix D: Initial Safety Attitude Items";
*v" Health and Safety Executive (2004) - "Occupational health and safety 
enforcement strategies to promote concordance in the hospitality industry - 
Appendix Five - Health and Safety in the Hospitality Industry
167
Chapter 6 168 
Questionnaire"; and
•$• KAM Chi-kit (2002), the thesis "The Exploration of a Multi-Dimensional 
Safe Behaviour Model for construction workers in Hong Kong - A 
Structural Equation Modelling Approach" - "Appendix I: The English 
Version of the Questionnaire on Workers'Safety Perception".
•$• Safety Survey [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/bs/JIP/SAFESURV.HTM [Accessed 15 January 2006]
To evaluate the relevance of questionnaire items and the extent to which there 
may be problems in misleading responses, a review of content validity was required. 
Carmines et al. (1991, p.20) describes the content validity as "The extent to which a 
measurement reflects the specific intended domain of content" and; "Content validity, also 
called face validity, has to do with items seeming to measure what they claim to. In 
content validity one is also concerned with whether the items measure the full domain 
implied by their label. Use of surveys of panels of content experts or focus groups of 
representative subjects are ways in which content validity may be established, albeit using 
subjective judgments." Available from: Garson, D. Validity, 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/validitv.htm [Accessed 15 April 2008]
The draft questionnaire was reviewed by Dr. Charles C.K. Kam, former Deputy 
Chief Occupational Safety Officer of Labor Department of HKSAR; Dr. Joseph Kwan, 
Director of Safety and Environmental Protection Office (SEPO) of the University and Mr. 
Nigel Wright, my project supervisor in The University of Hull, U.K. before the pilot survey.
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Inspiration gained from the consultation was essential in developing seventy-seven (77) 
questionnaire items for data collection in the pilot survey. After the validation process, 
the wording of some items was changed by simplifying and rewording, so as to eliminate 
any ambiguous statements.
A complete set of self-reported "Safety Attitudes Survey" questionnaire contains 
seventy-seven (77) items together with an introductory letter for the pilot survey is attached 
in Appendix II for reference.
These seventy-seven (77) items in the questionnaire were used to evaluate 
respondents "DSRs" safety attitudes. To avoid bias to the respondents, all the items have 
purposely been put into a random order and would be asked in different (positive/negative) 
ways. Six (6) out of the seventy-seven (77) questionnaire items included SM11, MC03, 
PB06, PB08, SN03 and SN05 were negatively worded. (See Table 18)
TABLE 18; NEGATIVELY WORDED QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
SM11
MC03
PB06
PB08
SN03
SN05
DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT ONLY REPORT ACCIDENT INVOLVING OF 
LOST- WORKDAY INJURY TO SEPO.
DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT "TURNS A BLIND EYE" TO THINGS THAT ARE DONE 
IN AN UNSAFE MANNER.
ACCIDENTS IN THE WORKPLACE ARE TOTALLY UNAVOIDABLE, BECAUSE OF "ACTS 
OF GOD"!
IT IS NECESSARY TO "TURN A BLIND EYE" TO RULE VIOLATIONS, IF PEOPLE 
INVOLVED ARE YOUR SUPERIOR.
PEOPLE WOULD TAKE SHORTCUTS TO PERFORM THEIR TASKS NATURALLY.
PEOPLE USUALLY TURN A 'BLIND EYE' TO UNSAFE MATTERS.
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3.2 STEP 2; IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
SIZE;
The study is focused on a target group "DSRs" that has been given an enormous 
responsibility in the implementing SMS at departmental level. For the academic year 
2005/2006, a total of 314 staff members performed the duty of DSR at the University. 
Following is the distribution of 314 DSRs:-
•$• 111 Departmental Safety Officers/Deputy Departmental Safety Officers 
from 61 departments/offices;
•v" 203 staff members with duty of safety supervision in the campus. It was 
included 108 Fire Safety Ambassadors from 12 departments and 95 staff 
with additional safety duty from 3 offices namely Estate Management Office, 
Campus Service Office and Safety & Environmental Protection Office.
Adequacy of sample size has a significant impact on the validity and the 
reliability of parameter estimates, model fit, and statistical power (i.e. the ability to detect 
and reject a poor model). Although there is no explicit sample size requirements for 
structural equation modeling (SEM), Harris et al. (1990, pp.337-360) suggest that "The 
recommended ratio of sample size to free parameters in a structural equation model is 
between 5:1 and 10:1, depending on the number of free parameters in the model". 
Hoogland et al. (1998, p.329) also point out that ""The minimum sample size should be ten 
times the number of free parameters". Based on recommendations from Harris and 
Hoogland et al. that the sample size for the pilot survey and field survey in this study is 
considered appropriate. In this study, sample size issues have received considerable
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attention. There were 120 DSRs involved in the pilot survey and 194 DSRs involved in 
the field survey.
3.3 STEP 3: COLLECTION OF DATA FOR PILOT TEST;
It is generally a good idea to run a pilot test before the questionnaire subjected to 
actual field data testing. A pilot survey was conducted in February 2006 after the 
approval from my project supervisor. A total of 120 self-reported six (6) points Likert 
type "DSRs Safety Attitudes Survey" questionnaires with an introductory letter for pilot 
survey were sent to the target population in February 2006 either by hand or through the 
internal postal system. Contents of an introductory letter described the purpose, 
instruction on how to complete the questionnaire and confidentiality of the survey. It was 
expected that respondents should take approximately 25 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. To maintain anonymity, there was no requirement to put respondent's name, 
signature, department and job title in the questionnaire. All respondents were reminded to 
return the completed survey questionnaire within 6 days either by hand or via internal mail 
to the researcher from the date of issue.
The pilot survey data was collected and a total of 102 valid questionnaires (with 
85 % response rate) were finally secured. For test of validity and reliability of the 
research instrument - the questionnaire, a statistical package, SPSS version 11.0 for 
Windows was used. All pilot data collected were coded and entered into a computer 
statistical package for factor analysis. The researcher double checked all data to ensure 
that there were no missing data or errors. Negatively worded items were reverse scored so 
that their valence matched the positively worded items.
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3.4 STEP 4; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS - VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
TESTING OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE;
In evaluating the technical characteristics of a measurement procedure, two 
features are important, viz. validity and reliability. "Validity refers to the degree to which 
a study accurately reflects or assesses the specific concept that the researcher is attempting 
to measure. While reliability is concerned with the accuracy of the actual measuring 
instrument or procedure, validity is concerned with the study's success at measuring what 
the researchers set out to measure." Available from: Colorado State University, Writing Guides
Reliability & Validity, http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/relval/pop2b.cfrn [Accessed 25 October 
2007]
3.4.1 TEST OF VALIDITY FOR PILOT DATA:
Factor analysis is a fundamental component of Structural Equation modeling. 
Three primary applications of factor analysis include :-
•$• Explore data for patterns. Often a researcher is unclear if items or variables 
have discernible patterns. Factor Analysis can be done in an exploratory 
fashion to reveal patterns among the inter-relationships of the items.
•$• Data Reduction. Factor analysis can be used to reduce a large number of 
variables into a smaller and more manageable number of factors. Factor 
analysis can create factor scores for each subject that represents these 
higher order variables.
•$• Confirm hypothesis of factor structure. In measurement research when a 
researcher wishes to validate a scale with a given or hypothesized factor
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structure, Confirmatory Factor Analysis is used.
Available from: Coughlin M.A. and Knight W., Confirmatory Factor Analysis: The Basis for 
the Structural Model, http://www.spss.eom/events/e id 2134/presentation.ppt#28 [Accessed 6 
November 2007]
Cascio (1998, p.99) considers that "Two issues are of primary concern in 
validation - what a test or procedure measures and how well it measures". It is 
concerned about the degree of accuracy and appropriateness for predicting or drawing 
inferences about certain criteria. Cook et al. (1979, p.37) defines validity as "The best 
available approximation to the truth". With the pilot data, the validity test on the 
questionnaire items of "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" constructs was conducted to confirm 
measurement model construct validity.
"Construct validity seeks agreement between a theoretical concept and a specific 
measuring device or procedure." Available from: Colorado State University, Writing Guides 
Reliability & Validity, http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/relval/pop2b.cfrn [Accessed 25 October 
2007]
Goodwin (1999, pp.85-100) reports that "Factor analysis has become such a 
widely used technique for an estimation of construct validity". In this study, factor 
analysis techniques were applied to single out those items which doubly loaded to two or 
more factors; or to alienate factors that did not belong to a specific group. All identified 
factors simplify interpretation of these relationships by reducing the observed correlations 
into as few constructs as possible. These factors were used to represent relationships 
among many sets of inter-related perceptual questions about the target variable "DSR
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Safety Attitude" towards the implementation of SMS at the University. The reduced 
factors can also be used for further analysis.
In factor analysis, the sampling adequacy is measured by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) statistics. Garson (2008) states that "Measured by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
statistics, sampling adequacy predicts if data are likely to factor -well, based on correlation 
and partial correlation. In the old days of manual factor analysis, this was extremely 
useful. "... "KMO varies from 0 to 1.0 and KMO overall should be .60 or higher to proceed 
•with factor analysis. If it is not, drop the indicator variables with the lowest individual 
KMO statistic values, until KMO overall rises above .60. (Some researchers use a more 
lenient .50 cut-off)." Available from: Garson D. Factor Analysis. 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/factor.htmtfvars [Accessed 13 April 2008]
3.4.1.1 FACTOR ANALYTIC RESULTS;
FACTOR ANALYSIS - INITIAL TEST
An initial test of the 77 items with extraction method "Principal Component 
Analysis" followed by an "Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization" rotation method yielded a 
seventeen (17) factor solution with Eigenvalues greater than one and accounts for 80.058 % 
(percent) of the explained variance. The analyses shows that in both distributions 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures of sampling adequacy was 0.682 indicating that the 
data were appropriate for this analysis. Bartlett Test of Sphericity was significant 
[Approx Chi-Square = 8357.713, df = 2926, Sig = 0.000], indicating that the correlation 
matrix is not an identity matrix. An output of the factor analysis with factor loadings 
greater than or equal to 0.4 is shown in Table 19.
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TABLE 19; PATTERN MATRIX (A-l): THE 77 QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS - 
FACTOR LOADINGS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 0.4
Pattern Matrix(a)
SM01
SM02
SMO3
SM04
SM05
SM06
SM07
SM08
SM09
SM10
SM11
MC01
MC02
MC03
MC04
MC05
MC06
MC07
MC08
SC01
SC02
SC03
SC04
SC05
SC06
SCO?
SC08
SC09
SC10
Component
1 2 3
.626
.775
576
694
.717
.670
793
4 5 6
.906
.896
.927
901
507
7
-.433
8 9
.868
889
710
790
10
-.566
11 12 13 14 15
401
.793
818
16
-427
17
482
-.457
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ST01
ST02
ST03
ST04
ST05
ST06
ST07
ST08
ST09
ST10
PB01
PB02
PB03
PB04
PB05
PB06
PB07
PB08
PB09
PB10
SN01
SN02
SN03
SN04
SN05
SN06
SN07
SN08
SN09
SN10
SN11
SN12
SN13
628
942
910
.883
599
934
.739
405
.671
.807
.545
704
.405
564
.557
.745
720
800
.593
-.790
-769
.661
.492
-.762
-.601
-771
-550
-.531
.612
-.438
.756
801
-.438
-.470
176
Chapter 6 177
SN14
SR01
SR02
SR03
SR04
SR05
SR06
SR07
SR08
PE01
PE02
PE03
PE04
PE05
PE06
.477
.811
.631
.572
.843
.613
.807
-.706
-.720
-.612
-.456
-494
-632
-.547
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
j A Rotation converged in 37 iterations.
"The factor loadings are the correlation coefficients between the variables (rows) 
and factors (columns). Factor loadings are the basis for imputing a label to the different 
factors. Loadings above .6 are usually considered "high" and those below .4 are "low." 
Available from: Garson D., Factor Analysis: SPSS Output 
http://facultv.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/factspss.htm [Accessed 13 April 2008]. In this study, items
with factor loading less than 0.4 were suppressed.
In the initial test, there are a number of items loading on two factors (e.g. item 
ST02 loads onto factor 4 and 16), and not all items loaded onto the same factor (e.g. PB04, 
PB06, PB08, PB09 are alienated items that do not load onto factor "2" with the majority of 
the rest). A summary of the seven-seven (77) items and associated scales is shown in 
Table 20.
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TABLE 20; SUMMARY OF THE 77 ITEMS AND THE ASSOCIATED SCALES
SCALE
Safety Management 
[SM]
Perceived 
Management 
Commitment to 
Safety [MC]
Safety 
Communication [SC]
DSR's Perceptions of 
Safety Training [ST]
DSR's Personal 
Beliefs in Accident 
Causation [PB]
DSR's Perceptions of 
Group Safety Norms 
[SN]
DSR's Perceived 
Safety Responsibility[SRI
DSR's Perceived 
Efficacy in Managing 
Safety [PE]
REMAINING
ITEMS
SM01,SM03, 
SM05, SM07, 
SM08
MC01,MC02, 
MC05, MC06, 
MC07, MC08
SC01, SC02, 
SC03, SC05
ST01, ST05, 
ST06, ST08, 
ST09
PB01, PB02, 
PB03, PB05, 
PB07,PB10
SN04, SN05, 
SN06, SN07, 
SN08,SN11
SR01, SR02, 
SR04, SR05, 
SR06, SR07
PE01,PE02, 
PE03, PE04, 
PE05, PE06
ITEMS
(FACTOR
LOADING
LESS THAN
0.4)
SM02, SM06, 
SM11
SC06, SC10
ST03, ST07
SN02
SR03
ITEMS
(LOADING
ON TWO OR
MORE
FACTORS)
ST02
SN13
ITEMS
(ALIENATED)
SM04, SM09, 
SM10
MC3, MC4
SC04, SC07, 
SC08, SC09
ST04, ST10
PB04, PB06, 
PB08, PB09
SN01, SN03, 
SN09, SN10,
SN12, SN14
SR08
FACTOR ANALYSIS - SECOND TEST
To further enhance interpretability, items loading on two or more factors or that 
scattered around were removed. This resulted in the removal of 31 items in the second 
test. Factor loadings of the 46 items and the associated scales are shown in Table 21.
TABLE 21: PATTERN MATRIX (A-2); FACTOR LOADINGS OF THE
46 QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
Pattern M atrix(a)
Component
12 3 4|S « '1 8 9
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SMOl
SMO3
SM05
SM07
SM08
MC01
MC02
MC05
MC06
MC07
MC08
SC01
SC02
SC03
SC04
SC05
SC08
SC09
ST01i
ST05
ST06
ST08
ST09
PB02
PB03
PB05
PB07
PB10
SN04
SN05
SN06
SN07
SN08
.942
.924
865
.703
928
-.800
-.645
-.764
-.784
-.737
-.822
.740
797
814
.592
.724
.923
.880
916
.926
.473
-.591
-.682
-774
-819
-.820
883
.918
.707
.747
-820
-869
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SNll
SR01
SR02
SR04
SR05
SR06
SR07
PE01
PE02
PE03
PE04
PE05
PE06
492
.706
.681
669
.762
.497
-.669
-809
-.821
-693
-618
-.512
-692
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
A Rotation converged in 15 iterations.
The second test of the 46 items with extraction method "Principal Component 
Analysis" followed by an "Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization" rotation method yielded a 
nine (9) factor solution with Eigenvalues greater than one and accounts for 78.059 % 
(percent) of the explained variance. The analyses shows that in both distributions 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures of sampling adequacy was 0.807, indicating that the 
data were appropriate for this analysis. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was significant 
[Approx Chi-Square - 4870.793, df = 1035, Sig = 0,000], indicating that the correlation 
matrix is not an identity matrix. It is visualized that only the item SC04 with a factor 
loading less than 0.4 were suppressed, and item SC08, SC09 are alienated that do not load 
onto factor "7" with the majority of the rest). Summary of the forty-six (46) items and 
associated scales is shown in Table 22.
TABLE 22: SUMMARY OF THE 46 ITEMS AND THE ASSOCIATED SCALES
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SCALE
Safety Management 
[SM]
Perceived 
Management 
Commitment To 
Safety [MC]
Safety 
Communication [SC]
DSR's Perceptions of 
Safety Training [ST]
DSR's Personal 
Beliefs in Accident 
Causation [PB]
DSR's Perceptions of 
Group Safety Norms 
[SN]
DSR's Perceived 
Safety Responsibility 
[SR]
DSR's Perceived 
Efficacy in Managing 
Safety [PE]
REMAINING
ITEMS
SM01,SM03, 
SM05, SM07, 
SM08
MC01, MC02, 
MC05, MC06, 
MC07, MC08
SC01, SC02, 
SC03, SC05
ST01, ST05, 
ST06, ST08, 
ST09
PB02, PB03, 
PB05, PB07, 
PB10
SN04, SN05, 
SN06, SN07, 
SN08, SN11
SR01, SR02, 
SR04, SR05, 
SR06, SR07
PE01,PE02, 
PE03, PE04, 
PE05, PE06
ITEMS
fFACTOR
LOADING
LESS THAN
0.4)
SC04
ITEMS
(LOADING
ON TWO OR
MORE
FACTORS)
ITEMS
(ALIENATED)
SC08, SC09
FACTOR ANALYSIS - THIRD TEST
A further factor analysis (the third test) of the remaining 43 items with Principal 
Component Extraction followed by an Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization rotation was 
conducted again with Factor loading less than 0.4 suppressed. The analysis yields eight (8) 
factors with Eigenvalues greater than one, which together accounted for 77.237 % of the 
explained variance. The analyses shows that in both distributions Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measures of sampling adequacy was 0.796, indicating that the data were
appropriate for this analysis. Bartlett Test of Sphericity was significant [Approx
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Chi-Square = 4525.671, df = 903 and Sig. 0.000].
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The interpretability of the factor analyses output this time is greatly improved and 
is shown in Table: 23.
TABLE 23; PATTERN MATRIX (A-3); FACTOR LOADINGS OF
THE REMAINING 43 QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
Pattern Matrix(a)
SM01
SMO3
SM05
SM07
SM08
MC01
MC02
MC05
MC06
MC07
MC08
SC01
SC02
SC03
SC05
ST01
ST05
ST06
ST08
ST09
PB02
PB03
Component
1 2
.939
.923
3
-.808
-663
-745
-750
-.755
-838
4
774
.823
856
639
.768
5
.926
.879
.915
,930
475
6 7
.875
.901
720
.767
8
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PB05
PB07
PB10
SN04
SN05
SN06
SN07
SN08
SN11
SR01
SR02
SR04
SR05
SR06
SR07
PE01
PE02
PE03
PE04
PE05
PE06
787
838
788
700
.595
791
.864
.701
.922
-.592
-680
-.779
-.824
-808
-678
-.508
-.629
-686
-670
-733
-515
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
A Rotation converged in 12 iterations.
It is seen that all the remaining 43 items have been generally grouped together 
according to the scales. Summary of the remaining forty-three (43) items and associated 
scales is shown in Table 24.
TABLE 24; SUMMARY OF THE REMAINING 43 ITEMS
SCALE
Safety Management 
TSMl
REMAINING 
ITEMS
SM01, SM03, 
SM05, SM07,
ITEMS
(FACTOR 
LOADING 
LESS THAN 
0.4)
ITEMS
(LOADING 
ON TWO OR 
MORE 
FACTORS)
ITEMS
(ALIENATED)
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Perceived 
Management 
Commitment To 
Safety [MC]
Safety 
Communication [SC]
DSR's Perceptions of 
Safety Training [ST]
DSR's Personal 
Beliefs in Accident 
Causation [PB]
DSR's Perceptions of 
Group Safety Norms 
[SN1
DSR's Perceived 
Safety Responsibility 
[SR]
DSR's Perceived 
Efficacy in Managing 
Safety [PE]
SM08
MC01,MC02, 
MC05, MC06, 
MC07, MC08
SC01, SC02, 
SC03, SC05
ST01, ST05, 
ST06, ST08, 
ST09
PB02, PB03, 
PB05, PB07, 
PB10
SN04, SN05, 
SN06, SN07, 
SN08, SN11
SR01, SR02, 
SR04, SR05, 
SR06, SR07
PE01.PE02, 
PE03, PE04, 
PE05, PE06
Data collected from the pilot survey were analyzed to evaluate the factorial 
structure for each distribution. With the pilot data, the validity test was conducted by 
using factor analysis to single out those items which doubly loaded to two or more factors; 
or alienated factors do not belong to a specific group. After the validity test, the validity 
of the questionnaire items was established. It was anticipated that only forty-three (43) 
items out of seventy-seven (77) questionnaire items were retained for the field survey. 
The remaining items were subjected to a reliability test and look for reliability alpha 
greater than 0.7. Factor loadings less than 0.4 were ignored.
3.4.1.2 TEST OF RELIABILITY FOR PILOT DATA;
Reliability test is used to a measure of its internal consistency. Cascio (1998. 
p.88) defines the reliability of a measurement procedure "as its freedom from unsystematic 
errors of measurement". It is the extent to which a measure, procedure or instrument
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yields the same result on repeated trials. In this study, internal consistency is assessed by 
the manner in which all DSRs respond in similar ways to similar questions that measure a 
particular construct (e.g., perceived management commitment to safety).
"Cronbach's alpha is a commonly used measure testing the extent to -which 
multiple indicators for a latent variable belong together. It varies from 0 to 1.0. A 
common rule of thumb is that the indicators should have a Cronbach's alpha of .7 to judge 
the set reliable. " Available from: Garson, D., Structural Equation Modeling - Confirmatory factor 
analysis, http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm [Accessed 14 July 2006]
Up to this end, a reliability test for internal consistency of all forty-three (43) 
items was conducted. Result reflects Cronbach's alpha values of all 43 items ranging 
from of 0.8764 to 0.9349 over the recommended level of 0.70 and no significant 
cross-loading among the eight (8) exogenous variables was found. The result of the 
testing is summarized in Table 25.
TABLE 25; SUMMARY OF RELIABILITY FOR THE REMAINING 43 ITEMS IN PILOT SURVEY
Scale Items Cronbach's 
Alpha 'a'
Safety
Management
[SM]
SM01 A departmental safety management system is 
fully developed in your department / office.
SM03 An emergency plan (such as chemical spill, fire) 
is available in your department / office.
SM05 Workplace risk assessments have to be reviewed 
by authorized persons on a regularly basis.
SM07 Proper storage facility for dangerous 
goods/chemical substances is provided.
SM08 SEPO safety manual provides useful guidelines 
for users.
0.9222
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Perceived 
Management 
Commitment to 
Safety 
[MC]
MC01 Departmental management visibly 
demonstrates an interest in the safety matters.
MC02 Departmental management clearly considers the 
safety of people to be of great importance.
MC05 Departmental management always listens to 
safety concerns from people.
MC06 Departmental management is concerned for the 
operating cost more than safety.
MC07 Departmental management is always provided 
with sufficient resources to let people get the job done 
safely.
MC08 Safety is given high priority by the 
departmental management.
0.9239
Safety
Communication
[SC]
SC01 Safety meeting is conducted on a regularly basis. 
SC02 People are always informed of unsafe practices.
SC03 People are always informed of unsafe conditions 
in the workplace.
SC05 People are freely making suggestions for safety 
improvement.
0.9119
DSR's
Perceptions of 
Safety Training 
[ST]
ST01 Safety issues are given high priority in training 
programs.
ST05 Safety training can positively change people's 
attitudes towards safety.
ST06 Safety training can help to reduce accidents.
ST08 Safety training can help to improve individual's 
safety awareness.
ST09 Safety training can help to improve departmental 
safety performance.
0.8986
DSR's Personal 
Beliefs in 
Accident 
Causation 
[PB]_____
PB02 Accidents are mainly due to a lack of working 
experiences from people involved.
PB03 Accidents are mainly due to poor attitudes 
toward safety from people involved.__________
0.9349
186
Chapter 6 187
PB05 Accidents just happen, there is little one can do 
to avoid them.
PB07 Lots of minor injuries are a sign that more 
serious accidents could also occur.
PB10 Safety is the responsibility of SEPO, not others.
DSR's
Perceptions of 
Group Safety 
Norms 
[SN]
SN04 People would report any safety violation to their 
supervisors.
SN05 People usually turn a 'blind eye' to unsafe 
matters.
SN06 People are willing to report every workplace 
injury to the departmental management regardless of 
severity.
SN07 People have a clear picture of the risks 
associated with their operations.
SN08 People are in favor of legislation to ensure 
workplace safety.
SN11 People's attitude towards safety issues is very 
positive.
0.8764
DSR's
Perceived 
Safety
Responsibility 
[SR]
SR01 As a DSR, I am clear about my safety 
responsibility for the department / office.
SR02 As a DSR, I have to stop work if any imminent 
danger occurs.
SR04 As a DSR, monitoring of individual's safety 
performance is part of my duty.
SR05 As a DSR, departmental safety is my 
responsibility, not others.
SR06 As a DSR, conduct of the departmental safety 
meeting is part of my duty.
SR07 As a DSR, providing safety information to 
people involved is part of my duty.
0.9199
DSR's 
Perceived
PE01 As a DSR, I am capable identifying safety 
hazards at the workplace.____________
0.9256
187
Chapter 6
Efficacy in 
Managing 
Safety 
[PE]
188
PE02 As a DSR, I know what to do in case of an 
emergency (such as fire, chemical spill).
PE03 As a DSR, I am adequately trained in 
implementing the safety management program.
PE04 As a DSR, I am capable of making suggestions 
on relevant safety control measures.
PE05 As a DSR, I know how to apply the 
permit-to-work system in my department / office.
PE06 As a DSR, I know how to conduct the workplace 
risk assessment.
Based on the result of the pilot test, all forty-three (43) items in the questionnaire 
were used for the field survey. The self-reported DSRs safety attitudes survey 
questionnaire was then restructured into forty-three (43) items for the field survey.
3.5 STEP 5; RESTRUCTURE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FIELD 
SURVEY;
After establishing the validity and reliability of the research instrument - survey 
questionnaire, the 43 remaining items were refined in the questionnaire for field survey. 
A complete set of the restructured self-reported six points Likert type "DSRs Safety 
Attitudes Survey" questionnaire with an introductory letter for field survey is attached in 
Appendix III and "Summary of DSRs Safety Attitudes Survey Questionnaire - Response 
Options in the field survey" is shown in Appendix IV. For easy reference, items are 
labeled in a sequential order in Table 26.
TABLE 26: REVISED QUESTIONNAIRE WITH THE REMAINING 43 ITEMS FOR FIELD SURVEY
SCALE
Safety Management [SM]
REVISED ITEMS
SM01 = 1,SM03 = 2, SM05 = 3,
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Perceived Management Commitment To 
Safety [MC]
Safety Communication [SC]
DSR's Perceptions of Safety Training [ST]
DSR's Personal Beliefs in Accident 
Causation [PB]
DSR's Perceptions of Group Safety Norms 
[SN]
DSR's Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]
DSR's Perceived Efficacy in Managing 
Safety [PE]
SM07 = 4, SM08 = 5
MC01 = 6, MC02 = 7, MC05 = 8, 
MC06 = 9, MC07 = 10, MC08 = 1 1
SC01= 12, SC02 = 13, SC03 = 14, 
SC05 = 15
ST01 = 16, ST05 = 17, ST06 = 18, 
ST08 = 19,ST09 = 20
PB02 = 21, PB03 = 22, PB05 = 23, 
PB07=-24,PB10 = 25
SN04 = 26, SN05 = 27, SN06 = 28, 
SN07 = 29, SN08 = 30, SN1 1 = 3 1
SR01 = 32, SR02 = 33, SR04 = 34, 
SR05 = 35, SR06 = 36, SR07 = 37
PE01 = 38, PE02 = 39, PE03 = 40, 
PE04 = 41, PE05 = 42, PE06 = 43
3.6 STEP 6: COLLECTION OF FIELD DATA:
The formal self-reported "DSRs Safety Attitudes Survey" questionnaire for the 
collection of actual field data contains eight (8) variables that are supposed to have key 
roles in determining the "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". The launch of formal 
self-reported questionnaire for field survey was approved by Dr. Joseph Kwan, Director of 
SEPO before the distribution to all DSRs to fill-in. To ensure effective data collection, the 
pilot survey would be excluded from the actual field data collection.
Apart from 120 DSRs who conducted the pilot survey, the rest of 194 DSRs who 
did not participate in pilot survey were invited to join the field survey. The distribution of 
questionnaires was done through the internal postal system. A total of 194 sets of a 
self-reported "Safety Attitudes Survey" with an introductory letter (see the Appendix III) 
were distributed to the targeted population via internal mail in May 2006. Contents of an 
introductory letter described the purpose, instruction on how to complete the questionnaire 
and confidentiality of the survey. Respondents were requested to complete the survey 
questionnaire and send it back to the researcher either by internal mail or by hand within two
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Simple guidelines to respondents for completing the questionnaire were also 
developed. To maintain anonymity, there was no requirement to put respondent's name, 
signature and department in the questionnaire. Prior to analysis, all questionnaires 
returned to the writer were coded, entered and double checked by the researcher to ensure 
that there are no duplicates and missing data. A total of 144 valid questionnaires (with a 
response rate of 74.23%) were finally secured and formed the basis for the subsequent 
analyses.
3.7 STEP 7: RE-TEST OF RELIABILITY;
The reliability of each of the questionnaire scales from the 144 field data was 
verified again by Cronbach's Alpha. A further reliability test of the 43 items was 
conducted. Cronbach's alpha 'a' values of all forty-three (43) items ranging from 0.8297 
to 0.9192 (in Table 27) are over the recommended level of 0.70 and no significant 
cross-loading was found among the eight (8) exogenous variables. Results indicated that 
the data are highly reliable. At this stage, both validity and reliability were tested and are 
over the recommended level. The structural "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" comprising 
two endogenous variables and eight (8) exogenous variables will be tested empirically in 
the next chapter.
TABLE 27; SUMMARY OF RELIABILITY FOR THE REMAINING 43 ITEMS IN FIELD SURVEY
Scale
Safety Management [SM]
Perceived Management Commitment 
To Safety [MCI
Safety Communication [SC]
DSR's Perceptions of Safety Training
Items
SM01, SM03, SM05, SM07, SM08
MC01, MC02, MC05, MC06, 
MC07, MC08
SC01, SC02, SC03, SC05
ST01, ST05, ST06, ST08, ST09
Cronbach's 
Alpha 'a'
0.8835
0.8297
0.8591
0.8799
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[ST]
DSR's Personal Beliefs in Accident 
Causation [PB]
DSR's Perceptions of Group Safety 
Norms [SN]
DSR's Perceived Safety 
Responsibility [SR]
DSR's Perceived Efficacy in 
Managing Safety [PE]
PB02, PB03, PB05, PB07, PB10
SN04, SN05, SN06, SN07, SN08, 
SN11
SR01, SR02, SR04, SR05, SR06, 
SR07
PE01, PE02, PE03, PE04, PE05, 
PE06
0.9111
0.8670
0.9152
0.9192
Up to this end, actual field data collected from 144 valid questionnaires was 
tested. Results of reliability test indicated the data was highly consistent internally, 
Cronbach's alpha 'a' values ranging from 0.8297 to 0.9192. The data would then be 
subjected to model testing in the next chapter.
4. CHAPTER SUMMARY;
This chapter has given a detailed treatment on the construction of the research 
instrument - survey questionnaire. Steps in developing, testing of validity and reliability 
of the research instrument were discussed in detail. Attitude surveys provided insights 
that are extremely important to assess the safety attitudes of respondents "DSRs". It is 
considered that use a self-reported questionnaire is more appropriate at eliciting responses 
on items that are sensitive in this study. For example, questionnaire items of SM11 
"Departmental management only report accident involving of lost-working injury to 
SEPO" and MC06 "Departmental management is concerned for the operating cost more 
than safety" in the pilot survey. Interview the target group was not included in the pilot 
and field surveys. Respondents might feel less intimidated to answer a self-reported 
questionnaire when compared to being confronted an interviewer asking questions they 
regard as "sensitive". Interviews were not conducted as validation of the items in the 
questionnaire were derived from the literature and subjected to validation by expert 
opinion.
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It is important to know what variables could directly or indirectly influence the 
safety attitudes of DSRs towards the implementation of SMS at departmental level. 
Factor analysis was the primary analytical method used for this project to examine the 
validity of various items in the questionnaire. Analysis confirmed that a valid and reliable 
questionnaire was developed and used to conduct the DSRs safety attitudes survey. A 
very good response was received as well as positive comments on the content of the, 
questionnaire. The results of these studies clearly highlight how attitude is an outcome of 
a complex interaction of a variety of factors. The survey and analysis examined what 
personal factors of DSRs are most likely to influence the effectiveness of SMS. As such, 
the strength, weaknesses of the existing SMS can be reviewed to meet new challenges. 
The results of the survey will give indications to the University as to how to get DSRs 
involved in the implementation of SMS in an effective manner. It also indicates how well 
the safety management philosophies have been integrated into the University's operations. 
All this helps the University further strengthen the SMS at University's level. The 
ultimate goal is to foster safety culture amongst stakeholders, so as to ensure a healthy and 
safe environment in the University.
Chapter Seven (7) will proceed to the "Step Five - Model Testing" in accordance 
with the basic approach to performing a SEM analysis. The purpose of model testing is to 
test appropriateness of the structural model.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
MODEL TESTING OF
THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL"
1. INTRODUCTION;
The hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" tends to explain the direct and , 
indirect effects amongst eight (8) exogenous variables and two (2) endogenous variables. 
These eight (8) exogenous variables include "Perceived Safety Responsibility" [SR], 
"DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in Managing Safety" [PE], "DSRs Personal Beliefs in 
Accident Causation" [PB], "Safety Management" [SM], "DSRs Perceptions of Safety 
Training" [ST], "Perceived Management Commitment to Safety" [MC], "Safety 
Communication" [SC] and "DSRs Perceptions of Group Safety Norms" [SN] in the 
hypothesized model represented in rectangles. The model also included two (2) 
endogenous variables "Safety Culture" and "DSR Safety Attitude" shown in ovals.
It is assumed that all such variables in one way or other do spell out DSRs safety 
attitudes associated with safety culture; which in turn affect DSRs safety attitudes towards 
the implementation of SMS at departmental level.
SEM has the ability to test causal relationships between measured variables in the 
hypothesized model. This chapter is focused on the "Step Five - Model Testing" and the 
"Step Six - Results" of the basic approach to performing a SEM analysis. The 
hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" is going to be tested under six (6) key steps of 
"Model Testing" including model identification, formulating research hypotheses, selection
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of model fit indexes for Goodness-of-fit tests, evaluate model fit, re-specify the model 
based on the model's fit and discussion of findings.
Tests were conducted using Structural Equation Modeling "SEM" confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) for analyzing a series of dependence relationships among 
endogenous and exogenous variables simultaneously. Goodness-of-fit and significances 
tests are examined. All SEM and CFA were performed using AMOS.
2. JUSTIFICATIONS OF USING SEM FOR TESTING THE FITNESS OF 
THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL";
Why are researchers and academia using structural equation modeling (SEM) for 
testing the fitness of hypothesized models? The following justifications are presented:-
•v- "A main reason that structural equation models are widely used in many 
scientific fields of study is that they provide a mechanism for explicitly taking 
into account measurement error in the observed variables (both dependent 
and independent) considered in a model. In contrast, traditional regression 
analysis effectively ignores potential measurement error in all the explanatory 
(independent) variables included in a model. As a result, regression 
estimates can be misleading and potentially lead to incorrect substantive 
conclusions. " (Raykov et al., 2000, p.7)
4- "SEM can also be used to test the plausibility of hypothetical assertions about 
potential interrelationships between constructs and their observed measures 
or indicators. Latent variables are hypothesized to be responsible for the
193
Chapter 7 194 
outcome of observed measures." (Hershberger et al., 2003, p.4)
•$• "SEM is a statistical approach for hypothesis testing of relations between 
latent and observed variables, providing a possibility for modeling complex 
dependencies using the illustrative power of path diagrams". (Larsson, 2005, 
p. 15)
Schumacker et al. (2004, pp.98-99) also listed their reasons to support the use of 
SEM for model testing:-
•$• Researchers are becoming more aware of the need to use multiple observed 
variables to better understand their area of scientific inquiry.
•$• More recognition is given to the validity and reliability of observed scores 
from measurement instruments.
•$ Structural equation modeling has improved recently, especially the ability to 
analyze more advanced statistical models.
•0- SEM software programs have become increasingly user-friendly.
After the justifications of using SEM for model testing, attention is turned to the 
process of SEM model testing the fitness of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude 
Model".
3. MODEL TESTING:
Schumacker et al. (2004, pp.98-99) explain the goal of SEM analysis is "To 
determine the extent to which the theoretical model is supported by sample data. If the 
sample data support the theoretical model, then more complex theoretical models can be
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hypothesized. If the sample data do not support the theoretical model, then either the 
original model can be modified and tested or other theoretical models need to be developed 
and tested. Consequently, SEM tests theoretical models using the scientific method of 
hypothesis testing to advance our understanding of the complex relationships amongst 
constructs."
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) are two 
statistical approaches in SEM model testing. "Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) seeks to 
uncover the underlying structure of a relatively large set of variables. The researcher's a 
priori assumption is that any indicator may be associated with any factor. This is the most 
common form of factor analysis. There is no prior theory and one uses factor loadings to 
intuit the factor structure of the data." Available from: Garson D., Factor Analysis. 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/factor.htmtfconcepts [Accessed 13 April 2008]
In this study, CFA is employed for structural equation modeling tests to determine 
whether a preconceived model underlies a particular set of observations. Following is the 
justifications:-
•& "Confirmatory factor analysis models are commonly used to examine 
patterns of interrelationships among several constructs. Each construct 
included in the model is usually measured by its own set of observed 
indicators. Thus, in a confirmatory factor analysis model no specific 
directional relationships are assumed between the constructs, only that they 
are correlated with one another.'" (Raykov et al., 2000, pp.3-5)
4- "Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) seeks to determine if the number of
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factors and the loadings of measured (indicator) variables on them conform 
to what is expected on the basis of pre-established theory. Indicator 
variables are selected on the basis of prior theory and factor analysis is 
used to see if they load as predicted on the expected number of factors. " 
Available from: Garson D., Factor Analysis. 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/factor.htintfconcepts [Accessed 13 April 2008]
•*• "Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a statistical technique used to verify 
the factor structure of a set of observed variables. CFA allows the 
researcher to test the hypothesis that a relationship between observed 
variables and their underlying latent constructs exists. The researcher 
uses knowledge of the theory, empirical research, or both, postulates the 
relationship pattern a priori and then tests the hypothesis statistically." 
Available from: Suhr, D. Exploratory or Confirmatory Factor Analysis? Paper 200-31, 
University of Northern Colorado, http://www2.sas.com/proceedings/sugi31/200-31 .pdf 
[Accessed 20 February 2008]
"SEM is usually views as a confirmatory rather than exploratory procedure, in 
that models constructed by researchers using this approach are tested with measures of the 
degree to which the data fit the models."... "A common misconception about SEM is that it 
provides statistical evidence of a causal link between variables. The estimated 
coefficients in SEM tell us nothing about causality per se. Causality can only be inferred 
from the hypothesized model originally constructed by the researcher, and not merely from 
the statistical test of that model. " (Blanche et al., 1999, pp.262-263) "The condition with 
regard to -which SEM is most frequently misunderstood is directionality. Directional
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arrows in path diagrams are incorrectly interpreted by some as indicting that directionally 
has been tested using SEM or is implied by the investigator who has used SEM". (Hoyle, 
1995, p. 10)
Following are six (6) key steps of "Model Testing" in this study:- 
Step 1: Model identification 
Step 2: Formulating research hypotheses 
Step 3: Selection of model fit indexes for Goodness-of-fit tests 
Step 4: Evaluate model fit
Step 5: Re-specify the model based on the model's fit 
Step 6: Discussion of findings
Model testing was conducted using Structural Equation Modeling "SEM" for 
analyzing a series of dependence relationships among endogenous and exogenous variables 
simultaneously. All SEM and confirmatory factor analysis were performed using AMOS. 
The procedure was to test statistically the hypothesized models against a correlation matrix 
constructed from empirical measures of the variables. Steps were employed to test the 
fitness of the model by comparing the observed correlation matrix for the variable, with a 
goodness-of-fit statistic, and to interpret the result.
3.1 STEP 1 - MODEL IDENTIFICATION;
This step is to determine whether the model is identified before the test. 
Schumacker et al. (2004, p.63) states that "/« structural equation modeling, it is crucial 
that the researcher resolve the identification problem prior to the estimation of
parameters".
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"Model Identification concerns whether a unique value for each and every free 
parameter can be obtained from the observed data. It depends on the model choice and 
the specification affixed, constrained and free parameters. "... "The parameters of a SEM 
are the variances, regression coefficients and covariances among variables." Available 
from: Stoelting, R. Structural Equation Modeling/Path Analysis, 
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~efc/classes/biol710/path/SEMwebpage.htm [Accessed 24 January 2008]
Identification also refers to the idea that "There is at least one unique solution for 
each parameter estimate in a SEM model. Models in -which there is only one possible 
solution for each parameter estimate are said to be just-identified. Models for -which 
there are an infinite number of possible parameter estimate values are said to be 
underidentified. Finally, models that have more than one possible solution (but one best 
or optimal solution) for each parameter estimate are considered overidentified. " Available
from: Structural Equation Modeling using AMOS: An Introduction — model identification. 
http://www.utexas.edu/its-archive/rc/tutorials/stat/amos/tfmodel identification [Accessed 9 November 2007]
In this study, the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" needs to be 
overidentified in order to be estimated and in order to test hypotheses about relationships 
among variables. Hanneman (2000) holds the opinion that "A SEM model can be 
interpreted as a set of simultaneous linear equations mathematically. This set of 
equations represents a hypothesis about the way in which observed variables covary or 
correlate. " Available from: Hanneman R. A. (2000). Structural Equation Models: Identification issues
Online Lecture Notes: Sociology 203B. Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside. 
http://www.wizard.ucr.edu/~rhannema/soc203b/lectures/identifv.html [Accessed 10 November 2007]
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The issue of performing identification checks as part of the model fitting process 
requires mathematical calculation. The variance of the endogenous variables and the 
regression (path) coefficients associated with them depend on the units with which the 
variables are measured, but initially this is unknown. The SEM software program permits 
examination of more complex relationships in the hypothesized model.
The literature review has led to the conclusion that a SEM can be overidentified 
by having the value of some of the unknown parameters being pre-defined.
"Path Coefficient (path weight) - a path coefficient is a standardized regression 
coefficient (beta) showing the direct effect of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable in the path model". Available from: Garson D. Path Analysis. 
http://facultv.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/path.htm [Accessed 26 July 2008]
In achieving identification of the model, "// is necessary to assign an arbitrary 
value to a regression weight associated with the latent variable or error term. Once this 
is done, the remaining coefficients can be estimated for the remaining paths in the model. 
Therefore, for each latent variable, one of the paths leading away from it toward one of its 
indicator measures has been set to 1 by the researcher. This sets the measurement scale 
of each latent variable, whereas without this the scale would be indeterminate. Likewise, 
the paths from each error term to each indicator variable are set at 1. With these 
constraints, the model is identified. " Available from: Garson, D., Structural Equation Modeling 
Example Using WinAMOS. http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/semAMOS 1 .htm [Accessed 28 
November 2007]
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Note that "The indicator selected to be constrained to 1.0 is the reference item. 
Typically one selects as the reference item the one which in factor analysis loads most 
heavily on the dimension represented by the latent variable, thereby allowing it to anchor 
the meaning of that dimension." Available from: Garson, D., Structural Equation Modeling. 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm. [Accessed 7 December 2007]
It is also noted that "When one builds a confirmatory factor analysis, the observed 
variables are also known as "indicator" variables, because they load together on the 
underlying theoretical construct. " (Jackson et al., 2005, p.2)
Based on Garson's suggestion, a process of model identification is required before 
subjecting the hypothesized model depicted in Figure 19 to be analyzed by AMOS. In 
this research, there are two (2) endogenous variables (latent) "Safety Culture" and "DSRs 
Safety Attitude" in the hypothesized model. "Safety Culture" is represented by five (5) 
exogenous (observed) variables included "Safety Management" [SM], "DSRs Perceptions 
of Safety Training" [ST], "Perceived Management Commitment to Safety" [MC], "Safety 
Communication" [SC] and "DSRs Perceptions of Group Safety Norms" [SN]. "DSR 
Safety Attitude" is represented by three (3) exogenous (observed) variables "DSRs 
Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation" [PB], "DSRs perceived Self-efficacy in Managing 
Safety" [PE] and "Perceived Safety Responsibility" [SR].
Based on theoretical consideration, regression paths included the endogenous 
variable "Safety Culture" to the exogenous variable "Safety Management" [SM] and the 
endogenous variable "DSR Safety Attitude" to the exogenous variable "Perceived Safety
Responsibility" [SR] have been set to 1 as reference items in the hypothesized model. It is
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implies that the "Safety Culture" has a positive direct impact on "Safety Management" [SM] 
and "DSR Safety Attitude" has a positive direct impact on "Perceived Safety 
Responsibility" [SR]. A review of literature regarding the endogenous variable "Safety 
Culture" to the exogenous variable "Safety Management" [SM] can be found in "Chapter 
Four (4) Section 4.2: Paradigm shift to cultivate a Positive Safety Culture" and "Chapter 
Five (5) Section 3.4.1: Safety Culture -> Safety Management [SM]". Review of literature 
regarding the endogenous variable "DSR Safety Attitude" to the exogenous variable 
"Perceived Safety Responsibility" [SR] can be found in "Chapter Two Section 3.3.1: 
Accountability and Responsibility" and "Chapter Five (5) Section 3.4.6: DSR Safety 
Attitude -»DSRs Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]".
Likewise, paths from error terms to relevant variables were set at 1. Paths are 
included:-
<• el to "Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]"
4- e2 to "DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in Managing Safety [PE]"
4- e3 to "DSRs Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation [PB]"
<5> e4 to "Safety Management [SM]"
* e5 to "DSRs Perceptions of Safety Training [ST]"
<> e6 to "Perceived Management Commitment to Safety [MC]"
•o- e7 to "Safety Communication [SC]"
4- e8 to "DSRs Perceptions of Group Safety Norms [SN]"
<• e9 to "DSRs Safety Attitude"
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At this stage, the path-regressions included "Safety Culture" to "DSR Safety 
Attitude", "Safety Culture" to [SM], as well as "DSR Safety Attitude" to [SR] is defaulted 
to unity for model identification. For easy reference, the hypothesized DSRs Safety 
Attitude Model with parameter constraints imposed was re-drawn in Figure 24.
Research hypotheses sought to confirm whether theoretical underlying constructs 
are reflected in the observed data by using confirmatory factor analysis "CFA" in this study. 
After the model identification, step 2, formulating research questions and hypotheses for 
the study is next.
The Hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" 
With Parameter Constraints Imposed
(e3i PB
DSR
Safety ;——fe9) 
Attitude,
FIGURE 24: THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL" WITH PARAMETER CONSTRAINTS
IMPOSED TO [SM1 AND [SRI
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3.2 STEP 2 - FORMULATING RESEARCH HYPOTHESES;
To test whether the hypothesized model fits the data, the hypothesis of an overall 
model fitness under test is denoted Ho and is presented below: -
HYPOTHESIS Ho: "The DSRs Safety Attitude Model fits the data"
Regarding the testing of research hypotheses between the model constructs, there' 
are seven (7) hypotheses Hi-Hv proposed between two (2) endogenous variables (latent) 
and its associated variables in the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". Their 
proposed relationships are clearly defined with theoretical support from the literature 
review.
An overview of four (4) research questions and eight (8) research hypotheses 
(Ho-H?) for the "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" is summarized in Table 28.
TABLE 28; OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES BETWEEN
THE MODEL CONSTRUCTS
RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN THE
MODEL CONSTRUCTS
RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS
RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESES
AN OVERALL MODEL OF
"DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE 
MODEL"
RESEARCH QUESTION 1:
Does the hypothesized 
model fit the data?
HYPOTHESIS Ho:
The DSRs Safety Attitude 
Model fits the data.
SAFETY CULTURE —> 
DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE
RESEARCH QUESTION 2:
To what extent does safety 
culture affect DSRs safety 
attitude on the 
implementation of SMS at 
departmental level?
HYPOTHESIS Hi:
The extent to which Safety 
Culture will have a positive 
direct impact on DSRs 
Safety Attitude.
SAFETY CULTURE —>
DSR's PERCEPTIONS OF
SAFETY TRAINING
[ST]
RESEARCH QUESTION 3:
To what extent does safety 
culture affect DSRs 
perceptions on the 
implementation of SMS at
HYPOTHESIS H2:
The extent to which Safety 
Culture will have a positive 
direct impact on DSRs 
Perceptions of Safety___
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SAFETY CULTURE —>
PERCEIVED
MANAGEMENT
COMMITMENT To SAFETY
[MC]
SAFETY CULTURE -»
SAFETY COMMUNICATION
[SC]
SAFETY CULTURE —>
DSR's PERCEPTIONS OF
GROUP SAFETY NORMS
[SN]
departmental level? Training [ST].
HYPOTHESIS H3:
The extent to which Safety 
Culture will have a positive 
direct impact on Perceived 
Management Commitment 
to Safety [MC]
HYPOTHESIS H4:
The extent to which Safety 
Culture will have a positive 
direct impact on Safety 
Communication [SC].
HYPOTHESIS Hs:
The extent to which Safety 
Culture will have a positive 
direct impact on DSRs 
Perceptions of Group 
Safety Norms [SN].
DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE
DSR'S PERCEIVED
SELF-EFFICACY IN
MANAGING SAFETY
[PE]
DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE
DSR's PERSONAL BELIEFS
IN ACCIDENT CAUSATION
[PB]
RESEARCH QUESTION 4:
To what extent does the 
"Personal Beliefs" of DSRs 
affect their safety attitudes 
on the implementation of 
SMS at departmental level?
HYPOTHESIS H6:
The extent to which DSRs 
Safety Attitude will have a 
positive direct impact on 
DSRs Perceived 
Self-efficacy in Managing 
Safety [PE].
HYPOTHESIS H?:
The extent to which DSRs 
Safety Attitude will have a 
positive direct impact on 
DSRs Personal Beliefs in 
Accident Causation [PB]
The hypothesis of an overall model fitness under test, denoted Ho and seven (7) 
other hypotheses (Hl-Hv) for the causal relationships within the model constructs were 
proposed. When a good-fitting model is found, the structural parameters of the 
hypothesized model will be estimated.
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For easy reference, the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" with 
hypotheses (Hl-H?) and parameter constraints imposed is depicted in Figure 25.
The Hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model"
With Hypotheses 
And Parameter Constraints Imposed
Safety 
Culture
DSR 
Safety 
ttitude
FIGURE 25: THE HYPOTHESIZED "DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL" WITH HYPOTHESES (Hl-H7> AND
PARAMETER CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED
To analyze the model, Step 3, Selection of Model Fit Indexes for Goodness-of-fit 
tests follows.
3.3 STEP 3 - SELECTION OF MODEL FIT INDEXES FOR 
GOODNESS-OF-FIT TESTS;
The hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" in Figure 25 contains two (2) 
endogenous variables (latent) with various variables which could help to explain DSRs
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safety attitude. The hypothesized model will be a predictive model if the model constructs 
fit the data.
The fundamental question of model testing is imposed to clarify the reason for 
"Goodness of fit" test. Byrne (2001, p.7) states that "Once the model is specified, the 
researcher tests its plausibility based on sample data that comprise all observed variables 
in the model. The primary task in this model-testing procedure is to determine the 
goodness of fit between the hypothesized model and the sample data. As such, the 
researcher imposes the structure of the hypothesized model on the sample data, and then 
tests how well the observed data fit this restricted structure. "
Perrin (1999, pp.524-624) writes, "In general, the goodness-of-fit of a model to 
the data is determined by comparing the observed covariances with the covariances 
predicted by the model. Large discrepancies between the two sets of covariances are 
indicative of a poor fitting model". Deleus et al. also states that "A structural equation 
model implies a structure of the covariance matrix of the variables. Once the model's 
parameters have been estimated, the resulting model-implied covariance matrix can be 
compared to an observed or data-based covariance matrix. If the two matrices are 
consistent with one another, the structural equation model can be considered a plausible 
explanation for relations between the measures." Available from: Deleus F. and Van Hulle M. 
Modelling the Connectivity Between Terms in the Neuroscience Literature, pp. 3293-94. 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/9486/30109/013812Q7.pdf?arnumber=l 381207 [Accessed 26 Feb, 2008] It is
concluded that less discrepancies between the two sets of covariances, the better will be the 
model fitness.
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In SEM testing, the careful choice of suitable model fit indexes for assessment of 
an overall model fit has become a critical issue for the researcher's consideration. To 
choose appropriate model-fit indexes to support the view that the model being tested is a 
good fit model is a must, Schumacker et al (2004, pp. 100-104) suggested that "Model fit 
determines the degree to which the sample variance covariance data fit the structural 
equation modeP' and "Parsimony refers to the number of estimated parameters required to 
achieve a specific level of fit. Basically, an overidentified model is compared -with a 
restricted model.'"
Coughlin et al. also explain the term "Parsimony" as:-
•v- Better to have a model with fewer paths; and
•$• Able to explain variables with fewer paths and fewer equations;
•$• Similar principle in multiple regression — more economical to be able to
predict with fewer predictors.
Available from: Coughlin M.A. and Knight W., Confirmatory Factor Analysis: The Basis for the 
Structural Model, http://www.spss.eom/events/e id 2134/presentation.ppt#28 [Accessed 6 
November, 2007]
The goodness of fit of SEM emphasized model parsimony; a more parsimonious 
model with fewer estimated parameters is better than a more complex model. This 
research is looking for a "Fit but Parsimonious" model as the basic principle of parsimony 
suggests the simplest of similar models is the better choice. While exploring the "DSRs 
Safety Attitude Model" fitting with the data, the issue of parsimony should not be 
overlooked. Stapleton (1997) writes, "One of the goals of science is parsimony, because 
as William of Occam argued, parsimonious solutions are more likely to be true and are
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therefore typically more generalisable" (paragraph. 29).
For model testing, different fit indexes for model parsimony carrying different 
implications. Kam (2002, p.299) states that "After model testing, AMOS generates a 
number of statistical outputs including 25 different goodness-of-fit measures. The 
researcher will have to choose appropriate fit indexes to support the view that the model 
being tested is a good fit model. "
The fact that there are so many is indicative of both the fact that none are perfect 
and the importance of model fitting in SEM. "There is wide disagreement on just which 
fit indexes to report, but one should avoid the shotgun approach of reporting all of them, 
which seems to imply the researcher is on a fishing expedition." Available from: Garson D. 
Structural Equation Modeling - Goodness of fit tests http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm 
[Accessed 29 April 2008]
The warnings of Garson had alerted researchers that there are no pre-determined 
sets of indexes ready for selection. Any estimates falling outside the admissible range 
signal a clear indication that either the model is wrong, or the input matrix lacks sufficient 
information.
To evaluate the overall goodness of fit of the models, a mixture of fit-indexes 
included the ratio of Chi-square (p) value, Goodness-of-fit index (GFI), Adjusted 
Goodness-of-fit Index (AGFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and 
PCLOSE were employed in this study. The choice of above-mentioned indexes should be 
justified. A detailed submission has been made in this section on the choice of the
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model-fit indexes. Following is a detailed explanation on the justification of the choice of 
fit indexes in this study:-
> Chi-square (p) value: Chi-square test was used to test the possible 
statistical significant differences between variables. It compares the 
predicted and observed covariance matrix; a zero value indicates that there is 
no difference between the two representing a perfect fit. The chi-square 
test is an absolute test of model fit: If the probability value (P) is below
0.05, the model is rejected. Available from: Interpreting AMOS Output - Section 5. 
http://www.utexas.edu/its/rc/tutorials/stat/amos/ [Accessed 28 August 2006]. For model 
fit acceptance, the Chi-square (p) value should be greater than 0.05. 
[p>0.05]
Also note that "The degrees of freedom will be the difference between the 
number of observations and the number of parameters the model must 
estimate. A just-identified model is one with no degrees of freedom. An 
over-identified model is one with positive degrees of freedom. ".... "Some 
researchers divide the Chi-square by the numbers of degrees of freedom. A 
rule of thumb is that if this ratio is lesti than 2, it is considered well-fitted; it 
is considered acceptable if it is less than 3 and definitely not acceptable if 
greater than 5. " (Jackson et al., 2005, pp. 12-13)
> The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is an
absolute fit index and a standardized summary of the average covariance
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residuals. Loehlin et al. (2004, p.68) states that "The Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is a population-based index, -which means 
that it is relatively insensitive to sample size. It has an explicit parsimony 
adjustment, does not require specification of a baseline model, and one can 
obtain confidence intervals for it or use it to carry out statistical tests." 
McCallum et al. (1996, pp. 130-149) also describes that "While different 
indicators have been proposed to interpret the goodness of fit of findings 
from confirmatory factor analyses, the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) has been regarded as the most informative 
indicator in structural equation modeling".
"A value of the RMSEA up to 0.05 would indicate a good model fit. A 
value of about 0.08 or less would indicate a reasonable error of 
approximation, and values greater than 0.1 indicate poor model fit" 
(Browne and Cudeck, 1993, pp. 132-162). For model of fit acceptance, a 
value of RMSEA for a good model should be less than or equal to 0.05 is 
considered acceptable. [RMSEA <=0.05]
> PCLOSE is a "p value" that tests the null hypothesis that RMSEA is no
greater than 0.05. Available from: Garson, D., (1998) PA 765 Statnotes: An Online
Textbook. NC State University, http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/statnote.htm 
[Accessed 13 April 2008]
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A value of the PCLOSE less than 0.05 would lead to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the computed RMSEA is greater than 0.05 
indicating lack of a close fit. [PCLOSE>=0.05l
> Jorskog-Sorbom Goodness-of-fit Index (GFI) directly assessed how well 
a model reproduces the sample data and does not depend explicitly on 
sample size. It is a measure of the discrepancy between predicted and 
observed covariance, varying between 0 for no fit and 1 for perfect fit, 
indicates the proportion of the observed covariance explained by the model 
covariance. "A value of 0.9 for all these indices has been proposed as a 
minimum for model acceptance" (Bentler et al., 1980, pp.588-606). For 
model fit acceptance, GFI should be equal to or greater than 0.90. 
IGFI>=0.90]
> Adjusted Goodness-of-fit Index (AGFI) provides an index of model 
parsimony. It is a variant of GFI and a parsimony rewarding measure. 
For model fit acceptance, AGFI should be equal to or greater than 0.90. 
[AGFI>=0.90]
The rationale on the choice of model-fit indexes was thoroughly discussed. Five 
model-fit indexes, namely the Chi-square (p) value, Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), PCLOSE, Goodness-of-fit Index (GFI) and Adjusted 
Goodness-of-fit Index (AGFI) to be adopted for the evaluation of model fitness are 
consolidated in Table 29. "Each fit measure is designed to give information about how 
•well your model fits the data in your dataset." (Jackson et al., 2005, pp.12-13)
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TABLE 29; SUMMARY OF MODEL-FIT INDICES
MODEL FIT INDEX
Chi-square (p) value
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA)
PCLOSE
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI)
Adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI)
MINIMUM 
ACCEPTABLE 
VALUE FOR 
MODEL FITNESS
P > 0.05
RMSEA <=0.05
PCLOSE >= 0.05
GFI>=0.90
AGFI >= 0.90
MODEL - FIT 
ACCEPTANCE
(YES/NO)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
All five (5) selected model indexes will use to determine the adequacy of the 
hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". After imposing all the parameter constraints 
for model testing, the selection of modification indexes (M.I.) is also required, in order to 
obtain a better-fitting model.
3.3.1 SELECTION OF MODIFICATION INDICES (MS) FOR MODEL 
TESTING;
Why the M.I. threshold is set to 4 for model testing? "It is rare that a model fits 
well at first. Sometimes model modification is required to obtain a better-fitting model. 
AMOS allows for the use of modification indices to generate the expected reduction in the 
overall model fit chi-square for each possible path that can be added to the model. ".... "The 
Threshold for Modification Indices allows you to specify what level of chi-square change is 
required for a path to be included in the modification index output. The default value is 
4.00 because it slightly exceeds the tabled critical value of a chi-square distribution with
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one degree of freedom: 3.84." Available from: Interpreting AMOS Output - Section 5. 
http://www.utexas.edu/its/rc/tutorials/stat/amos/ [Accessed 28 August 2006]
"The minimum value would be 3.84, since chi-square must drop that amount 
simply by virtue of having one less parameter (path) in the model." Available from: Garson 
D., Structural Equation Modeling - Goodness of fit tests' 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm [Accessed 29 April 2008] After imposing all 
the parameter constraints with the default value of M.I. is set to 4 for model testing, the 
next is Step 4 to evaluate model fit of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" 
depicted in Figure 25 against data collected.
3.4 STEP 4 - EVALUATE MODEL FIT;
Having specified the hypothesized model in previous sections, this section is 
focused on the evaluation of model fit via the input of field data collected from the survey. 
The model was then analyzed using AMOS 5, a statistical package of SPSS. AMOS 5 
generated a comprehensive graphical output and text reports on the model constructs such 
as variances, regression weights and model fit indexes.
Regarding notations in SEM, "A variance can be indicated by a two-headed 
arrow, both ends of which point at the same variable, or, more simply by a number within 
the variable's drawn box or circle. Regression coefficients are represented along 
single-headed arrows that indicate a hypothesized pathway between two variables (These
are the weights applied to variables in linear regression equations). Covariances are
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associated with double-headed, curved arrows between two variables or error terms and 
indicate no directionality, " Available from: Stoelting, R. Structural Equation Modeling/Path Analysis. 
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~efc/classes/biol710/path/SEMwebpage.htm [Accessed 24 January 2008]
The AMOS graphical output shows test results of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety 
Attitude Model" (the default model) in the following sections for discussion.
What is the default model? Garson (2008) explained that "The default model is 
the researcher's structural model, always more parsimonious than the saturated model and 
almost always fitting better than the independence model with which it is compared using 
goodness of fit measures." Available from: Garson, D., Structural Equation Modeling. 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm [Accessed 29 April 2008]
3.4.1 INTERPRETING THE RESULTS OF DEFAULT MODEL IN AN INITIAL 
TEST;
At this stage, the default model was analyzed using AMOS. The path diagram 
and graphical output showing an initial test result is shown in Figure 26.
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DSRs Safety Attitude Model 
Chi-square = 54.157 Degree of Freedom = 19 p = .OOO
GFI = .916 AGFI = .842 
RMSEA =.114 PCLOSE = .002
FIGURE 26; AN INITIAL TEST - DSRS' SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL
Regarding the Goodness-of-fit of the model in Figure 26, initial fit statistics were 
found unsatisfactory. An initial test of the model fit indexes lead to the conclusion that 
the hypothesized model should be rejected based on the following reasons:-
1. The model testing yields a chi-square fit statistic of 54.157 with 19 degrees 
of freedom. The probability level (p-value) for observing the said 
chi-square value is zero. Since the observed level of significance is less 
than the cut-off limit of 0.05, the hypothesized model is to be rejected 
(ACITS, 1999; Garson, 1998).
2. Model fit indexes of GFI, AGFI and RMSEA; only the GFI is of value 0.916
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greater that the minimum cut-off value of 0.90 for model acceptance. 
AGFI and RMSEA are of values falling outside the model acceptance limit. 
The value of AGFI after model testing is of value 0.842 which is below the 
acceptance value of 0.90 for model fitness, whereas the RMSEA is 0.114 
which is greater than the maximum value of 0.05 for model fitness.
3. The PCLOSE is of value 0.002 less than 0.05 of the model acceptance limit 
would lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis and conclude that the 
computed RMSEA is greater than 0.05 indicating lack of a close fit.
For easy reference, test results of the fit statistics are displayed in Table 30:- 
TABLE 30: TEST RESULTS OF THE FIT STATISTICS
MODEL FIT INDEX
Chi-square (p) value
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI)
Adjusted goodness-of-fit index 
(AGFI)
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA)
PCLOSE
MINIMUM 
ACCEPTABLE 
VALUE FOR 
MODEL FITNESS
P>0.05
GF1>=0.90
AGFI >= 0.90
RMSEA <=0.05
PCLOSE >= 0.05
OUTPUT VALUE
P=0.000
GFI=0.916
AGFI=0.842
RMSEA=0.114
PCLOSE=0.002
MODEL 
ACCEPTAN
CE
(YES/NO)
No
Yes
No
No
No
It is hypothesized that model fits the data well enough to serve as a useful 
representation of reality and a parsimonious explanation of the data. An initial test of the 
model fit indices lead to the conclusion that the default model should be rejected due to the 
model fit indexes indicate that the data do not fit the model. Schumacker et al. (2004, 
p.245) suggested that "If the fit of an implied theoretical model is not acceptable, which is 
typically the case with an initial model, the next step would be to modify the model and
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subsequently evaluate the new, respecified model." Re-specify the model is required for 
model testing. Details would be discussed in section 3.5.
3.5 STEP 5 - RESPECIFY THE MODEL BASED ON THE MODEL'S FIT:
In connection with the testing of the default model, AMOS generates output with 
estimated chi-square values "M.I." that are used to justify the inclusion of each path for 
model fitness improvement. In Table 31, AMOS output listed out six (6) parameters 
included (ST^PB, SM^SR, MC^SN, SN^MC, PB-»ST and SR^SM) with MI. and 
the parameter change "Par Change".
TABLE 31: MODIFICATION INDICES OF DEFAULT MODEL - REGRESSION WEIGHTS
PB <— ST
SR<— SM
SN<— MC
MC<— SN
ST <— PB
SM<— SR
M.I.
7.990
5.905
4.793
6.155
11.480
4.438
Par Change
.330
.159
.160
.170
.156
.126
M.I. for the regression path could lead to the reduction of the chi-square value in 
the default model. The suitability of each suggested new path should be justified under 
the theoretical considerations; even if M.I. and "Par change" indicate that model fit will 
increase if a regression path is added between variables or a covariance arrow is added
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between indicator error terms. "The "parameter change," -which is the estimated change 
in the new path coefficient when the model is altered (labeled "Par Change"). "Par 
change" is the estimated coefficient -when adding arrows, since no arrow corresponds to a 
0 regression coefficient, and the parameter change is_ the regression coefficient for the 
added arrow." Available from: Garson D. Structural Equation Modeling, 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm [Accessed 13 Feb 2008]
Before making full use of the M.I. suggested by AMOS in improving model 
fitness, ACITS (1999) and Arbuckle (1997) have both warned that the function of the MI 
should not be abused. The inclusion of additional causal paths may distort the theoretical 
sense of the default model in explaining DSRs' safety attitude towards the implementation 
of SMS at departmental level and also complicated the testing process. As such, the 
adoption of the M.I. in improving the model fitness should not rest entirely on the amount 
of chi-square reduction but should be justified theoretically. "Caution should be used in 
model re-specification. Most SEM software will make suggestions for improving the 
model's fit. Blindly modifying the model according to those suggestions without a good 
theoretical justification will yield nonsensical, but well-fitted models. " (Jackson et al., 2005, 
p. 12)
In this study, there are two (2) endogenous (latent) variables "Safety Culture" and 
"DSRs Safety Attitude" in the default model depicted in Figure 23. "Safety Culture" is 
represented by five (5) exogenous (observed) variables included "Safety Management"
[SM], "DSRs Perceptions of Safety Training" [ST], "Perceived Management Commitment
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to Safety" [MC], "Safety Communication" [SC] and "DSRs Perceptions of Group Safety 
Norms" [SN]. "DSR Safety Attitude" is represented by "DSRs Personal Beliefs in 
Accident Causation" [PB], "DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in Managing Safety" [PE] and 
"Perceived Safety Responsibility" [SR]. At this stage, the inclusion of suggested 
regression paths is not considered, as the causal relationships between model constructs 
have already been fully addressed in Chapter Five (5) - Construction of the hypothesized 
DSRs Safety Attitude Model. After the theoretical evaluation, the inclusion of six (6) 
suggested regression paths (ST->PB, SM-»SR, MC-+SN, SN->MC, PB-»ST and 
SR->SM) is rejected.
Now, attention is turned to the six pairs of suggested covariances between the 
residuals shown in Table 32. As suggested by Jackson et al. (2005, p. 12); "If the SEM 
software suggests that the fit would be better with the addition of a covariance between 
variables X and Y and that suggestion makes good theoretical sense to you, then the 
modification should be made. If there is no reasonable theoretical underpinning, such 
suggestions should be ignored. " As such, the suitability of each new added path in the 
default model should be justified under the theoretical considerations.
TABLE 32: MODIFICATION INDICES OF DEFAULT MODEL - COVARIANCES
e6<-->e1
e6<->e8
e5<->e3
e4<->e9
M.I.
5.167
9.114
12.363
5.757
Par Change
-1.930
3.951
3.065
1.646
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e4<->e3 
e4<->e1
M.I. Par Change
5.223 -2.410 
9.671 2.034
A total of six pairs of covariances between the residuals e6 <--> el; e6 <--> e8; e5 
<--> e3; e4 <--> e9; e4 <-> e3 and e4 <-> el listed in Table 32 are suggested for 
considerations in improving the model fitness. Based on theoretical evaluations, three
pairs of suggested co variance paths (e6 <--> el; e4 <--> e9 and e4 <--> el) were not added
in the model for testing. Following are the justifications:- 
> The exclusion of covariation path e6 <--> el
The e6 and el are residuals belonging to exogenous (observed) variables of 
[MC] and [SR] respectively. [MC] is grouped under an endogenous 
variable "Safety Culture" and [SR] is grouped under an endogenous variable 
"DSR Safety Attitude". The exclusion of the suggested covariance path e6 
<—> el is justified since there is no common variance shared amongst these 
residuals. Further more, the expected reduction in chi-square statistic is 
5.167 when e6 <--> el is included which is far below the expected reduction 
of 9.114, if replaced by e6 <--> e8.
> The exclusion of covariation path e4 <-> e9
The e4 is a residual belonging to exogenous (observed) variables of [SM] 
and e9 is a residual belonging to an endogenous (latent) variable "DSR 
Safety Attitude" respectively. [SM] is grouped under an endogenous 
variable (latent) "Safety Culture" and e9 a residual of an endogenous (latent)
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variable "DSR Safety Attitude". The exclusion of the suggested 
covariance path e4 <--> e9 is justified since there is no common variance 
shared amongst these residuals.
> The exclusion of covariation path e4 <—> el
The e4 and el are residuals belonging to exogenous (observed) variables of 
[SM] and [SR] respectively. [SM] is grouped under an endogenous (latent) 
variable "Safety Culture" and [SR] is grouped under an endogenous (latent) 
variable "DSR Safety Attitude". The exclusion of the suggested 
covariance path e4 <--> el is justified since there is no common variance 
shared amongst these residuals.
The exclusion of three pairs of suggested covariance paths included e6 <--> el; e4 
<--> e9 and e4 <—> el is justified. At this stage, only three pairs of suggested covariance 
paths e6 <--> e8, e5 <--> e3 and e4 <--> e3 are eligible for inclusion. The following is the 
theoretical justification:-
> The inclusion of covariance path e6 <--> e8
The e6 is a residual belonging to "Perceived Management Commitment to 
Safety" [MC] and e8 is a residual belonging to "DSRs Perceptions of Group 
Safety Norms" [SN]. The covariance of e6 with e8 could be considered as 
the existence of a composite of common variables that [MC] and [SN] could 
depend upon but which are not included in the measurement. Examples of 
these common variables shared by [MC] and [[SN] could be "Departmental
management always listens to safety concerns from people" [MC05] and
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"People are willing to report every workplace injury to the departmental 
management regardless of severity" [SN06]. The inclusion of the 
suggested covariance path e6 <--> e8 is further secured since the expected 
reduction in chi-square statistic is 9.114 which is well above the expected 
reduction of 5.167 when e6 <--> el is included.
The inclusion of covariance path e5 <—> e3
The e5 is a residual belonging to "DSRs Perceptions of Safety Training" [ST] 
and e3 is a residual belonging to "DSRs Personal Beliefs in Accident 
Causation" [PB]. The covariance of e5 with e3 could be considered as the 
existence of a composite of common variables that [ST] and [PB] could 
depend upon but which are not included in the measurement. Examples of 
these common variables shared by [ST] and [PB] could be "Safety training 
can positively change people's attitudes towards safety" [ST05] and 
"Accidents are mainly due to poor attitudes toward safety from people 
involved" [PB03]. The inclusion of the suggested covariance path e5 <--> 
e3 is further secured since the expected reduction in chi-square statistic is 
12.363 which could make significant contribution in improving the model 
fitness.
> The inclusion of covariance path e4 <--> e3
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The e4 is a residual belonging to "Safety Management [SM]" and e3 is a 
residual belonging to "DSRs Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation" [PB]. 
The covariance of e4 with e3 could be considered as the existence of a 
composite of common variables that [SM] and [PB] could depend upon but 
which are not included in the measurement. Examples of these common 
variables shared by [SM] and [PB] could be "SEPO safety manual provides 
useful guidelines for users" [SM08] and "Safety is the responsibility of 
SEPO, not others." [PB 10]. The inclusion of the suggested covariance path 
e4 <--> e3 is further secured since the expected reduction in chi-square 
statistic is 5.223 which could make significant contribution in improving the 
model fitness.
At this stage, the three suggested covariance paths included e6 <--> e8; e5 <—> e3 
and e4 <--> e3 were added in the model after theoretical justifications. In improving the
model fitness, there are two additional covariance paths e6 <--> e7 and el <--> e2 also
added in the model based on the theoretical considerations. Following is theoretical 
justifications:-
> The inclusion of an additional covariance path e6 <—> e7 based on 
theoretical considerations:
The e6 is a residual belonging to "Perceived Management Commitment to 
Safety" [MC] and e7 is a residual belonging to "Safety Communication" 
[SC]. The covariance of e6 with e7 could be considered as the existence of
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a composite of common variables that [MC] and [SC] could depend upon 
but which are not included in the measurement. Examples of these 
common variables shared by [MC] and [SC] could be "Departmental 
management always listens to safety concerns from people" [MC05] and 
"People are freely making suggestions for safety improvement" [SC05].
> The inclusion of an additional covariance path e2 <—> el based on 
theoretical considerations:
The e2 is a residual belonging to "DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in 
Managing Safety" [PE] and el is a residual belonging to "Perceived Safety 
Responsibility" [SR]. The covariance of e2 with el could be considered as 
the existence of a composite of common variables that [PE] and [SR] could 
depend upon but which are not included in the measurement. Examples of 
these common variables shared by [PE] and [SR] could be "As a DSR, I am 
adequately trained in implementing the safety management program" [PE03] 
and "As a DSR, monitoring of individual's safety performance is part of my 
duty" [SR04].
Up to this end, a total of five (5) covariance paths (e6 <—> e8; e5 <--> e3, e4 <-->
e3, e6 <--> e7 and el <--> e2) were added in the model after theoretical justifications.
The default model in Figure 27 is re-specified with the additional covariance paths 
imposed.
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The Re-specified "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" 
With Additional Covariance Paths Imposed
MC
>
L
sc
,
SN
, •* 
/
FIGURE 27: THE RE-SPECIFIED DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL WITH ADDITIONAL COVARIANCE PATHS
IMPOSED
3.5.1 INTERPRETING THE RESULTS OF DEFAULT MODEL IN THE 
SECOND TEST;
The re-specified model (in Figure 27) was re-tested again to obtain a "Fit but 
Parsimonious" model. Graphical output of the second test is shown in Figure 28. 
Interpretation the results of the default model in the second test would be discussed in 
detail.
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DSRs Safety Attitude Model 
Chi-square = 17.892 Degree of Freedom = 14 p
GFI = .970 AGFI = .924 
RMSEA = .044 PCLOSE = .518
= .212
e© (e7) (e8)
^T -30 | .44 T - 23
FIGURE 28; THE SECOND TEST OF DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL
Concerning the Goodness-of-Fit of the model in Figure 28, the default model 
should fail to be rejected based on the following reasons:-
1. The model testing yields a chi-square fit statistic of 17.892 with 14 degrees of 
freedom. The probability level (p-value) for observing the said chi-square 
value is p = 0.212. Since the observed level of significance is greater than
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the cut-off limit of 0.05, the hypothesized model fitness is not to be rejected. 
(ACITS, 1999; Garson, 1998)
2. The model fit indexes of GFI, AGFI and RMSEA are of value indicating 
fitness acceptance (GFI= 0.970, AGFI= 0.924 and RMSEA= 0.044).
3. The PCLOSE of value 0.518 greater than 0.05 of the model acceptance limit 
would lead the null hypothesis to fail to be rejected and conclude that the 
computed RMSEA is less than 0.05 indicating a close fit.
All five (5) selected model fit indexes were used to judge the statistical 
significance and substantive meaning of a hypothesized model, so as to guide final model 
selection. Since all five (5) selected model fit indexes fulfilled the criteria of model 
acceptance, as such the hypothesis of an overall model fitness (Ho; "The DSRs Safety 
Attitude Model fits the data") fail to be rejected.
The fit statistics indicate that the default model provides a good fit to the data. It 
is concluded that the default model in Figure 28 falls within the criteria of a "Fit but 
Parsimonious" model in explaining DSRs' safety attitude towards the implementation of 
SMS at departmental level. For easy reference, test results of the fit statistics are 
displayed in Table 33.
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TABLE 33; TEST RESULTS OF THE FIT STATISTICS
MODEL FIT INDEX
Chi-square (p) value
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI)
Adjusted goodness-of-fit index 
(AGFI)
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA)
PCLOSE
MINIMUM 
ACCEPTABLE 
VALUE FOR 
MODEL 
FITNESS
P > 0.05
GFI>=0.90
AGFI >= 0.90
RMSEA 
<=0.05
PCLOSE >= 
0.05
OUTPUT 
VALUE
P=0.212
GFI=0.970
AGFI=0.924
RMSEA=0.044
PCLOSE=0.518
MODEL 
ACCEPTANCE
(YES/NO)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
In assessing the overall fitness of the default model, an examination of the five 
selected model fit indexes with reference to each respective cut-off value is the first step. 
Perrin (1999, pp. 524-624) has suggested that apart from the issue of fitness, the hypothesized 
relationships in the model should be critically examined.
The next step is to perform significance tests on hypothesizes (Hl-Hv) between 
the model constructs.
3.5.2 SIGNIFICANCE TESTS OF THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIZES (Hl-H7) 
BETWEEN MODEL CONSTRUCTS IN THE HYPOTHESIZED MODEL;
SEM has the ability to test the hypothesized models of the causal relationship 
between the measured variables. Referring to Perrin's advice, the evaluation of 
relationships between the variables hypothesized in Hl-H? of the default model is hence 
made with reference to the AMOS output. Besides the model fit indexes, the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates "MLE" - Regression Weights of the default model displaying the
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C.R. and significance of path coefficients is presented in Table 34.
TABLE 34; MLE - REGRESSION WEIGHTS
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
DSR_Safety_Attitude <— Safety_Culture 
SM <— Safety_Culture 
ST <—Safety_Culture 
MC <— Safety_Culture 
SC <— Safety_Culture 
SN <— Safety_Culture 
SR <—DSR_Safety_Attitude 
PE <—DSR_Safety_Attitude 
PB___________<— DSR_Safety_Attitude
1.508 .240 6.279 *** par_7
1.000
1.034 .170 6.100 *** par_l
1.238 .243 5.090 *** par_2 
.984 .166 5.945 *** par_3
1.089 .235 4.644 *** par_4
1.000
.969 .093 10.373 *** par_5 
.402 .158 2.550 .011 par_6
Note that "The MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES (MLE) estimates of the 
regression weights below are the estimated path coefficients for the arrows in the model. ", 
"Standard errors are also given for the path coefficients", and "C.R." is the critical ratio, 
which is the estimate divided by its standard error." Available from: Garson D., Structural 
Equation Modeling Example Using WinAMOS. http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/semAMOS 1 .htm. 
[Accessed 28 November 2007] In short, MLE reflects how likely that the observed values of 
the dependent may be predicted from the observed values of the independents.
Regarding relationships of Critical Ratio (C.R.) between the significance of path 
coefficients and the significance of factor covariances: "When the Critical Ratio (CR) is > 
1.96 for a regression weight, that path is significant at the .05 level (that is, its estimated 
path parameter is significant)" and "The significance of estimated covariances among the 
latent variables are assessed in the same manner: if they have a C.R. > 1.96, they are 
significant". Available from: Garson D. Structural Equation Modeling. 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm. [Accessed 7 December 2007] Thus, using a 
significance level of 0.05, any critical ratio that exceeds 1.96 in magnitude would be called
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significant.
Interpretations for the significance of research hypothesized relationships in the 
default model are summarized in Table 35.
TABLE 35; INTERPRETATIONS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIZES (Hi-H?)
HYPOTHESIS Hi: The extent to which Safety Culture will have a positive direct impact 
on DSRs Safety Attitude.
Estimated path coefficients = 1.508 and C.R. = 6.279
Remarks: Since the C.R. is greater than 1.96 in magnitude and the regression weight of 
SAFETY CULTURE -> DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE is significantly greater than 
zero at the 0.05 level. It is concluded that the extent to which Safety Culture will 
have a positive direct impact on DSRs Safety Attitude and the hypothesis Hi is "fails 
to be rejected".
HYPOTHESIS H2: The extent to which Safety culture will have a positive direct impact 
on DSRs Perceptions of Safety Training [ST].
Estimated path coefficients = 1.034 and C.R. = 6.1
Remarks: Since the C.R. is greater than 1.96 in magnitude and the regression weight of 
SAFETY CULTURE -» DSR'S PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY TRAINING FST1 is 
significantly greater than zero at the 0.05 level. It is concluded that the extent to 
which Safety culture will have a positive direct impact on DSRs Perceptions of Safety 
Training [ST] and the hypothesis H2 is "fails to be rejected".
HYPOTHESIS H3: The extent to which Safety Culture will have a positive direct impact 
on Perceived Management Commitment to Safety [MC]
Estimated path coefficients =1.238 and C.R. = 5.09
Remarks: Since the C.R. is greater than 1.96 in magnitude and the regression weight of 
SAFETY CULTURE -* PERCEIVED MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT TO 
SAFETY [MCI is significantly greater than zero at the 0.05 level. It is concluded 
that the extent to which Safety culture will have a positive direct impact on Perceived 
Management Commitment to Safety [MC] and the hypothesis H3 is "fails to be 
rejected".
HYPOTHESIS H4: The extent to which Safety culture will have a positive direct impact 
on Safety Communication [SC].
_________Estimated path coefficients = 0.984 and C.R. = 5.945________
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Remarks: Since the C.R. is greater than 1.96 in magnitude and the regression weight of 
SAFETY CULTURE -> SAFETY COMMUNICATION TSC1 is significantly greater
than zero at the 0.05 level. It is concluded that the extent to which Safety culture will 
have a positive direct impact on Safety Communication [SC] and the hypothesis H4 is 
"fails to be rejected".
HYPOTHESIS Hs: The extent to which Safety Culture will have a positive direct impact 
on DSRs Perceptions of Group Safety Norms [SN].
Estimated path coefficients = 1.089 and C.R. = 4.644
Remarks: Since the C.R. is greater than 1.96 in magnitude and the regression weight of 
SAFETY CULTURE ^DSR'S PERCEPTIONS OF GROUP SAFETY NORMS TSN1 
is significantly greater than zero at the 0.05 level. It is concluded that the extent to 
which Safety culture will have a positive direct impact on DSRs Perceptions of Group 
Safety Norms [SN] and the hypothesis H5 is "fails to be rejected".
HYPOTHESIS H6: The extent to which DSRs Safety Attitude will have a positive direct 
impact on DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in Managing Safety [PE].
Estimated path coefficients = 0.969 and C.R. = 10.373
Remarks: Since the C.R. is greater than 1.96 in magnitude and the regression weight of 
DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE -» DSRS PERCEIVED SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY 
[SR] is significantly greater than zero at the 0.05 level. It is concluded that the extent 
to which DSRs Safety Attitude will have a positive direct impact on DSRs Perceived 
Self-efficacy in Managing Safety [PE] and the hypothesis H6 is "fails to be rejected".
HYPOTHESIS H7: The extent to which DSRs Safety Attitude will have a positive direct 
impact on DSRs Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation [PB]
Estimated path coefficients = 0.402 and C.R. = 2.55
Remarks: Since the C.R. is greater than 1.96 in magnitude and the regression weight of 
DSRs SAFETY ATTITUDE -*DSR'S PERSONAL BELIEFS IN ACCIDENT 
CAUSATION FPB] is significantly greater than zero at the 0.05 level. It is concluded 
that the extent to which DSRs Safety Attitude will have a positive direct impact on 
DSRs Personal Beliefs In Accident Causation [PB] and the hypothesis H? is "fails to 
be rejected". ___________________________________
It is noted that "SEM models can never be accepted; they can only fail to be 
rejected. This leads researchers to provisionally accept a given model. "... "SEMsoftware 
programs require researchers to be very explicit in specifying models. While models that
fit the data well can only be provisionally accepted, models that do not fit the data well can
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be absolutely rejected. " Available from: Structural Equation Modeling using AMOS: An Introduction -
model identification [Online], http://vyww.utexas.edu/its-archive/rc/tutorials/stat/amos/tfniodel identification 
[Accessed 9 November 2007]
Perrin (1999) also states that "The maximum-likelihood algorithm used to estimate 
the parameters in the model minimizes a chi-square statistic that compares the observed 
and predicted covariances. This same chi-square can be used to test the null hypothesis 
that the model Jits the data. This hypothesis is stating that the discrepancy between the 
observed and predicted covariances is equal to zero. Therefore, we do not want to reject 
the null hypothesis" (paragraph.2).
For easy reference, the test result of research hypothesizes (H1-H7) is summarized 
in Table 36.
TABLE 36: TEST RESULTS OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIZES (HI-H?)
RESEARCH
HYPOTHESIZES
Hypothesis Hi:
The extent to which 
Safety Culture will have 
a positive direct impact 
on DSRs Safety Attitude.
Hypothesis Hi:
The extent to which
Safety culture will have a 
positive direct impact on 
DSRs Perceptions of 
Safety Training [ST].
Hypothesis H3:
The extent to which
Safety Culture will have
ESTIMATED
PATH
COEFFICIENT
S
1.508
1.034
1.238
PATH
COEFFICIENT
S
.240
.170
.243
C.R.
6.279
6.100
5.090
HYPOTHESI
S
REJECTED?
FAIL TO BE 
REJECTED
FAIL TO BE 
REJECTED
FAIL TO BE 
REJECTED
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a positive direct impact 
on Perceived
Management 
Commitment to Safety 
[MC].
Hypothesis H4:
The extent to which
Safety culture will have a 
positive direct impact on 
Safety Communication 
[SC].
Hypothesis H5:
The extent to which
Safety Culture will have 
a positive direct impact 
on DSRs Perceptions of 
Group Safety Norms 
[SN].
Hypothesis H6:
The extent to which
DSRs Safety Attitude 
will have a positive direct 
impact on DSRs 
Perceived Self-efficacy 
in Managing Safety [PE].
Hypothesis H7:
The extent to which
DSRs Safety Attitude 
will have a positive direct 
impact on DSRs Personal 
Beliefs in Accident
Causation [PB]
.984
1.089
.969
.402
.166
.235
.093
.158
..
5.945
4.644
10.373
2.550
FAIL TO BE 
REJECTED
.
FAIL TO BE
REJECTED
FAIL TO BE 
REJECTED
FAIL TO BE 
REJECTED
Test results evidenced that the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" fits 
the data. The implications of test results reflect the importance of DSRs safety attitude 
towards the implementation of SMS at departmental level. It should be of interest to the 
management of the University to review the criteria of DSRs selection.
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3.6 STEP 6 - DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS;
With the acceptances of the Goodness-of-Fit and research hypothesizes of the 
default model, the research findings regarding significance of the factor covariances; 
predictive power, indirect, direct and total effects amongst variables would be discussed in 
detail.
3.6.1 SIGNIFICANCE TESTS OF THE FACTOR COVARIANCES
Regarding tests of the significance of factor covariances, "When the Critical Ratio 
(CR) is > 1.96 for a regression weight, that path is significant at the .05 level (that is, its 
estimated path parameter is significant)'".... "The significance of estimated covariances 
among the latent variables are assessed in the same manner: if they have a c.r. > 1.96, they 
are significant." Available from: Garson, D., (2008). Structural Equation Modeling. 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm [Accessed 9 November 2007]
TABLE 37; COVARIANCES OF THE DEFAULT MODEL
e6
e6
e4
e5
e1
<--> e7
<--> e8
<--> e3
<--> e3
<--> e2
Estimate
2.174
4.795
-2.335
2.674
1.914
S.E.
.871
1.478
1.147
1.083
3.359
C.R.
2.497
3.243
-2.036
2.469
.570
P
.013
.001
.042
.014
.569
Label
par_8
par_9
par_1 0
par_1 1
parj 2
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In table 37, only the C.R. of covariance of "el <--> e2" is 0.57 which less than 
1.96 in magnitude. Besides that, the C.R. of four (4) other covariances included "e6 <--> 
e7", "e6 <--> e8", "e4 <--> e3" and "e5 <--> e3" are greater than 1.96 in magnitude, as 
such they are significant. It is summarized that:-
> Covariance of "e6 <--> e7", means that e6 and e7 influences on each other is
significant. 
> Covariance of "e6 <--> e8", means that e6 and e8 influences on each other is
significant. 
> Covariance of "e4 <--> e3", means that e4 and e3 influences on each other is
significant. 
> Covariance of "e5 <--> e3", means that e5 and e3 influences on each other is
significant.
> Covariance of "el <--> e2", means that el and e2 influences on each other is 
not significant.
Through AMOS, the above direct cause-and-effect relationships amongst 
endogenous and exogenous variables in the model were carefully examined and clarified.
3.6.2 INDIRECT. DIRECT AND TOTAL EFFECTS AMONGST EXOGENOUS 
VARIABLES AND ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES OF THE "DSRS 
SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL";
Regarding the structural coefficients in the default model, Garson (2008) 
reminded that "Researchers should report not only goodness-of-fit measures but also 
should report the structural coefficients so that the strength of paths in the model can be
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assessed. Readers should not be left with the impression that a model is strong simply 
because the "fit" is high. When correlations are low, path coefficients may be so low as 
not to be significant....even when fit indexes show "good fit." Available from: Garson D.
Structural Equation Modeling, http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.httn [Accessed 13 Feb 
2008]
AMOS produces indirect, direct and total effects amongst endogenous and 
exogenous variables in the default model. Path coefficients indicted in the Table 38 could 
help to explain indirect and direct effects in the default model.
TABLE 38: STANDARDIZED REGRESSION WEIGHTS OF THE DEFAULT MODEL
DSR_Safety_Attitude <—
SM <—
ST <—
MC <—
SC <—
SN <---
SR <—
PE <—
PB <—
Safety_Culture
Safety_Culture
Safety_Culture
Safety_Culture
Safety_Culture
Safety_Culture
DSR_Safety_Attitude
DSR_Safety_Attitude
DSR_Safety_Attitude
Estimate
.936
.601
.691
.544
.665
.477
.802
.775
.298
The following are direct and indirect effects of the default model:-
> "Safety Culture" structure with 0.936 path coefficient is a determinant of
"DSR Safety Attitude" structure. In the table, it is visualized that "Safety
Culture" structure imposed the strongest direct influence on "DSR Safety
Attitude" compared with "SR", "PE", "PB", "SM', "ST", "MC", "SC" and
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"SN".
> Three exogenous variables including "SR", "PE" and "PB" depends directly 
on "DSR Safety Attitude" structure. From the table, it is visualized that 
amongst these three exogenous variables, the "DSR Safety Attitude" 
structure with 0.802 path coefficient imposed the strongest direct influence 
on "SR".
> Three exogenous variables included "SR", "PE" and "PB" depends 
indirectly on "Safety Culture" structure. From the table, it is visualized 
that amongst these three exogenous variables, the indirect effect of "Safety 
Culture" structure with 0.751 path coefficient (0.936 0. 802) imposed the 
strongest indirect influence on "SR".
> Five exogenous variables included "SM', "ST", "MC", "SC" and "SN" 
depends directly on "Safety Culture" structure. From the table, it is 
visualized that amongst these five exogenous variables, the direct effect of 
"Safety Culture" structure with 0.647 path coefficient (0.936 0. 691) 
imposed the strongest direct influence on "ST".
In terms of total effects amongst endogenous and exogenous variables in the 
default model, Table 39 is a matrix extracted from the AMOS model testing output. For 
easy reference, total effect upon the "DSR Safety Attitude" is underscored.
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DSR_Safety_Attitude
PB
PE
SR
SN
SC
MC
ST
SM
Safety_Culture
.936
.279
.725
.751
.477
.665
.544
.691
.601
DSR_Safety_Attitude
.000
.298
.775
.802
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
It is summarized that:-
> "DSR Safety Attitude" depends directly on "Safety Culture". From the 
table, it is visualized that "Safety Culture" imposed the strongest influence 
on "DSR Safety Attitude". The total effect of "Safety Culture" on "DSR 
Safety Attitude" is 0.936.
> The three exogenous variables included "SR", "PE" and "PB" depends 
directly on "DSR Safety Attitude". From the table, it is visualized that 
"DSR Safety Attitude" imposed the strongest influence on "SR". The total 
effect of "DSR Safety Attitude" on "SR" is 0.802.
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> Five exogenous variables included "SM', "ST", "MC", "SC" and "SN" 
depends directly on "Safety Culture". From the table, it is visualized that 
"Safety Culture" imposed the strongest influence on "ST". The total effect 
of "Safety Culture" on "ST" is 0.691.
Indirect, direct and total effects amongst endogenous and exogenous variables in 
the default model were discussed. It is evidenced that "Safety Culture" structure imposed 
the strongest direct influence on "DSR Safety Attitude" structure in implementing the SMS 
at departmental level. The evidence has further substantiated the reliability of the default 
model in this study.
3.6.3 PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE "DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDE MODEL";
In regarding predictive power of the default model, Kam (2002, p.336) states that 
"A way to visualize the predictive power is to examine the percentage of the variance 
explained, i.e. the Coefficient of Determination (R2) - the square of the coefficient of 
correlation (R)."
As a rule of thumb, Krus (2003) proposed that that "Correlation coefficients (R) 
between .00 and .30 are considered weak, those between .30 and .70 are moderate and 
coefficients between . 70 and 1.00 are considered high". Available from: Krus, D. (2003). Visual 
statistics with Multimedia Chapter 9 Correlation: Interpretations, Cruise Scientific. 
http://iimk.ac.in/gsdl/cgi-bin/library?e=d-000-00—Ostatis-00-O-O-Oprompt-10—4——0-11-- l-en-50—20-ab 
out—00031-001 -1 -Outf2z-8-00&a=d&c=statis&cl=CL 1 &d=HASHO 185d5fe8b40fD67f8a54ab4.4.3
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[Accessed 9 November 2007] Extending Krus's proposal to the Coefficient of Determination 
(R2), a moderate value of R2 should range from 0.09 (0.302=0.09) to 0.49 (0.702 = 0.49). 
Whereas a high value of R2 should range from 0.49 to 1.
TABLE 40; SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS OF THE DEFAULT MODEL
DSR_Safety_Attitude
PB
PE
SR
SN
SC
MC
ST
SM
Estimate
.876
.089
.601
.644
.228
.443
.296
.477
.362
From the AMOS output in the Table 40, it is summarized that:- 
> "DSRS Safety Attitude", "PE" and "SR" imposed a high value of "Squared 
Multiple Corrections" in the default mtydel.
> "PB", "SN", "SC", "MC", "ST" and "SM" imposed a moderate value of 
"Squared Multiple Corrections" in the default model.
In view of the overall amount of variance explained, the default model appears to 
be logical and reasonable. "Squared Multiple Corrections" in the default model ranging
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from a moderate value of 0.089 (8.9%) to a high value of 0.876 (87.6 %). Especially, the 
critical variable "DSR Safety Attitude" imposed a high value of 0.876 (87.6%) in the 
default model. The model is considered to be a highly predictive model in explaining 
DSRs safety attitudes towards the implementation of SMS at departmental level.
4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY;
The present research has identified ten (10) variables which provide the important 
implications with regard to DSRs safety attitude towards the implementation of SMS at 
departmental level. This study had several limitations that merit attention:-
> This research relied entirely on self-report measures of DSRs safety attitudes, 
which may suffer from inaccuracy in report. Reliance on self-report can be 
problematic and may threaten the validity of the findings. As Ajzen (1991, 
pp. 179-211) states that "By directly measuring an attitude are several 
limitations presented; attitudes are often changing, social norms influence 
attitudes, the level of experienced control affects ones attitudes, as -well as do 
the beliefs directed towards performing the behaviour affect the behaviour". 
It is possible that DSRs could be biased in their replies, and some of them may 
have felt uncomfortable in replying honestly to certain questions. From the 
survey, it was found that different DSRs safety attitude implies different 
perception towards safety. Validity and reliability of the survey was depends 
on sample size. The results are time dependent. Since the observed 
response was in the year of 2006, as such, there is every possibility of a lagged 
effect that is not properly captured in this modeling effort.
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> An extensive range of potential predictors (observed variables and latent 
variables) were tested in the present research. It is possible that if other 
variables had been included in the model in the present study, a better fitting 
or more appropriate model may have been identified. Although an extensive 
range of factors were tested in the present research that may impose certain 
effect on DSRs safety attitude. It is conceivable that many factors which 
may also be relevant were not included in the current study, because of 
practical limitations. An exhaustive examination of each and everyone is far 
beyond the capability of this one-man study.
> Direction of arrows in a structural equation model represents the researcher's 
hypotheses of causality within a system. The choice of variables and 
pathways is also based on a researcher's assumptions that will limit the 
structural equation model's ability to recreate the sample covariance and 
variance patterns that have been observed in nature.
5. CHAPTER SUMMARY;
In this study, DSRs safety attitude towards the implementation of SMS in the 
University was critically examined. The present research has identified factors and 
practical implications that are associated with various co-factors of DSRs safety attitudes. 
There are eight exogenous variables grouped under two endogenous (latent) variables 
"Safety Culture" and "DSR Safety Attitude" in the "DSRs Safety Attitude Model". 
"Safety Culture" directly influences on "DSR Safety Attitude", "Safety Management [SM]", 
"DSRs Perceptions of Safety Training" [ST], "Perceived Management Commitment to 
Safety" [MC], "Safety Communication" [SC] and "DSRs Perceptions of Group Safety
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Norms" [SN] in a positive way. Similarly, "DSR Safety Attitude" directly influences on 
"DSRs Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]", "DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in Managing 
Safety" [PE] and "DSRs Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation" [PB].
The SEM model was tested by examining the goodness of fit of the model against 
a collection of data measuring the variables included in the model. Assessment of model 
fit was based on multiple criteria including model-fit indexes of Chi-square (p) value, 
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI), Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and PCLOSE. The default model in Figure 28 was 
tested and the results obtained from CFA on the default model adequately reflects a good fit 
to the observed data with Chi-square (y2 = 17.892), Degree of Freedom (df = 14), 
Probability level (p = .212); GFI = 0.970; AGFI = 0.924, RMSEA = 0.044, PClose = 0.518 
and all the items loaded significantly on the constructs was measured with p < 0.05. Since 
all the five (5) selected model fit indexes fulfilled the criteria of model acceptance, as such 
the hypothesis of an overall model fitness Hypothesis HO: "The DSRs Safety Attitude 
Model fits the data" failed to be rejected. It is concluded that the default model "DSRs 
Safety Attitude Model" falls within the criteria of a "Fit but Parsimonious" model in 
explaining DSRs safety attitude towards the implementation of SMS at departmental level. 
Testing of the default model constructs also involved ti set of seven (7) hypotheses (Hi-H7). 
From the test, seven (7) hypotheses (Hl-H?) also failed to be rejected. It is reflected in the 
significance of research hypothesized relationships (Hl-H?) in the default model concurred 
with the hypothesized model structure. Moreover, the directions of the all the paths were 
positive as anticipated.
The excellent fit of the data from the questionnaire to the hypothesized "DSRs
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Safety Attitude Model" provides further evidence of the validity and reliability to the 
questionnaire. Data collected with the questionnaire shows a "Fit but Parsimonious" 
model confirming that the questionnaire has been based upon a valid overall model. From 
the test result, the strength of "Safety Culture", "DSR Safety Attitude" and "Perceived 
Safety Responsibility [SR]" once again played central roles with regard to the 
implementation of SMS at departmental level. Significance of the factor covariances 
together with predictive power, as well as indirect, direct and total effects amongst 
exogenous variables and endogenous variables of the default model were also tested. All 
of the paths between the endogenous (latent) variables were statistically significant. It 
was further secured that the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" fits the sample 
data well. Results and findings on DSRs safety attitudes towards the implementation of 
SMS at departmental level in the University were discussed in detail. In general, DSRs 
have a positive attitude towards the implementation of SMS at departmental level.
The conclusion, recommendation and contribution of this study will be discussed 
in Chapter Eight (8).
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RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION AND 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
1. INTRODUCTION;
The title of this study is "THE EXPLORATION OF A SAFETY ATTITUDE 
MODEL FOR DEPARTMENTAL SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES TOWARDS THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN AN INSTITUTE 
OF TERTIARY EDUCATION IN HONG KONG".
An attempt has been made to study the DSRs safety attitudes by exploring the 
relationships of DSRs introspection and various cognitive factors which may most likely 
influence the effectiveness of SMS implementation in the University. A total often (10) 
variables were identified from the review of eleven (11) psychological theories and models. 
It provided the theoretical framework on construction of the hypothesized "DSRs Safety 
Attitude Model". Major steps involved in developing the research instrument "Safety 
Attitude Survey Questionnaire" and data collection for SEM analysis are shown in Table 16. 
To minimize the chance of middle option, a self-reported 6-point Likert type survey 
questionnaire contains seventy-seven (77) items for eight (8) exogenous variables was 
developed for pilot survey. Data collected from the targeted group (i.e. DSRs) and a total 
of 102 valid questionnaires (with 85 % response rate) were finally secured. The validity 
was tested and established by using factor analysis to single out those items which doubly 
loaded on two or more factors; or alienated factors that did not belong to a specific group. 
The sampling adequacy was measured by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics.
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KMO value should be 0.60 or higher to proceed with factor analysis. Internal consistency 
also assessed and Cronbach's alpha 'a' values of all 43 items ranging from of 0.8764 to 
0.9349 over the recommended level of 0.70 and no significant cross-loading among the 
eight (8) exogenous variables was found. Based on the result of the pilot test, only 
forty-three (43) items out of seventy-seven (77) questionnaire items were retained for the 
field survey. In the field survey, a total of 144 valid questionnaires (with a response rate 
of 74.23%) were finally secured and formed the basis for the subsequent analyses. A 
further reliability test was conducted and Cronbach's alpha 'a' values of all forty-three (43) 
items ranging from 0.8297 to 0.9192 (in Table 27) were over the recommended level of 
0.70 and no significant cross-loading was found among the eight (8) exogenous variables. 
From the survey results, both validity and reliability were over the recommended level. It 
is concluded that the "Safety Attitude Survey Questionnaire" used to evaluate DSRs safety 
attitude towards the implementation of SMS is highly reliable.
In this study, all SEM and confirmatory factor analyses were performed using 
AMOS. The hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" was developed and tested 
throughout the six steps including "Model Identification", "Formulating Research 
Hypotheses", "Selection of Model Fit Indexes for Goodness-of-fit tests", "Evaluate Model 
Fit", "Re-specify the Model based on the Model's Fit5' and "Discussion of Findings".
Research hypotheses sought to confirm whether or not theoretical underlying 
constructs are reflected in the observed data by using confirmatory factor analysis "CFA". 
The eight (8) hypotheses imposed the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" were 
tested. Test results of the fit statistics from the re-specified model shown in Table 33
adequately reflects a good fit to the observed data with Chi-square (%2 = 17.892), Degree of
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Freedom (df = 14), Probability level (p = .212); GFI = 0.970; AGFI = 0.924, RMSEA = 
0.044, PClose = 0.518 and all the items loaded significantly on the constructs was measured 
with p < 0.05. From the results of hypotheses testing, it was evident that the hypothesis 
HO "The DSRs Safety Attitude Model fits the data" failed to be rejected; since all the five 
(5) selected model fit indexes fulfilled the criteria of model acceptance. Hl-H? also failed 
to be rejected and has indicated that the endogenous variable "DSR Safety Attitude" is 
directly influenced by endogenous variable "Safety Culture". The endogenous variable 
"Safety Culture" is directly influenced on five (5) exogenous variables including "Safety 
Management [SM]", "DSRs Perceptions of Safety Training" [ST], "Perceived Management 
Commitment to Safety" [MC], "Safety Communication" [SC] and "DSRs Perceptions of 
Group Safety Norms" [SN]. The endogenous variable "DSR Safety Attitude" (the target 
variable) is directly influenced on three (3) exogenous variables included "DSRs Perceived 
Safety Responsibility [SR]", "DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in Managing Safety" [PE] and 
"DSRs Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation" [PB].
The excellent fit of the data from the questionnaire to the hypothesized "DSRs 
Safety Attitude Model" provided further evidence of validity and reliability to the 
questionnaire. Significance of research hypotheses between model constructs concurred 
with the hypothesized model structure. Moreover, significance of the factor covariances 
together with predictive power, as well as indirect, direct and total effects amongst 
exogenous variables and endogenous variables of the hypothesized model were tested. 
All the paths between the endogenous variables were statistically significant. It further 
demonstrated that the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" fits the sample data well. 
It is concluded that the hypothesized "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" falls within the criteria
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of a "Fit but Parsimonious" model.
An understanding of and reasoning about human factors is important in sustaining 
a high level of safety performance. Yet, the aim of this study has given a substantial 
consideration to the factors that could influence DSR safety attitudes toward the 
implementation of SMS.
2. RECOMMENDATIONS;
Based upon this study, the two-tiers strategic management approach that could 
help the University's management building momentum in sustaining safety, so as to further 
enhance the effectiveness of SMS implementation is recommended. Geller (2005, p.305) 
pointed out that "Sports psychologists talk about momentum as a gain in psychological 
power — including confidence, self-efficacy, and personal control — that changes 
perceptions and attitudes, and enhances both mental and physical performance. It all 
starts with noticing a run of individual or team achievement".
FOR CAMPUS COMMUNITY;
> VISIBLE MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT TO SAFETY
This study demonstrates that "Perceived Management Commitment to 
Safety" is directly influences by "Safety Culture". How management's 
safety attitude is transmitted to stakeholders depends on how accurately the 
management commitment to safety perceived by them. "Management 
commitment produces higher levels of motivation and concern for health 
and safety throughout the organisation. It is indicated by the proportion of 
resources (time, money, people) and support allocated to health and safety
management and by the status given to health and safety versus production,
248
Chapter 8 249
cost etc. The active involvement of senior management in the health and 
safety system is very important" ... "It is important that management is 
perceived as sincerely committed to safety. If not, employees will generally 
assume that they are expected to put commercial interests first, and safety 
initiatives or programmes -will be undermined by cynicism. " Available from: 
Common topic 4: Safety Culture, p.l. 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/comah/common4.pdfrAssessed 9 December 2008].
DSRs and other stakeholders' perceptions on management commitment to 
safety may be subject to negative stereotyping by the departmental 
management. "Where employees perceive managerial attitudes and 
actions toward safety to be less than adequate, problems may ensure that 
affects the effective functioning of the organization as a whole, as the 
workforce become less committed to the organization per se, because 
management are seen as unwilling to provide a safe working 
environment. "(Cooper 1995. p.2)
Geller (2005, p.321) points out that "Commitments are most influential 
when they are public, active, and perceived as voluntary or not coerced". 
No SMS will be successful without visible management commitment 
throughout the operation in the University. Departmental management 
demonstrates not only an interest, but a long term visible commitment in 
maintaining adequate resources and support for safety. When stakeholders 
notice that staff at management level is adopting a very committed attitude 
towards safety in terms of time, efforts and resources, they will perceive that
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safety is whole-heartedly supported from the University.
> A POSITIVE SAFETY CULTURE BECOMES AN INTEGRAL PART 
OF THE UNIVERSITY'S CULTURE ;
Organizational factors and individual factors that have effects on the 
safety culture are complicated. "The concept of risk depends on our 
mind and culture and is invented to help us understand and cope with the 
danger and uncertainties of life. " "In the beginning, reactions towards 
obvious risks may occur, but may be difficult to express, and safety has to 
be trusted. After an introductory period, during -which risk and safety 
knowledge may be low, perception may be higher, but along with 
increased experience risks may become accepted as normal." (Stave, 
2005, pp. 15-16) This study demonstrates that "DSR Safety Attitude" and 
"DSRs Perceptions of Group Safety Norms" are directly influenced by 
"Safety Culture". Everley (1995, pp. 19-22) points out that "The greater 
improvement in safety performance may rest upon a greater 
understanding of employees and their attitudes and behaviours in the 
workplace". In cultivating a positive safety culture, it is important to 
understand how the individual thinks and behaves in relation to safety 
within the University. Group safety norms developed by the workgroup 
will greatly influence the individual's perception of risk and value on 
safety, so as to influence safety culture either positively or negatively. 
Pidgeon (1998, pp.202-216) presented four organisational properties of a 
'good' safety culture:
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> Senior management commitment to safety (both actions and -words). 
> Attitudes of shared care and concern about hazards, and also about
their impacts upon people, distributed throughout all levels of an
organisation. 
> Norms and rules that permit a flexible approach to dealing -with both
well-defined and ill-defined hazardous conditions. 
>• Reflection on practice (or organisational learning) through such
things as monitoring, incident analysis and feedback systems.
"Paradigms are powerful perceptions, or biases, if you will. Whatever 
your attitude toward a particular experience, or your expectation of how 
things will work out, that's your paradigm. "(Geller, 2005, p.298) 
Implementing the SMS will only be effective where a positive safety 
culture exists throughout all stakeholders. A paradigm shift is needed for 
building momentum for safety. The University's management needs to 
cultivate a positive safety culture through interactions with stakeholders. 
Safety promotion and recognising safety contributions could help to 
achieve the goal. "The more recognition a person received, the better 
they feel about themselves. And the better people feel about themselves, 
the more they will actively care for the safety of others." (Geller, 2005, 
pp.316) A successful SMS results when a positive safety culture 
becomes an integral part of the University's culture. It encourages every 
individual to project a positive safety attitude toward safety at work.
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> EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION ACROSS STAKEHOLDERS;
An effective communication with stakeholders is critical in the process of 
consultation, decision making for safety improvement and taking corrective 
action to eliminate hazards. Cooper (1995, p.5) points out that "The 
perceived effectiveness of the organisation's safety committees may be 
judged from varying perspectives. To some extent they can be seen as an 
indirect measure of the safety communication flow, the prevailing industrial 
relations context in which the committees function, and management 
commitment toward safety. In addition, safety committees are judged by 
how well they influence and improve health & safety in the organization. 
The more rapidly their recommendations are implemented and publicised 
the more they will be seen to be effective, and the more credibility they 
accrue."
This study demonstrates that "Safety Communication" is directly influenced 
by "Safety Culture". The poor communication among department 
management, DSRs and stakeholders seemed to be an invisible barrier to 
sustaining participation in safety initiatives. Stave (2005, p. 18) points out 
that "If risks and safety are not communicated at and through all levels of 
the organisation, there will be little understanding of the risks and safety. 
It is human nature that the workforce usually just keep their mouths shut. 
To cultivate a positive safety culture, an effective safety communication is 
necessary in providing feedback to management, safety committee, DSRs
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and stakeholders about all safety related matters both good things and bad 
things. The establishment of clear channels of communication between 
them should not be overlooked. Early communication can reduce 
uncertainty and enhance stakeholders' participation in striving safety for 
excellence. HODs have to encourage stakeholders to report hazards, safety 
violations and non-compliances of legal requirements without blame from 
line supervisor and fellow workers. To enhance further the effectiveness of 
communication across "Rank and file", HOD therefore has responsibility to 
ensure that safety information is disseminated to the work force.
> "SAFETY" IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY;
The DSR is responsible for ensuring that all operations are performed with 
the utmost regard for the safety at the designated workplace. The 
effectiveness of SMS very much depends on the individual DSR's attitude 
towards safety and how he/she valued roles and responsibility of DSR. 
This study demonstrates that "DSRs Perceived Safety Responsibility" is 
directly influenced by "DSRs Safety Attitude".
"Many of today's safety management systems are built on control. 
Managing risk through control does not take into account the fact that 
individuals are intentional in how they define and carry out tasks. " (Stave, 
2005, p. 13) In the University, safety responsibility shared by stakeholder 
is in-doubt. Some people still rely heavily on DSRs' effort hi
implementing SMS at departmental level. Too much work load and too
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heavy safety responsibility could influence DSRs' attitudes toward safety. 
The complexity of operations requires that safety responsibility is shared 
among all stakeholders in the campus community. Safety should not be the 
sole responsibility of the University's safety professionals and DSRs. It 
should be a shared safety responsibility among stakeholders including staff 
members at all levels, students and contractors. To ensure the campus is a 
safer place, individuals should be held responsible for safety on their own 
and others. "Experienced employees should feel especially responsible to 
demonstrate safe work practices to new employees. People look for 
guidance in unfamiliar situations. So supervisors should give new hires 
opportunities to work with experienced employees who are most enthusiastic 
about safety-related activities. "(Geller, 2005, p.322)
An individual's safety responsibility has to be stated in the University's 
policy and through the formal job descriptions. When stakeholders 
recognize "Safety is a Shared Responsibility", collaboration across them will 
demonstrate the synergy of team work. As such, the University can turn 
safety into a much easier job.
> SMS IS AN INTERGAL PART OF THE UNIVERSITY'S 
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS:
Cultivating a positive safety culture in the University's community is vitally 
important from the safety management perspective. This study
demonstrates that "Safety Management" is directly influenced by "Safety
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Culture".
The University always treasures people's lives by taking proactive 
approaches in controlling hazards and reducing risk exposures. This goal 
can only be successfully achieved by continuously and systematically 
improving the safety management, reducing hazards and at-risk behaviour 
through cultivating a positive safety culture in the University. To a large 
extent, the effectiveness of SMS relies on the culture wherein each 
individual contributes to and is responsible for safety.
Stave (2005, p. 15) points out that "A constant demand for effective resource 
allocation and short-term revenues from investment may result in priorities 
that are in opposition to safety, reducing redundancy, cutting margins, 
increasing work pace, and reducing time for reflection and learning." 
Geller et al. (2003, p.4) points out that "Safety is a value not a priority of a 
job "; he states that "Employees know safety is not number one - profit is. 
If the company does not make money, there are no jobs, and there's no need 
for occupational safety. So stop putting safety in a position to compete 
with profit-making. Instead, give safety a separate and special category — 
value ". "The term 'priority' implies importance and a sense of urgency. 
A priority today might not be a priority tomorrow. Depending upon the 
demands of the moment, one priority often gets shifted for another. Safety 
should be a 'value' that employees bring to every job, regardless of the 
ongoing priorities or task requirements." (Geller, 2005, p.33) Applying
Geller's safety philosophy in the University' environment, this can only
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happen when everyone in the University considers that safety is a crucial 
factor as important of and the same value as teaching, technology research 
and development.
From the safety management perspective, creating and nurturing a culture of
safety ingrains safety into every aspect, making safety an integral part of
every process in daily operations is necessary. If the SMS is not integrated,
it will function independently of other management functions. This usually
results in safety deficiencies being overlooked and not communicated
throughout all stakeholders. To ensure a safe campus, there is a need to
integrate SMS into the University's management functions. Frick (2000,
p.316) summarized the underlying motives commonly given for such a
change as:
> improvement of occupational health and safety performance;
> ensuring a more capable organization for planning, implementation
and control of the required occupational safety and health measures;
and 
> improving motivation for occupational safety and health of managerial
staff and employees at all levels.
FORDSRS;
> BETTER EDUCATION AND TRAINING;
Most accidents are caused by human errors. Generally, causes of accidents 
might be due to the operator's lack of safety knowledge and training, poor
attitude and awareness toward safety, unsafe behaviour and failure to follow
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safety procedures. In the University's environment, advances in 
technologies, new legislative requirements, the potential for costly medical 
claims from work related injuries, "Hurry-Hurry" culture and "to do more 
with less resources" strategy combined to make the duty of DSRs more 
complex and tougher than ever before.
This study demonstrates that "DSRs Perceptions of Safety Training" is 
directly influenced by "Safety Culture". Pidgeon (1991, pp. 129-40) states 
that "A good safety culture is reflected in the positive safety attitudes and 
perceptions of the workforce" and "How people perceive risk is associated 
•with a number of behavioural factors - attitude, personality, memory, their 
ability to process information, the level of training received, the level of 
arousal and individual skills available". (Stranks, 1994, p.55)
Different DSRs may perceive levels of risks quite differently. A high level 
of safety culture will produce a positive impact upon the DSR's safety 
attitude towards the implementation of SMS at departmental level. Their 
safety attitudes and competences may facilitate or hinder the effectiveness of 
their actions in implementing SMS at departmental level. Do they have the 
knowledge, skills to accomplish their role? All these factors have 
correspondingly increased the importance of both education and training for 
DSRs. Geller (2005, p.290) points out that "Training programs that only 
teach step-by-step procedures can be perceived as a top-down 'flavor of the 
month'. Educating people about the principles or rationale behind a new
safety policy, program or process enables understanding and critical
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thinking. It also allows you to customize procedures for particular work 
situations. " To provide only training is inadequate to enable DSRs perform 
their duties in an effective manner. Stranks (1994, p. 103) suggest that 
"The systematic development of attitude, knowledge and skill patterns 
required by the individual to perform adequately a given task or job. It is 
often integrated with further education".
In enhancing the effectiveness of the implementation of SMS and improving 
an overall safety performance, appropriate safety education and training 
could be very useful for DSRs to acquire the knowledge and skills. 
Educate and train them so they are confident they can handle safety tasks. 
Building-up DSRs' safety attitude at work by education and training not 
only boost up a sense of safety awareness and emergency response, but also 
helps to cultivate a positive safety culture. It is suggested that safety 
education and training for DSRs should be reviewed on the basis of 
University's needs.
> EMPOWERMENT;
Cooper (1997a, pp. 185-202) states th#t "Specific attitudinal biasing factors 
that affect risk perception in safety include people's personal commitment to 
safety, their beliefs about the causes of accidents and how stressful they find 
their jobs." This study demonstrates that "DSRs Perceived Self-efficacy in 
Managing Safety" and "DSRs Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation" are 
directly influenced by "DSR Safety Attitude".
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DSR safety attitude could significantly influence stakeholders' attitudes and 
behaviour either positively or negatively towards safety at work, so as to 
influence an entire safety culture in the University. "The role of safety 
representatives in promoting a positive safety culture is to assist in the 
development and monitoring of communication links between management 
and the shop floor on matters of company safety policy. As such safety 
representatives need to be respected diplomats with enhanced status if they 
are to positively influence events in the workplace" (Cooper, 1995, p.5) 
DSR's position in the hierarchy is an indicator of the University's 
management commitment to safety. Without visible commitment, mutual 
respects from the management and other stakeholders, DSRs would never 
make the SMS a success. To improve workplace safety; it is suggested that 
DSRs be appointed at an appropriate level and empowered with the 
authority in establishing, developing, maintaining, implementing, 
controlling and monitoring of SMS.
Menendez et al. (2008, p. 12) states that "Empowerment of safety 
representatives does not only involve participation but also control on their 
resources and activities. Three mum specific aspects are related to the 
empowerment of safety representatives need to be emphasized here. The 
first is the need to achieve visibility and respect from management, health 
and safety professionals. Secondly, safety representatives need to have the 
recognition and support from the assembly of workers (not only the union 
membership) as well as from the union inside the company. A third issue is
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the need of getting a clear and formal recognition from the government. " 
Geller (1994, pp. 18-24) also points out that "Empowerment refers to an 
individual's perceptions or attitudes as a result of a delegation of authority 
or responsibility by upper-level management. An empowered attitude can 
lead to increased motivation to 'make a difference', to go beyond the call of 
duty for organizational safety and take responsibility for ensuring safe 
operations". When DSRs are empowered with safety duties, they have 
substantial voices and influential power in safety decisions and hold 
themselves responsible for their decisions and actions.
3. CONCLUSION;
The main objectives in this study have been addressed through the model testing 
and hypotheses testing. From the research findings, the main conclusion of this study is 
that DSRs in general have a positive safety attitude which influences the effectiveness of 
the implementation of SMS in the University. A substantial association was found 
between DSRs safety attitude and safety culture influences on the overall safety 
performance in the University.
A landmark decision has been made for the tertiary education sector in Hong 
Kong to change the undergraduate program from a 3-year to a 4-year in 2012. 
Unfortunately, the world is facing the worst economic crisis in 2008. The University, 
other tertiary institutions, industrial and non-industrial sectors are no exemption in 
suffering the retrenchment of resources for daily operations and future development. In 
coping with change, the University's strategy "do more with less resource" and perhaps the
intensification of work may give rise to increase safety risks. It is important that the
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University's management have to understand the effect and consequence that DSRs safety 
attitudes have either positive or negative impacts on the effectiveness of the implementation 
of SMS. The research results have provided practical implications to the University's 
management to understand what personal factors of DSRs are likely to influence the 
effectiveness of SMS and how well the safety management philosophy has been integrated 
into the University's operations. Achieving a high level of safety performance, careful 
selection and appointment of DSRs are challenges for the University's management.
4. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES;
The "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" provided a theoretical background in 
explaining how the complexity of DSRs attitudinal factors influence the effectiveness of 
SMS implementation. Cultivating a positive safety culture is becoming a prime concern 
for accident prevention and safety culture has to become as part of an organizational culture. 
When considering future researches, two significant questions emerge as directions for 
further studies. First, to what extent do DSRs safety attitudes influence on the culture of 
safety in the organization? Second, to what extent does the culture of safety influences on 
the entire organizational culture? To address these two questions in future research would 
greatly enhance an understanding the important role of DSRs in cultivating safety culture in 
the organization.
5. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY;
The research on safety attitudes sheds light on the reasons DSRs hold the altitudes 
they do and the degree to which attitudes influence the effectiveness of SMS 
implementation. The thesis has been brought to the end, hopefully this research not only
contributed to the University but also applicable to other tertiary institutions, industrial and
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non-industrial sectors for two main reasons.
First, the research instrument "A Self-reported 6-point Likert type Safety 
Attitudes Survey Questionnaire" was developed. The results reported throughout this 
thesis confirm that the questionnaire is a reliable tool to measure the extent of DSRs safety 
attitudes toward the implementation of SMS. It is suggested that researchers, safety 
professionals and departmental management in other tertiary institutions, industrial arid 
non-industrial sectors could modify the questionnaire for further studies of attirudinal and 
behavioural issues. Second, the "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" provides a systematic 
research framework to explore the extent of DSRs' safety attitudes toward the 
implementation of SMS. It is suggested that researchers, safety professionals and 
departmental management in other tertiary institutions, industrial and non-industrial sectors 
could generalise the application of the "DSRs Safety Attitude Model" as a tool for further 
investigation of attitudinal and behavioural issues. Finally, it is also the intention of this 
research to contribute the best of its effort to draw people's attention and understanding of 
the important role of human factors in sustaining a high level of safety performance under 
the self-regulatory safety management approach.
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This study is concluded by the following statements:
"KNOWLEDGE IS LIKE A GARDEN: 
IF IT IS NOT CULTIVATED. IT CANNOT BE HARVESTED"
(GUINEA, AFRICAN PROVERB)
"LEARNING IS A NEVER-ENDING PROCESS"
SEIGO TADA (1922-1997)
HANSHI SEIGO TADA, THE FOUNDER AND MY GRAND MASTER IN 
ALL JAPAN SEIGOKAN KARATEDO ASSOCIATION
"LIFE-LONG LEARNING IS A WAY IN SUSTAINING THE SUCCESS"
Chi-moon LI (JUNE 2009)
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APPENDIX 1 
SOURCES OF ADOPTED AND MODIFIED QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS FOR PILOT SURVEY:
> Health and Safety Executive HSE (2004). "Research Report 259 - Occupational 
health and safety enforcement strategies to promote concordance in the hospitality 
industry", Prepared by King's College London.
KAM Chi-kit (2002), The Exploration of a Multi-Dimensional Safe Behaviour 
Model for construction -workers in Hong Kong - A Structural Equation Modelling 
Approach - Appendix 1: The English Version of the Questionnaire on Workers; 
Safety Perception. PhD. Diss., University of Hull.
> Safely Survey. Available from:
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/bs/JIP/SAFESURV.HTM [Accessed 15 January 2006].
Seaboch (1994) "Effects of Safety Instruction upon Safety Attitudes and Knowledge 
of University Students enrolled in selected Agricultural Engineering Courses" 
Appendix D: Initial Safety Attitude Items.
281
Appendices 282
APPENDIX 1
1. Safety Management [SM]
Eleven (11) items [SM 01-11] to address "Safety
management" [SM]:
SOURCES OF ADOPTED AND 
MODIFIED QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
SM02 Safety procedures in your department are easy 
to understand.
Most safety rules are cumbersome.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 5
SM10 "Accident prevention rather than cure" is the 
main safety management strategy in your 
department / office.
Accidents do not happen to careful people.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 58
SM11 Departmental management only report accident 
involving of lost-workday injury to SEPO.
Management acts only after accidents have 
occurred.
Safety Survey - Question 19
2. Perceived Management Commitment To Safety 
[MC]
Eight (8) items [MC 01-08] to address "Perceived 
management commitment to safety" [MC]
MC01 Departmental management visibly 
demonstrates an interest in the safety matters.
In my workplace managers show interest 
in my safety.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 6
MC02 Departmental management clearly considers 
the safety of people to be of great importance.
Management clearly considers the safety 
of employees of great importance.
Safety Survey - Question 5
MC03 Departmental management "tu
rns a blind eye" 
to things that are done in an unsafe manner.
In my workplace management turn a blind 
eye to safety issues.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 5
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MC04 Departmental management encourages people 
to report any unsafe act and unsafe condition.
_____________________283
Manager encouraged me to provide inputs 
and suggestions for the purpose of 
improving the safety and health in my 
work area.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 9
MC06 Departmental management is concerned for the 
operating cost more than safety.
Productivity is more important than safety.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 70
2. Perceived Management Commitment To Safety
; PC]
Eight (8) items [MC 01-08] to address "Perceived 
management commitment to safety" [MC]
MC08 Safety is given high priority by the 
departmental management.
Sometimes production has to be given 
priority over safety.
HSE (2004) - Health and Safety in the 
Hospitality Industry - Questionnaire
3. Safety Communication [SC]
Ten (10) items [SC 01-10] to address "Safety
communication" [SC],
SC02 People are always informed of unsafe 
practices.
/ often point out unsafe situations to my 
friends.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 40
SC03 People are always informed of unsafe 
conditions in the workplace.
/ often point out unsafe situations to my 
friends.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 40
SC04 People are welcome to share their safety 
concerns with others.
Management has encouraged open 
communication about safety and health 
throughout the workplace.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 8
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SC05 People are freely making suggestions for safety 
improvement.
_____________________284
Manager encouraged me to provide inputs 
and suggestions for the purpose of 
improving the safety and health in my 
work area.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 9
SC09 Health and safety publications/magazines are 
circulated for perusal.
Safety information is always brought to my 
attention by my line manager/supervisor.
Safety Survey - Question 31
SC10 Information regarding health and safety 
training and seminar is provided.
Safety information is always brought to my 
attention by my line manager/supervisor.
Safety Survey-Question - 31
4. DSR's Perceptions of Safety Training [ST]
Ten (10) items [ST 01-10] to address "DSR*s perceptions
of safety training" [ST],
ST02 People are adequately trained to perform then- 
tasks safely.
Workers should be trained for safe 
practices.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 24
5. DSR's Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation [PB]
Ten (10) items [PB 01-10] to address "DSR's personal 
beliefs in accident causation" [PB],
PB01 Accidents are mainly due to a lack of safety 
knowledge from people involved.
Accidents are usually caused by a machine 
failure.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 9
PB02 Accidents are mainly due to a lack of working 
experiences from people involved.
Accidents and near-misses are caused by 
bad management.
HSE (2004) - Health and Safety in the 
Hospitality Industry - Questionnaire.
PB03 Accidents are mainly due to poor attitudes 
toward safety from people involved.
Accidents and near-misses are caused by 
bad management.
HSE (2004) - Health and Safety in the 
Hospitality Industry - Questionnaire.
PB04 Accidents are mainly due to a lack of safety 
supervision.
Accidents and near-misses are caused by 
bad management.
HSE (2004) - Health and Safety in the 
Hospitality Industry - Questionnaire.
284
Appendices 285
PB05 Accidents just happen, there is little one can do 
to avoid them.
Accidents just happen, there is little one 
can do to avoid them.
HSE (2004) - Health and Safety in the 
Hospitality Industry - Questionnaire.
PB06 Accidents in the workplace are totally 
unavoidable, because of "Acts of God"!
Accidents are uncontrollable.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 12
PB07 Lots of minor injuries are a sign that more 
serious accidents could also occur.
Lots of small injuries are a sign that more 
serious accidents could also occur.
HSE (2004) - Health and Safety in the 
Hospitality Industry - Questionnaire.
5. DSR's Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation [PB]
Ten (10) items [PB 01-10] to address "DSR's personal 
beliefs in accident causation" [PB],
PB08 It is necessary to "turn a blind eye" to rule 
violations, if people involved are your 
superior.
Sometimes it is necessary to turn a blind 
eye to rule violations.
HSE (2004) - Health and Safety in the 
Hospitality Industry - Questionnaire.
PB09 Safety is the management responsibility, not 
others.
Safety is the government's problem, not 
mine.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 27
PB 10 Safety is the responsibility of SEPO, not 
others.
Safety is the government's problem, not 
mine.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 27
6. DSR's Perceptions of Group Safety Norms [SN]
Fourteen (14) items [SN 01-14] to address "DSR's 
perceptions of group safety norms" [SN],
SN02 People would take every possible safety 
measures to prevent accident.
My colleagues strive to fulfill the safety 
rules.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 16
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SN03 People would take shortcuts to perform their 
tasks naturally.
There are often situations where a 
competent operator can bypass safety 
systems in order to get a job done.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 16
SN04 People would report any safety violation to 
their supervisors.
/ am strongly encouraged to report unsafe 
conditions.
Safety Survey - Question 15
SN05 People usually turn a 'blind eye' to unsafe 
matters.
In my workplace management turn a blind 
eye to safety issues.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 5
SN06 People are willing to report every workplace 
injury to the departmental management 
regardless of severity.
/ am strongly encouraged to report unsafe 
conditions.
Safety Survey Question - 15
6. DSR's Perceptions of Group Safety Norms [SN]
Fourteen (14) items [SN 01-14] to address "DSR's 
perceptions of group safety norms" [SN],
SN08 People are in favor of legislation to ensure 
workplace safety.
The only reason teachers stress safety is to 
reduce or eliminate their legal liability in 
case something happens.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 10
SN 10 People talking about safety is one thing; but 
practicing is another.
Talking about safety is one thing; 
practicing it is another.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 19
SN 12 People recognize that the workplace is a safer 
place to work than other organizations they 
have worked for.
This is a safer place to work than other 
companies I have worked for.
Safety Survey-Question 14
7. DSR's Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]
Eight (8) items [SR 01-08] to address "DSR's perceived 
safety responsibility" [SR]
SR01 As a DSR, I am clear about my safety 
responsibility for the department / office.
/ am clear about what my responsibilities 
are for health and safety.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 40
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SR02 As a DSR, I have to stop work if any imminent 
danger occurs.
______287
/ will stop the task if that presents potential 
serious safety or health hazard.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 77
SR03 As a DSR, I always point out any unsafe act or 
unsafe condition to people involved.
/ often point out unsafe situations to my 
friends.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 40
SR04 As a DSR, monitoring of individual's safety 
performance is part of my duty.
/ can influence health and safety 
performance here.
Safety Survey-Question - 29
SR08 "Health and Safety should be everybody's 
business".
Safety is everyone's business.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 47
8. DSR's Perceived Efficacy in Managing Safety [PE] 
Six (6) items [PE 01-06] to address "DSR's perceived 
efficacy in managing safety" [PE].
PE01 As a DSR, I am capable identifying safety 
hazards at the workplace.
I have known of situations where people 
have gotten hurt because they honestly did 
not know something was dangerous.
Seaboch (1994) - Appendix D: Item 14
PE02 As a DSR, I know what to do in case of an 
emergency (such as fire, chemical spill).
Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how 
to handle unforeseen dangerous situations 
safely.
Kam (2002) Appendix I: Item 33
287
Ippendices 288
Appendix II
A COMPLETE SET OF SELF-REPORTED "SAFETY ATTITUDES SURVEY" QUESTIONNAIRE 
WITH AN INTRODUCTORY LETTER PREPARED FOR PILOT SURVEY:
INTRODUCTORY LETTER:
Distribution to: All Departmental Safety Representatives (DSRs)
(Departmental Safety Officers, Deputy Departmental Safety 
Officers and staff members with duty of safety supervision)
From: LI Chi-moon, Health and Safety Officer, SEPO 
Date: 9 February 2006
SAFETY ATTITUDES SURVEY (PILOT TEST)
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For the research project of "THE EXPLORATION OF A SAFETY ATTITUDE
MODEL FOR DEPARTMENTAL SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES 
TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM IN AN INSTITUTE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION IN HONG KONG"
I am studying the course of PhD Education (Part-time) offered by the 
University of HULL, U.K. The purpose of the survey is to obtain feedback 
from departmental safety representatives (DSRs) about their attitudes towards 
to the implementation of safety management system at departmental level. 
Results of this survey will be used for my research study, and will also be made 
available to the Safety & Environmental Protection Office (SEPO) for reviewing 
the effectiveness of the current safety management system.
The questionnaire is divided into "PART A - Respondent's Data with 8 
items" and "PART B - Safety Attitudes Survey with 77 statements". Please try 
to answer all of the questions accurately to,the best of your judgment. The 
success of the survey depends on your contribution.
Please kindly return the questionnaire to me "C.M.LI - SEPO" by interna 
mail on or before 14 February 2006. All information will remain confidential
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Should you have any query about this survey, please feel free to contact me via
email "cmlsea@ust.hk". Many thanks for your kind assistance!
C.M.LI
SAFETY A TTITUDES SUR VEY
FOR THE RESEARCH PROJECT OF "The Exploration of a Safetv Attitude Model for 
Departmental Safetv Representatives Towards the Implementation Of A Safetv 
Management System in An Institute of Tertiary Education in Hong Kong
PART A: Respondent's Data
Please make a tick\r\ the appropriate box "n" that best describes your response
on each question.
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1. Gender:
p 1. Male 
a 2. Female
2. Which of the following best describes your position?
D 1. Researcher / Teaching Staff 
D 2. Engineer / Technical Staff 
D 3. Administrative / Clerical Staff
3. What is your role in the departmental/office: 
n 1. DSO 
a 2. Deputy DSO 
a 3. Staff member with duty of safety supervision
4. Age Group:
n1.(<21), p 2. (21-30), n 3. (31-40), 
n 4. (41-50), n 5. (51-60), D 6. (> 60)
5. Highest Educational Level Attained:
n 1. (Doctoral Degree), n 2. (Master's Degree), D 3. (Bachelor's 
Degree),
n 4. (Diploma), n 5. (Certificate)
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6. How long have you been employed in the organization?
n 1. (< 3 yrs), n 2. (3-5 yrs), a 3. (6-8 yrs), a 4. (9-11 yrs), a 5. (> 11
yrs)
7. How long have you been appointed as Departmental Safety
Representative?
n 1. (< 3 yrs), n 2. (3-5 yrs), n 3. (6-8 yrs), n 4. (9-11 yrs), a 5. (>11
yrs)
8. Department / Office:
"Optional")
_(Write it down,
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
1. Safety Management [SM]
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SM
01
SM
02
SM
03
SM
04
SM
05
SM
06
SM
07
A departmental safety management system
is fully developed in your department / office.
Safety procedures in your department are
easy to understand.
An emergency plan (such as chemical spill,
fire) is available in your department / office.
Safety procedure is frequently reviewed.
Workplace risk assessments have to be
reviewed by authorized persons on a
regularly basis.
People are always equipped with proper
tools and equipment to perform the job
safely.
Proper storage facility for dangerous
goods/chemical substances is provided.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
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SM
08
SM
09
SM
10
SM
11
SEPO safety manual provides useful
guidelines for users.
SEPO plays an active role in managing
safety in the campus.
"Accident prevention rather than cure" is the
main safety management strategy in your
department / office.
Departmental management only report
accident involving of lost-workday injury to
SEPO.
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
2. Perceived Management Commitment To Safety [MC]
MC
01
Departmental management visibly
demonstrates an interest in the safety
matters.
1 2 3 4 5 6
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MC
02
MC
03
MC
04
MC
05
MC
06
MC
07
MC
08
Departmental management clearly
considers the safety of people to be of great
importance.
Departmental management "turns a blind
eye" to things that are done in an unsafe
manner.
Departmental management encourages
people to report any unsafe act and unsafe
condition.
Departmental management always listens to
safety concerns from people.
Departmental management is concerned for
the operating cost more than safety.
Departmental management is always
provided with sufficient resources to let
people get the job done safely.
Safety is given high priority by the
departmental management.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
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3. Safety Communication [SC]
SC
01
SC
02
Safety meeting is conducted on a regularly
basis.
People are always informed of unsafe
practices.
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
SC
03
SC
04
SC
05
People are always informed of unsafe
conditions in the workplace.
People are welcome to share their safety
concerns with others.
People are freely making suggestions for
safety improvement.
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
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sc
06
SC
07
SC
08
SC
09
SC
10
Changes in working procedures and their
effect on safety are effectively
communicated to people involved.
Results of safety inspection are
communicated to the responsible parties for
follow up action.
Identified safety and health concerns are
addressed in a timely manner
Health and safety publications/magazines
are circulated for perusal.
Information regarding health and safety
training and seminar is provided.
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
4. DSR's Perceptions of Safety Training [ST]
ST
01
ST
02
Safety issues are given high priority in
training programs.
People are adequately trained to perform
their tasks safely.
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
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ST
03
Training need analysis has been conducted
for different trades.
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
ST
04
ST
05
ST
06
ST
07
ST
08
Safety training program offered by SEPO
meets with departmental training needs.
Safety training can positively change
people's attitudes towards safety.
Safety training can help to reduce accidents.
Safety rules have been clearly explained to
participants in the induction training.
Safety training can help to improve
individual's safety awareness.
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
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ST
09
ST
10
Safety training can help to improve
departmental safety performance.
A "Permit-to-work" system has been
introduced to participants in the induction
training.
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
5. DSR's Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation [PB]
PB
01
PB
02
PB
03
PB
04
Accidents are mainly due to a lack of safety
knowledge from people involved.
Accidents are mainly due to a lack of
working experiences from people involved.
Accidents are mainly due to poor attitudes
toward safety from people involved.
Accidents are mainly due to a lack of safety
supervision.
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
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PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
PB
05
PB
06
PB
07
PB
08
PB
09
PB
10
Accidents just happen, there is little one can
do to avoid them.
Accidents in the workplace are totally
unavoidable, because of "Acts of God"!
Lots of minor injuries are a sign that more
serious accidents could also occur.
It is necessary to "turn a blind eye" to rule
violations, if people involved are your
superior.
Safety is the management responsibility, not
others.
Safety is the responsibility of SEPO, not
others.
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
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6. DSR's Perceptions of Group Safety Norms [SN]
SN 
01
SN
02
SN
03
SN
04
SN
05
People would refuse to work, if proper 
personal protection equipment (PPE) is not
provided.
People would take every possible safety
measures to prevent accident.
People would take shortcuts to perform their
tasks naturally.
People would report any safety violation to
their supervisors.
People usually turn a 'blind eye' to unsafe
matters.
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
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SN
06
SN
07
SN
08
SN
09
SN
10
SN
11
SN
12
People are willing to report every workplace
injury to the departmental management
regardless of severity.
People have a clear picture of the risks
associated with their operations.
People are in favor of legislation to ensure
workplace safety.
People fear that there will be negative
consequences associated with reporting
errors to the departmental management.
People talking about safety is one thing; but
practicing is another.
People's attitude towards safety issues is
very positive.
People recognize that the workplace is a
safer place to work than other organizations
they have worked for.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
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SN
13
"Sanctions for mistakes" is widely accepted
by individuals.
SN
14
A "Blame Culture" is widely accepted in
your department / office.
6
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
7. DSR's Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]
SR
01
As a DSR, I am clear about my safety
responsibility for the department / office.
SR
02
As a DSR, I have to stop work if any
imminent danger occurs.
SR
03
As a DSR, I always point out any unsafe act
or unsafe condition to people involved.
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SR
04
SR
05
SR
06
SR
07
SR
08
As a DSR, monitoring of individual's safety
performance is part of my duty.
As a DSR, departmental safety is my
responsibility, not others.
As a DSR, conduct of the departmental
safety meeting is part of my duty.
As a DSR, providing safety information to
people involved is part of my duty.
"Health and Safety should be everybody's
business".
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
8. DSR's Perceived Efficacy in Managing Safety [PE]
PE
01
PE
02
As a DSR, I am capable identifying safety
hazards at the workplace.
As a DSR, I know what to do in case of an
emergency (such as fire, chemical spill).
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
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PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
PE
03
PE
04
PE
05
PE
06
As a DSR, 1 am adequately trained in
implementing the safety management
program.
As a DSR, 1 am capable of making
suggestions on relevant safety control
measures.
As a DSR, 1 know how to apply the
permit-to-work system in my department /
office.
As a DSR, 1 know how to conduct the
workplace risk assessment.
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
Remarks: Do you have any other comments about health and safety in your
workplace?
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Please check that you have answered all questions. Thank you very much for 
taking the time to complete the questionnaire. Your participation is highly 
appreciated!
Appendix III
A COMPLETE SET OF THE RESTRUCTURED SELF-REPORTED "SAFETY ATTITUDES 
SURVEY" QUESTIONNAIRE WITH AN INTRODUCTORY LETTER PREPARED FOR
FIELD SURVEY.
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INTRODUCTORY LETTER:
Distribution to: All Departmental Safety Representatives (DSRs)
(Departmental Safety Officers, Deputy Departmental Safety 
Officers and staff members with duty of safety supervision)
From: LI Chi-moon, Health and Safety Officer, SEPO 
Date: 15 May 2006
SAFETY ATTITUDES SURVEY
For the research project of "THE EXPLORATION OF A SAFETY ATTITUDE 
MODEL FOR DEPARTMENTAL SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES 
TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM IN AN INSTITUTE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION IN HONG KONG"
I am studying the course of PhD Education (Part-time) offered by the 
University of HULL, U.K. The purpose of the survey is to obtain feedback 
from departmental safety representatives (DSRs) about their attitudes towards 
the implementation of safety management system at departmental level. 
Results of this survey will be used for my research study, and will also be made 
available to the Safety & Environmental Protection Office (SEPO) for reviewing
307
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the effectiveness of the current safety management system.
The questionnaire is divided into "PART A - Respondent's Data with 8 
items" and "PART B - Safety Attitudes Survey with 43 statements". Please try 
to answer all of the questions accurately to the best of your judgment. The 
success of the survey depends on your contribution.
Please kindly return the questionnaire to me "C.M.LI - SEPO" by internal 
mail on or before 31 May 2006. All information will remain confidential. 
Should you have any query about this survey, please feel free to contact me via 
email "cmlsea@ust.hk". Many thanks for your kind assistance!
C.M.LI
SAFETY A TTITUDES SUR VEY
FOR THE RESEARCH PROJECT OF "The Exploration of a Safety Attitude Model for 
Departmental Safely Representatives Towards the Implementation Of A Safety 
Management System in An Institute of Tertiary Education in Hong Kons
PART A: Respondent's Data
Please make a tick\r\ the appropriate box "n" that best describes your response
on each question.
308
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3. Gender: 
n 1. Male 
n 2. Female
4. Which of the following best describes your position?
D 1. Researcher / Teaching Staff 
D 2. Engineer / Technical Staff 
D 3. Administrative / Clerical Staff
3. What is your role in the departmental/office: 
n 1. DSO 
n 2. Deputy DSO 
n 3. Staff member with duty of safety supervision
4. Age Group:
n1.(<21), n 2. (21-30), D 3. (31-40), 
n 4. (41-50), n 5. (51-60), a 6. (> 60)
5. Highest Educational Level Attained:
n 1. (Doctoral Degree), n 2. (Master's Degree), D 3. (Bachelor's 
Degree),
309
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n 4. (Diploma),
310
n 5. (Certificate)
6. How long have you been employed in the organization?
n 1. (< 3 yrs), n 2. (3-5 yrs), n 3. (6-8 yrs), n 4. (9-11 yrs), n 5. (> 11
yrs)
7. How long have you been appointed as Departmental Safety
Representative?
n 1. (< 3 yrs), n 2. (3-5 yrs), n 3. (6-8 yrs), n 4. (9-11 yrs), n 5. (>11
yrs)
8. Department / Office: .(Write it down,
"Optional")
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
1. Safety Management [SM]
310
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01 A departmental safety management system 
is fully developed in your department / office.
311
6
02 An emergency plan (such as chemical spill, 
fire) is available in your department / office.
03 Workplace risk assessments have to be
reviewed by authorized persons on a
regularly basis.
04 Proper storage facility for dangerous
goods/chemical substances is provided.
05 SEPO safety manual provides usefu
guidelines for users.
4
2. Perceived Management Commitment To Safety [MC]
06 Departmental management visibly
demonstrates an interest in the safety
matters.
07 Departmental management clearly
considers the safety of people to be of great
importance.
311
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08 Departmental management always listens to
safety concerns from people.
312
6
09 Departmental management is concerned for
the operating cost more than safety.
4
10 Departmental management is always
provided with sufficient resources to let
people get the job done safely.
11 Safety is given high priority by the
departmental management.
4
3. Safety Communication [SC]
12 Safety meeting is conducted on a regularly
basis.
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
13 People are always informed of unsafe
practices.
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14
15
People are always informed of unsafe
conditions in the workplace.
People are freely making suggestions for
safety improvement.
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
4. DSR's Perceptions of Safety Training [ST]
16
17
18
19
20
Safety issues are given high priority in
training programs.
Safety training can positively change
people's attitudes towards safety.
Safety training can help to reduce accidents.
Safety training can help to improve
individual's safety awareness.
Safety training can help to improve
departmental safety performance.
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
5. DSR's Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation [PB]
21 Accidents are mainly due to a lack of
working experiences from people involved.
1 2 3 4 5 6
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22
23
24
25
Accidents are mainly due to poor attitudes
toward safety from people involved.
Accidents just happen, there is little one can
do to avoid them.
Lots of minor injuries are a sign that more
serious accidents could also occur.
Safety is the responsibility of SEPO, not
others.
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6. DSR's Perceptions of Group Safety Norms [SN]
26 People would report any safety violation to 
their supervisors.
1 2 3 4 5 6
314
Appendices 315
27
28
29
30
31
People usually turn a 'blind eye' to unsafe
matters.
People are willing to report every workplace
injury to the departmental management
regardless of severity.
People have a clear picture of the risks
associated with their operations.
People are in favor of legislation to ensure
workplace safety.
People's attitude towards safety issues is
very positive.
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
7. DSR's Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]
32
33
As a DSR, I am clear about my safety
responsibility for the department / office.
As a DSR, I have to stop work if any
imminent danger occurs.
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
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34
35
As a DSR, monitoring of individual's safety
performance is part of my duty.
As a DSR, departmental safety is my
responsibility, not others.
PART B: Safety Attitudes Survey
Please indicate your level of agreement with each
of the statements in the table below by ticking the
appropriate box.
36
37
38
39
As a DSR, conduct of the departmental
safety meeting is part of my duty.
As a DSR, providing safety information to
people involved is part of my duty.
As a DSR, I am capable identifying safety
hazards at the workplace.
As a DSR, I know what to do in case of an
emergency (such as fire, chemical spill).
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
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8. DSR's Perceived Efficacy in Managing Safety [PE]
40
41
42
43
As a DSR, I am adequately trained in
implementing the safety management
program.
As a DSR, I am capable of making
suggestions on relevant safety control
measures.
As a DSR, I know how to apply the
permit-to-work system in my department /
office.
As a DSR, I know how to conduct the
workplace risk assessment.
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
,6
6
6
Remarks: Do you have any other comments about health and safety in your
workplace?
Please check that you have answered all questions. Thank you very much for
taking the time to complete the questionnaire. Your participation is highly
317
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appreciated!
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APPENDIX IV
DSRS SAFETY ATTITUDES SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE OPTIONS IN THE
FIELD SURVEY:
PART A: RESPONDENT'S DATA RESPONSE OPTIONS
1. Gender Male / Female
2. Nature of Position a 1. Researcher / Teaching Staff 
a 2. Engineer / Technical Staff 
D 3. Administrative / Clerical Staff
3. Role in the departmental/office
a 1. DSO, n 2. Deputy DSO
a 3. Staff member with duty of 
safety supervision
4. Age Group n1.(<21), a 2. (21-30), 
a 3. (31-40), n 4. (41-50), 
a 5. (51-60), a 6. (> 60)
5. Highest Educational Level Attained
a 1. (Doctoral Degree), 
a 2. (Master's Degree), 
a 3. (Bachelor's Degree), 
D 4. (Diploma), 
a 5. (Certificate)
6. How long have you been employed in the 
organization?
a1.(<3yrs), 
a 2. (3-5 yrs), 
a 3. (6-8 yrs), 
a 4. (9-11 yrs), 
a 5. (> 11 yrs)
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7. How long have you been appointed as Departmental 
Safety Representative?
8. Department / Office
PART B: SAFETY ATTITUDES SURVEY
1 . Safety Management [SM]
01
02
03
04
05
A departmental safety management system is fully 
developed in your department / office.
An emergency plan (such as chemical spill, fire) is 
available in your department / office.
Workplace risk assessments have to be reviewed by 
authorized persons on a regularly basis.
Proper storage facility for dangerous goods/chemical 
substances is provided.
SEPO safety manual provides useful guidelines for users.
a1.(<3yrs), 
a 2. (3-5 yrs), 
D 3. (6-8 yrs), 
n 4. (9-1 1 yrs), 
n5. (>11 yrs)
Optional
RESPONSE OPTIONS
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
2. Perceived Management Commitment To Safety [MC]
06
07
08
09
10
Departmental management visibly demonstrates an 
interest in the safety matters.
Departmental management clearly considers the safety of 
people to be of great importance.
Departmental management always listens to safety 
concerns from people.
Departmental management is concerned for the operating 
cost more than safety.
Departmental management is always provided with 
sufficient resources to let people get the job done safely.
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
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11 Safety is given high priority by the departmental 
management.
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
3. Safety Communication [SC]
12
13
14
15
Safety meeting is conducted on a regularly basis.
People are always informed of unsafe practices.
People are always informed of unsafe conditions in the 
workplace.
People are freely making suggestions for safety 
improvement.
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
4-.- DSR's Perceptions of Safety Training [ST]
16
17
18
19
20
Safety issues are given high priority in training programs.
Safety training can positively change people's attitudes 
towards safety.
Safety training can help to reduce accidents.
Safety training can help to improve individual's safety 
awareness.
Safety training can help to improve departmental safety 
performance.
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
5. DSR's Personal Beliefs in Accident Causation [PB]
21
22
23
24
25
Accidents are mainly due to a lack of working 
experiences from people involved.
Accidents are mainly due to poor attitudes toward safety 
from people involved.
Accidents just happen, there is little one can do to avoid 
them.
Lots of minor injuries are a sign that more serious 
accidents could also occur.
Safety is the responsibility of SEPO, not others.
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
6. DSR's Perceptions of Group Safety Norms [SN]
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26
27
28
29
30
31
People would report any safety violation to their 
supervisors.
People usually turn a 'blind eye' to unsafe matters.
People are willing to report every workplace injury to the 
departmental management regardless of severity.
People have a clear picture of the risks associated with 
their operations.
People are in favor of legislation to ensure workplace 
safety.
People's attitude towards safety issues is very positive.
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
7. DSR's Perceived Safety Responsibility [SR]
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
As a DSR, I am clear about my safety responsibility for 
the department / office.
As a DSR, I have to stop work if any imminent danger 
occurs.
As a DSR, monitoring of individual's safety performance 
is part of my duty.
As a DSR, departmental safety is my responsibility, not 
others.
As a DSR, conduct of the departmental safety meeting is 
part of my duty.
As a DSR, providing safety information to people involved 
is part of my duty.
As a DSR, I am capable identifying safety hazards at the 
workplace.
As a DSR, I know what to do in case of an emergency 
(such as fire, chemical spill).
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
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8. DSR's Perceived Efficacy in Managing Safety [PE]
40
41
42
43
As a DSR, I am adequately trained in implementing the 
safety management program.
As a DSR, I am capable of making suggestions on 
relevant safety control measures.
As a DSR, I know how to apply the permit-to-work system 
in my department / office.
As a DSR, I know how to conduct the workplace risk 
assessment.
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agr,ee
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